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I. Introduction
A. Cuba in Today's Policy Debate
Cuba, located ninety miles off the coast of Florida,' is the only
Communist country in the Western Hemisphere.2 It captivates the im-
agination of international policymakers as they try to predict what will
1. Trevor R. Jefferies, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: A Rottn Carrot and a
Broken Stick?, 16 Hous. J. ILr'L L. 75, 76 (1993).
2. Paul Bernstein, Cuba: Last Look at an Alternative Legal System?, 7 TEMP. INT'L &
Comp. L.J. 191, 191 (1993) (stating that "Yankee pundits point to Cuba a,, the last bastion
of communism").
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happen when Castro "falls" and when that might be.3 Former land-
owners seek to recover lost assets, or at least some measure of indem-
nification. 4 Development experts strategize ways to invigorate the
country's moribund economy.5 Pharmaceutical companies await
privatizations.6 Cuba's future depends, in part, on whatever changes
take place in Cuba's government. Cuba's future also depends, in part,
on existing law and current legal reforms. Perhaps foremost among
the current reforms being debated are the roles of tenure policy and
property law.
3. Tad Thompson, Agriculture Key to Cuba's Future, 4 INT'L PRODUCE J. 35, 35
(1995); INTmRNATIONAL REPuBLICAN INmsTrru CUBA TRANtsoN RF-souncE GUIE
(1995); Marifeli Perez, The Field of Cuban Studies, 26 LxrT Am. RESounCE GUIDE 239,
239-40 (1991) (noting that "[t]he Cuban Revolution never fails to arouse controversy. A
great schism divides its discussion: paradise or hell, progress or ruin, democracy or tranny.
Intellectual discourse on Cuba is rarely just about scholarship . .. ."). See Castro Takes
One More Step Toward Capitalism, EcoNo.TIsr, Sept. 9. 1995, at 45 (asking "if China's
leaders are finding it increasingly hard to keep capitalist economies out of communist poli-
tics, how long can Cuba's?"). Furthermore, according to press accounts, notable recent
visitors to Cuba investigating investment opportunities include billionaire John Kluge, Ted
Turner of CNN, and Robert Wright, NBC President. See Hugh Davies, Bankrupt Castro
Yields to Capitalism, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 8, 1995, at 14.
4. See, e.g., Rosalind Resnick, Bringing the Law Back Home: Cuban Exiles Prepare
For the Day Castro Falls, NAT'L LJ., June 28, 1993, at 1, 35.
5. The U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, created a Cuba
Task Force in 1995 to study potential scenarios in any "Free Cuba." In the past year,
representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) met with Cuban officiaLs to
discuss how the ]MF and Vorld Bank could help the economy make a transition from
communism's central planning. See Suzanne Bilello, U.S. Companies Look Again to Cuba,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 20, 1994, at 106. Reportedly, a confidential report issued after a Novem-
ber IMF visit criticized the embargo. Id.
6. The pharmaceutical and tourism sectors are the two main areas in which letters of
intent have been signed with the Cuban government to undertake new investments once
the embargo is lifted. See Michael Becker, Cuba Woos 'Top' U.S. Firms Eager to Invest,
Mama HERALD, Apr. 11, 1995, at A6. After developing a number of .accines and
medicines Cuba's biotechnology industry has attracted the attention of several major drug
companies. Id. Observers see pharmaceutical companies making a big push to provide
medical supplies in Cuba. See Mary Romano, Growing Number of U.S. Companies Pre-
pare for Future Business With Cuba, VALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1994, at B5. Both Merck & Co.
and Johnson & Johnson have said that they have visited the island. Id. According to a
company spokesperson, Eli Lilly & Co. has recently made a S1,7 million donation of insu-
lin and antibiotics to Cuba, and contributed $1.2 million in a previous donation in January.
Id. The United States permits these types of humanitarian donations. Id. Furthermore, in
October 1995, 60 top U.S. corporate executives flew to Cuba on a fact finding %isit. U.S.
Executives Head for Cuba, Fir. Temis, Oct. 7, 1995, at 3. The executives, representing
more than 40 major U.S. business corporations, attended a dinner with Fidel Castro and
questioned him about politics, economics, and his own personal views. World News High-
lights, European Community Report, Reuters, Oct. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Reuee File.
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Cuba's relationship with the United States has been long and tu-
multuous. In response to the expropriation of more than US$1.8 bil-
lion worth of U.S. property in Cuba, President John F. Kennedy
imposed a trade embargo on Cuba on February 6, 1962.1 In enacting
the embargo, President Kennedy relied on the Foreign A.sistance Act
of 1961 that deals specifically with the restitution of confiscated prop-
erty.8 This property confiscated by Cuba over thirty years ago is now
valued at close to US$6 billion.9
In a major change in Cuban policy, foreign investment in Cuba
has recently been welcomed.' ° Over the past two or three years, for-
eign investment in tourism, mining, and, most recently, agriculture
have begun to increase." Canadian entrepreneurs in particular have
begun massive investments in Cuba, especially in the oil and mineral
sector.' In 1994, Cuba's first large-scale privatization since 1959 re-
sulted in a $1.4 billion investment by Domos International, a Mexican
investment group.' 3 In this venture, the group agreed to renovate
Cuba's telephone system in exchange for a forty-nine percent share in
the state telecommunications concern, ETEC.' 4 That same year, in-
vestment groups in Israel and Chile began investing in Cuban citrus
7. Jason S. Bell, Comment, Violation of International Law and Doomed U.S. Policy:
An Analysis of the Cuban Democracy Act, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 77, 81 (1993).
8. Tom Carter, Cuba Unlikely To Be Next Trading Partner for U.S, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1994, at A10.
9. Hearing on Free Trade with Cuba Act Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures and Trade of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 47
(Mar. 17, 1994) (testimony of Robert Menendez, New Jersey Congressman).
10. Cuban Decree No. 50, promulgated in 1982, allowed for foreign c-pital investment
in Cuba. See Victor Figueroa Albelo, La Reforma Econ6mica en Cuba y Sus Direcci6nes
Principales, CoTrmApuwro, May 1995, at 41. This policy was ratified by Party Resolution
in 1991. Id. A London-based investment manager is planning to create a $50 million fund
to immediately start investing in Cuba. See London-Based Find Plans to Invest in Cuba,
MIAMI HERAL.D, Oct. 24, 1994, at C1. Beta Funds Ltd., which already manages funds for
Vietnam and Poland, has set up what it claims is the first foreign investment management
company on the island, Havana Asset Management. Id.
11. William A. Messina, Jr., Presentation at the Library of Congress in Washington
D.C. (May 17, 1995) (presentation by Mr. Messina, the Executive Coordinator of Interna-
tional Agricultural Trade and Development Center at the University of Florida's Institute
of Food and Agricultural Sciences) (notes from presentation on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Messina Presentation]. For a discussion of private restaurants in Cuba, see Douglas
Farah, Cuba's Revolutionary Restaurants: Private Eateries, Catering to Local Clientele, Are
Faring Well, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1995, at A28.
12. Peter Benesh, Canadian Trade with Cuba Growing: U.S. Embargo is Helping by
Pushing Business Opportunities North, STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 16, 1993, at 8D.
13. Noll Scott, Informality Belies the Castro Message, GUARDIAN, Jun- 17, 1994, at 13.
14. Sarah Cameron, Cuba, 1995 BRrrANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 397, 398 (1995).
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productions." Because of this foreign investment, Cuba has improved
both the quality and the timing of its citrus production and is compet-
ing commercially with Florida in places such as Europe and Japan. 16
In the agricultural sector, several foreign groups have provided
investments. For example, investment groups from Spain and Greece
have formed a consortium to invest in citrus. 17 Canadian and French
investment groups are investing in sugar, and the Spanish are invest-
ing in Cuban tobacco production.s Canadians are very much in-
volved in petroleum sector investments. 19 There are currently 212
joint venture enterprises for foreign investment.2 0 Nevertheless, ana-
lysts suggest that export volumes from these investments will not have
any substantial effect on the general foreign exchange picture, because
most of the foreign investment has been funneled toward production
rather than hard assets. 2 This uneven investment is fueled by inves-
tor concerns regarding the high risk of expropriation in Cuba.Y
Other communist countries have made the transition to private
land ownership. For example, in Eastern Europe, little analysis of the
property question was carried out before the changes in government.
When the changes came, they took donor agencies and host govern-
ments by surprise, leaving no established strategy for addressing ten-
ure issues. While substantial literature exists regarding privatization
and resolution of American claims against Cuba for expropriation of
property, most of it is of an advocacy nature rather than objective.
Little else on general development strategies or tenure policy exists.
15. Larry Luxner, Israelis Invest in Citrus Operation, THE PCKER, Dec. 25, 1995, at
6C.
16. Messina Presentation, supra note 11. The Israeli investment is a joint venture %%ith
the largest state citrus enterprise, "Jaguey Grante," covering 40,000 hectares. See Hearing
on Agricultural Implications of Renewed Trade with Cuba Before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Agriculture and Hunger Comm. on Agricultur4 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 8. 10 (May 19,1994)
(testimony of Carmen Diana Deere. Professor of Economics and Director of the Latin
American Studies Program at University of Massachusetts, Amherst) [hereinafter Deere
Testimony]. This is a $22 million operation. ld.
17. Castro Says Approval of Investments Will Be 'Flexible' but Subject to Scrutiny,
BBC SusirARY OF o.RLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 6,1995, available in LEXIS. New3 Library,
Bbcwb File.
18. Messina Presentation, supra note 11.
19. Id.
20. See Peter Benesh, Canadians Profit from Connection with Cuba, ST. PL-rmRsBuG
Tvms, Sept. 12,1993, at I. Canadian oil and gas companies are helping Cubans find their
own sources of energy and providing the technology for Cuba to refine the sulfur-laden
"heavy" oil it does have. Id.
21. Messina Presentation, supra note 11.
22. Id.
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This Article seeks to address property ownership from a broader,
objective view, providing a panorama of property law in Cuba that
includes a general discussion of agrarian reform, property registries,
and the property claims dispute with the United States. The Article
then discusses possible issues that Cuba will need to resolve. The Ar-
ticle does not attempt to lay out a "master plan" for property in
Cuba2 or to record a history of expropriations and their possible reso-
lution.24 Instead, it attempts to summarize the past and present state
of Cuban property law and flag issues that the Cuban government
should address in reforming this system. How these issues are re-
solved will be a matter of participatory negotiation and diplomacy,
both within Cuba and internationally. It is hoped that this Article will
contribute to this discussion and provide the information base needed
to begin that process.
B. Property as a Key Constraint and the Key Tool
to Development
Land policy is directly related to the goals of privte investors.
These concerns include broadly based economic growth, the global
environment, democracy, food and disaster assistance, and the stabili-
zation of world population growth.25 Consequently, tenure policy re-
form is a critical element in economic revitalization. Mark Schneider,
the Assistant Administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), has argued unequivocally:
One only has to look at the tragedy of events in Chiapas [Mlexico] to
illustrate the gravity of failing to address land security for the poor.
There are also few issues as potentially destructive to our hopes for
consolidating democracy and achieving sustainable development
than the denial of access to land and property right; for the
poor.... Formalizing land ownership gives a sense of purpose, a
stake in society and a seat in the community council. It also is the
key to unlocking the door to rural credit, to new technology and to
23. In proposing reforms in the British constitution, the Economist explained that
"[o]ur goal is not to write a blueprint. That would be to side with angry uncompromisers
bearing final solutions. It is, rather, to show that Britain's constitution does need repairing,
and to offer some ideas for putting it right." Reclaiming Britain's Constitution, ECONO.
MIsT, Oct. 14, 1995, at 18. This Article seeks to accomplish the same by offering sugges-
tions for "repairing" Cuba's legal structure.
24. This topic is handled skillfully elsewhere. See, e.g., Matias F. Travieso-Dfaz, Some
Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims
Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'. Bus. L. 217, 220 (1995).
25. See generally Steven E. Hendrix, Tenure, LAC TEcH BULLETIN (USAID Agricul-
ture and Rural Development Technical Services (LAC TECH) project), Sept. 1994 at 1, 2.
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the infrastructure for rural development.... USAID is pledged ...
to promote land security for the poor... .26
The agriculture sector is critical to the health of the Cuban econ-
omy. Until 1989, eighty-five percent of foreign exchange was gener-
ated by the agriculture sector.27 In 1995, at least eighty percent of
foreign exchange was generated in agriculture, while tourism contrib-
uted about ten percent.S Consequently, agriculture and tenure policy
continue to be intimately related to general macroeconomic perform-
ance in Cuba.
Cuba maintains a large, affluent exile community in Miami. As a
result, Cuba enjoys much greater economic strength than, for exam-
ple, Nicaragua.29 This may translate into greater potential for priva-
tization or investment should there be a change in policy between
Havana and Washington.30 New foreign investment industries may
also contribute if conditions are favorable. However, such investment
would have to be predicated on reassurances of private property
rights.3'
II. Cuban Property Law
A. Constitutional and Civil Code Provisions
1. Historical Perspective: The Roots of Current Cuban
Property Law
The original Cuban Constitution dates from 1901,-22 and contains
a strong provision on protection of private property. "No one shall be
26. Mark Schneider, Presentation at the conference, Property for the Poor: 'The Path
to Development in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 12, 1994) (presentation by Mr. Schneider, As-
sistant Administrator for Latin America at USAID) (notes from presentation on file with
author) [hereinafter Schneider Presentation]. The reference to Chiapas relates to a peas-
ant uprising in southern Mexico that began on January 1, 1994. Id. Two of the main issues
in that uprising were land rights and inequitable land distribution in the state of Chiapas.
Id
27. Messina Presentation, supra note 11.
28. Id.
29. David Willig, Presentation at the Organization of American States in Washington,
D.C. (Sept. 18, 1992) (notes from presentation on file with author) [hereinafter Willig
Presentation].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. More technically, there were several "Cuban Constitutions" while the Spanish still
controlled the island. However, this legal history is beyond the scope of this Article.
Readers interested in earlier constitutional and quasi.constitutional arrangements should
refer to William T. D'Zurilla, Comment, Cuba's 1976 Constitution and the Fidehsta Inter-
pretation of Cuban Constitutional History, 55 TuLiNE L. RE%,. 1223, 1225-32 (1981).
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deprived of his property, except by competent authority, upon proof
that the condemnation is required by public utility, and previous in-
demnification. If the indemnification is not previously paid, the courts
shall protect the owners and, if needed, restore to them the
property. '33
As Cuban governments haphazardly enforced the 1901 Constitu-
tion with increasing inconsistency, observers in both Cuba and the
United States began to doubt the existence of any legitimate constitu-
tional rule.34 Despite improvements in Cuba's standard of living dur-
ing this period, political instability hindered socioeconomic advances
and "created a sense of dissatisfaction with the overall status of indi-
vidual rights on the island. '35 During the 1920s and 1930.,, a period of
considerable turmoil, political and academic leaders began to debate
how to create a national, social, and economic commitment.3 6 These
political and academic leaders "created popular support for the crea-
tion of a new constitution that would reflect the progressive values of
its citizens."'37
Between 1934 and 1940, Fulgencio Batista y Zaldfvar was in com-
mand of the Army and effectively ruled the country.38 He overpow-
ered a series of politically weak presidents whom he replaced
whenever they refused to agree with his recommendations. 39 In 1939,
Batista attempted to improve Cuban relations with the international
community by allowing Cubans to elect delegates for a new constitu-
tional assembly "that would consolidate and formalize the gains the
revolutionary government achieved. '40 The people of Cuba chal-
lenged Batista to implement a new constitution; in response, after
winning the Cuban presidency he promulgated a new constitution on
July 5, 1940.41 From 1940 to 1944, Batista served as a constitutionally
elected president. The new constitution required a lapse of eight
years before a president could seek a second term, so Batista did not
33. See Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 228 (quoting and discussing CONSrITUCION DE
1901 art. 32 (Cuba) [hereinafter 1901 CONsrTrUtON]).
34. ld.
35. Jonathan Wachs, Comment, Reviving the 1940 Cuban Constitution: Arguments for
Social and Economic Rights in a Post-Castro Government, 10 Am. U. J. Irrr'L L. & PoL'Y
525, 540 (1994).
36. IcL
37. ld.
38. MARIO LAzo, AMERICAN PoLIcY FAILURES IN CUBA: DAGGER IN THE HEARTI 59
(1968).
39. Wachs, supra note 35, at 543.
40. Id at 542-43.
41. Id. at 543.
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run for re-election in 1944.42 Between 1944 and 1948 Grau San Mar-
tin, considered the most incompetent and corrupt president in Cuban
history, served as president.43 This period was followed by the presi-
dency of Carlos Prfo Socarr.s from 1948 to 1952, which was also
marked by financial scandals.44 After being out of office for eight
years, Batista returned to power illegally and held it illegally until he
was constitutionally elected in 1954 as the only candidate s He re-
mained President of Cuba until replaced by Fidel Castro on January 1,
1959. 6
Batista's November 1939 decision to hold elections for a constitu-
tional convention greatly enhanced his popularity. 7 Since 1940, Cuba
has had four constitutions: the 1940 Constitution, the 1959 Fundamen-
tal Law, the 1976 Constitution, and the 1992 Constitution.
Social and economic guarantees are prominent in the provisions
of the 1940 Constitution.4s Of the 286 articles, 61 dealt with social and
economic issues.49 Several provisions from the 1940 Constitutions"
addressed property concerns, including Article 24 of the 1940 Consti-
tution which prohibited confiscations of property.51 That provision
stated:
42. LAZO, supra note 38, at 79.
43. Id. at So.
44. Id- at 84.
45. Id. at 92.
46. Id
47. Id at 73.
48. See Arturo Fournier F., El Nuevo Deredco Agrario en Cuba, 31 REVISTA DE
CmNCAs JURIDICAS 72, 73 (1977) (citing CO5STrUCI6N DE 1940 (G.O. No. 464, July S.
1940) (Cuba) [hereinafter 1940 CoNsrrrrtmoN]). See also Wachs, supra note 35, at 543
(discussing these provisions).
49. LAzo, supra note 38, at 74.
50. See Fournier F., supra note 4S, at 73.
51. Id. (quoting 1940 CoNsrrrnoN art. 24) (translation by author). By definition,
confiscation is the taking back of property gained from an illicit activity, while expropria-
tion is the taking of property for a public purpose with indemnification. The use of the
word "confiscation" is significant. Unlike the word "expropriation," confiscation implies
that the former owner will not be compensated, because the property being taken was
illegally acquired. Cuba has often been compared to Nicaragua in terms of confiscated
assets. Nicaraguan Sandinista reform of property law began July 19, 1979 with the confis-
cation of property belonging to Somoza. Steven E. Hendrix, Property Law Innoration in
Latin America with Recommendations, 18 B.C. INT'L & Co. L. RE%, 1, 17 (1995).
Presumably, the property was acquired illegally and was simply being returned to its
rightful owners. See Decreto No. 172 (1979) (Nicar.). One law, signed by Daniel Ortega S.
and Violeta B. de Chamorro, among others, authorized the Procurador General de Justicia
(the Attorney General) to confiscate all goods belonging to Somoza's family, military offi-
cials, and other functionaries that were abandoned in the country after December, 1977.
Decreto No. 3 (1977) (Nicar.) [hereinafter Decree No. 3]. The Attorney General's confis-
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Confiscation of property is prohibited. No one can be deprived of
their property except by competent judicial authority and for the
justified cause of public or social utility, and always after payment
of the corresponding indemnification in cash, as judicially deter-
mined. Non-compliance with these requirements will not change
the right of the individual whose property has been expropriated to
be protected by the courts, and, if the case so requires, to have their
property restored.
The reality of the cause of public utility or social interest, and
the necessity for expropriation, will be decided by the courts in case
of a challenge.52
Article 87 of the 1940 Constitution recognized the existence of
private property within the broader framework of a "social function"
of land. 3 This Article acknowledges the fact that Latin American
countries generally recognize a social function for land, as distinct
from the concept of land as strictly an economic resource.5 4 This so-
cial function is considered a fundamental aspect of Latin American
cation powers were extended to goods belonging to personas allegadas (the followers) of
Somoza. Decreto No. 38 (1979) (Nicar.) [hereinafter Decree No. 38]. This decree was also
signed by Daniel Ortega, Violeta B. de Chamorro, and others. Decree No. 38 was later
suspended as of August 8, 1979. The vague wording of this decree, allowing for confisca-
tion of property from any "follower" of Somoza, may have lead to muc1 abuse.
52. Ld. This Article of the Constitution provides the following:
La confiscaci6n de ]a propiedad esti prohibida. Ninguno puede ser privado de ]a
suya a menos que sea por autoridad judicial competente y por causa justificada de
utilidad ptlblica o social, y siempre previo pago de ]a indemnizaci6n cor-
respondiente en efectivo, fijada judicialmente. El no cumplimiento de estos re-
quisitos no determinard el derecho de la persona cuya propiedad ha sido
expropiada, a ser protegido por las cortes, y, si el caso asf lo demandar, a tener
restitufda su propiedad.
La realidad de ]a causa de utilidad ptiblica o interds social, y ia necesidad de
expropiaci6n, serdn decididos por las cortes en caso de impugnaci6n.
Id. Compare this provision with Article 106 of the Constitution of El Salvador. CONsTrru.
c1ON art. 106 (El Sal.) (1983) available in <http.//www.georgetown.edu/LatAmerPolitical/
constitutions> (prohibiting confiscation, permitting expropriation for public utility or social
interest, and underscoring the need for compensation for such governmert actions). How-
ever, the Constitution of El Salvador limits properties to 245 hectares and requires that
properties comply with the social function. Id. art. 105.
53. LEONEL.o CHUMINATrO C., LEY DE REFORMA AGRARIA EN CUBA Y EL
PRoYEcro DE LEY CHILENO 34-35 (1964) (quoting the 1940 CONSrTITUON art. 87). The
1940 Constitution was heavily influenced by the 1917 Mexican Constitution, the 1918 Ger-
man (Weimar) Constitution, and the 1931 Spanish Constitution. See D'Zurilla, supra note
32, at 1237. For a general discussion of the Mexican Constitution's approach to the social
function of land, agrarian reform, and expropriations, see Hendrix, supra note 51, at 27-38.
For a discussion of the German and Spanish Constitutions in relation to the social function
of land, see id at 8 n.41.
54. See Hendrix, supra note 51, at 7-8 (describing constitutional provisions across
Latin America and the Caribbean).
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constitutional law,5" and is found in standard Latin American jurispru-
dence and doctrine. It embodies a national struggle against large
estates and feudalistic land distribution, and envisions an agrarian pol-
icy in favor of the resource poor? Defining land in terms of its social
function implies that the person who personally and directly works the
land owns it.5s
Article 90 of the 1940 Constitution allowed for size restrictions
against large farms and against foreign ownership of land.5 9 It stated:
Large estates are illegal and to effect their elimination, the Law vil
set forth the maximum expanse of property that each person or en-
tity can possess (for each type of use that land is dedicated to, tak-
ing into account respective peculiarities).
The Law will restrictively limit the acquisition and possession
of land by persons and foreign companies and adopt measures that
require the land to revert to Cubans. 60
55. For an introduction to the social function of land and relevant Civil Code doctrine,
see RAMON VICEMNrE CASANOVA, DERECHO AGRARiO 3748 (1990).
56. This is the concept of "land to the tiller" or "tierra a quien la trabaia" found in
many jurisdictions. See, e.g., CoNSTrrUcaON arts. 165, 166 (Bol.).
57. Id- See also Ley de Reforma Urbana whereas cl. 1 (G.O., Oct. 14, 1960) (Cuba)
(extending the social function of land to housing) [herinafter Urban Reform Law]. Inter-
estingly, the NAFrA-era amendment to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution also pro-
hibits large estates. See CONST1TUCI(N tit. I, art. 1, § 27 (Mex.).
58. However, this owner is distinct from the documentary owner, who ceases to own
the land if his or her use does not conform to the social function. This concept is codified in
the current Cuban Constitution. CONsrrruc6N DE 1992 art. 24 (Cuba) avaiable in <htnpl
www.georgetown.edu/LatAmerPoliticallconstitutions> [hereinafter 1992 COznS-
TUTIONI.
59. See Cratilio R. Navarrete Acevedo, Apuntes Sobre Derecho Agrario Cubano 77
(1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Land Tenure Center Library, University of
Wisconsin) (quoting and discussing 1940 CoNsrrnmroN art. 90); see also CHIUMIMATro C.,
supra note 53, at 35 (same). Such restrictions against latiflindia, or large estates, are very
common in Latin America. See Hendrix, supra note 51, at 7-11. Furthermore, in places
like Peru, which have recently enacted legislation aimed at encouraging foreign invest-
ment, some restrictions remain. Id. at 25.
60. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 76-77 (quoting 1940 Co-rTnioN. art.
90) (translation by author). Article 90 of the Constitution provides the following:
Se proscribe el latifundio y a los efectos de su disaparicitin la Ley seflalard el
mdximo de extensi6n de la propiedad que cada persona o entidad pueda poseer
(para cada tipo de explotaci6n a que la tierra se dedique y tomando en cuenta las
respectivas peculiaridades).
La Ley limitard restrictivamente la adquisici6n y posesi6n de la tierra por
personas y compafifas extranjeras y adoptard medidas que tienen a revertir la
tierra al cubano.
Id; see also ORLANDo VALD s GAgcfA, LA SOCAzC16N DE LA TIEP.RA EN CUBA 4
(1990) (discussing this provision) [hereinafter VAt.nts GARCIA, SOcIALIZAC6N]. Fidel
Castro noted Article 90 in his famous speech entitled "La historia me absolver.1" ("-History
will absolve me") in which he stated that the new revolutionary government would transfer
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Article 91 of the 1940 Constitution permitted the paternal family
head who occupied, cultivated, and directly exploited a farm of 2000
pesos or less to declare the land "irrevocable family property."'61
Other provisions in the 1940 Constitution required the nation to "em-
ploy the resources within its reach to furnish employmert to everyone
who lacks it" and to assure workers "the economic conditions neces-
sary to a fulfilling existence." 62
Before 1959, Article 349 of the Civil Code contemplated expro-
priation of privately-owned property, provided there was prior indem-
nification and the property was for a "public use."63 For example, in
1958, the rebel movement promulgated Law Number 3, the first revo-
lutionary piece of agrarian legislation.' 4 That legislation allowed oc-
cupants of up to two caballerias of land to become owners of that land
without payment.6 5 The State then promised indemnification to the
former owners.6 6 Where there was a group of occupants possessing
between two and five caballerfas, the occupants could receive the first
two caballerias free, and then demand the owner to sell the rest to the
occupant, up to a maximum of five caballerias67 Law Number 3 also
promulgated the following regulations: (a) forbade corporate owner-
ship (except by a "matrimonial society" or married couple, or by an
agrarian cooperative); (b) eliminated divisibility of land; (c) prohib-
ited transfers of land except for inheritance, transfers of land to the
state, trades authorized by the state, and public auctions in certain
cases; (d) permitted inheritance by only a single heir (or to a commu-
nity of heirs who would retain the property in indivisible form), or sale
in a public auction; (e) limited auction participants to qualified agri-
cultural workers or farmers, with rights of first refusal being granted
to the state; and (f) promoted state financed agricultural credit. s
lands to peasant occupants, paying indemnification to former owners equal to 10 years'
rental payments. See id. at 5; Orlando Vald~s Garcfa, Antecedentes Jurfdicos de la Revoht-
ci6n Agraria en Cuba, 26 DERECHO Y REFORMA AGRAIA REvSTA 109, 109-110 (1995)
[hereinafter Vald~s Garcfa, Antecedentes].
61. See CHuMiNATro C., supra note 53, at 35 (quoting 1940 CONs'ITrnoN art. 91).
62. See D'ZurilIa, supra note 32, at 1228 (citing 1940 CONSTTUTION art. 60 and substi-
tuting the word "fulfilling" for the word "fitting" in the translation).
63. Willig Presentation, supra note 29.
64. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 82 (quoting Ley No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1958)
(Cuba) [hereinafter Law No. 3]). As Law No. 3 was a rebel pronouncement, it was not
printed in the official gazette. It is sometimes referred to as Ley No. 3 de la Sierra (Law
No. 3 of the Mountains). See Fournier F., supra note 48, at 77.
65. Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 82. 1 caballerta = 13.4 hectares = 33 acres.
66. l
67. Id.
68. Id at 82-83.
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On March 10, 1952, towards the end of Carlos Prio's term as
President, Batista executed a military coup d'6tat.69 On April 4, 1952,
Batista's government issued a Constitutional Act that was to govern
the country.70 Nevertheless, at times throughout his tenure, constitu-
tional guarantees were entirely suspended.71 Batista's coup and the
suspension of constitutional guarantees served to break the legal con-
tinuity of the political system that was created with the enactment of
the 1940 Constitution. In response, many opposition groups were
established, including the 26th of July Movement, named after the as-
sault led by Fidel Castro on the Moncada military barracks in the Cu-
ban province of Oriente on July 26, 1953 73 Because of Batista's
suspension of all constitutional guarantees, restoration of the 1940
Constitution became a unifying goal among groups opposing BatistaZ4
Many Cubans viewed the creation of the 1940 Constitution as
"one of the most distinguished moments in Cuban history."75 Indeed,
it marked an important step in Cuba's progress toward democracy,
even though in practice it was never fully implemented." It was the
first Cuban national charter "created by a diverse representation of
the population without any influence from a foreign nation.""7 How-
ever, to fully implement its provisions, the government was required
to spend vast amounts of scarce financial resources. Cuban leaders
found it difficult to honor constitutional guarantees while also pro-
moting the prosperity of the nation.7s Consequently, many leaders ig-
nored these rights and Batista formally suspended the entire 1940
Constitution between 1952 and 1954.Y9 As a result, administration of
the relevant constitutional provisions was inconsistent; many Cubans
believed their social and economic rights, at least while Batista was in
power, were legitimate but unenforceable83 Indeed each of the three
presidents between 1940 and 1952 (Batista, Grau San Martin, and Prfo
69. Ignacio E. Sanchez, Cuban Property Rights and /ho 1940 Constinuton. 3 J. TrAr s
NAT'L L. & PoL'Y 135, 135 (1994).
70. Id. at 142.
71. Id.
72. 1d.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Wachs, supra note 35, at 544.
76. LAzo, supra note 3S, at 75.
77. Wachs, supra note 35, at 544.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Socarris) violated provisions of the 1940 Constitution." In particular,
Grau openly flaunted his disregard for the constitution.82
One author suggests that the 1940 Constitution attempted to in-
crease judicial independence by addressing the problem of presiden-
tial control over the appointment of justices.8 3 However, the effort
was not entirely successful because "the administration of justice con-
tinued to be subject to the problems and pressures arising from a pa-
tronage system and the general level of political morality."8" The
police did little to ameliorate this situation; although police were con-
sidered "reasonably efficient" in carrying out their regular police du-
ties, they were "subjects of patronage and favoritism, especially where
Havana's gambling and prostitution businesses were concerned."'85
Unemployment and underemployment increased throughout the
1940s and 1950S.86 By 1956 and 1957, the unemployment rate reached
a combined total of about thirty percent of the labor fo:rce.87 During
the early 1950's, Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, ardent nationalist, and
former student agitator, was extremely vocal in his hostility towards
the Batista government. Castro's rise to popularity in the 1950s oc-
curred largely because "he presented his movement to the Cuban peo-
ple as the legitimate heir of the 1933 Revolution and the 1940
Constitution."8 In a famous speech given to defend himself at trial
for his assault on Batista's military barracks, Castro made an impas-
sioned plea in favor of Cuba's social and economic goal s.89 After his
rebel movement solidified several years later, Castro formally de-
clared that his movement "foresees the establishment of an order in
which all the inalienable rights of a human being-political, social,
economic, and cultural-will be fully met and guaranteed." 9
Castro became prominent in Cuba in 1958.91 By 1957, the Cuban
economy had reached record heights, while that same year a pro-Cas-
81. LAZO, supra note 38, at 75.
82. Id.
83. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 193.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. CARMELO MESA-LAGo, THE LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT,
AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT IN CUBA: 1899-1970 28 (1972) [hereinafter MES;A-LAGo, LABOR
FORCE].
87. Id.
88. Wachs, supra note 35, at 545.
89. Vald6s Garcfa, Antecedentes, supra note 60, at 111.
90. Wachs, supra note 35, at 545.
91. LAZO, supra note 38, at 146.
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tro press campaign had begun in the United States.' U.S. Embassy
political aides and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advisors sided
with Castro, equating Batista with evil and Castro with good.9 On
March 14,1958, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Cuba.
Castro announced "total war" on the Batista regime on March 17,
1958, despite having fewer than two hundred men in its command. '
Although Batista reinstated constitutional guarantees on January 25,
1958, a campaign of bombing and arson led the government to again
suspend these guarantees on March 12, 1958.9- Similarly, general
elections were postponed from June 1 to November 3, 1958, with Cas-
tro calling for the assassination of all candidates2 6 Under accusations
of voter fraud, the government's candidate, Dr. Andr6s Rivero, was
declared the victor.97 Diplomatically, the United States began to tell
Batista to leave the country, which he did on New Year's Eve, 1958,
leaving Castro the island.9s
Following Batista's abdication of power, Manuel Urrutia became
President of Cuba,99 The first amendment to the 1940 Constitution
was published on January 13, 1959.10 This amendment introduced the
use of constituent power by the Council of Ministers.""l In effect, it
gave the Council of Ministers the right to amend the Constitution in
derogation of the requirements set forth in Articles 285 and 286.t )
Using the constituent power, the Council of Ministers, as part of that
first amendment, modified Article 24.103 The revised Article read as
follows:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. However, confiscation is au-
thorized in the case of property of natural persons or corporate bod-
ies liable for offenses against the national economy or the public
92. Id. at 151.
93. Id. at 152. Even Richard Nixon noted Castro's favorable press, acknoledging
that Castro was viewed as the leader of a successful revolution against a right-%%ing dicta-
tor. See RcHARD NIXON, THE MEMoiRs OF RicARD NLXON 201-02 (1978). Most of thu
U.S. Department of State's Latin American experts were ready to recognize Castro in
leadership. Id. Nixon himself believed Castro to be "either incredibly naive about com-
munism or under Communist discipline." Id.
94. LAZO, supra note 38, at 156-57.
95. Id at 158-59.
96. Id. at 168.
97. Id at 168-69.
98. Id at 178.
99. Sanchez, supra note 69, at 143.
100. Id
101. Id
102. Id.
103. Id at 140.
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treasury committed during the tyranny which ended on December
31, 1958, as well as in the case of property of the tyrant and his
collaborators. No one can be deprived of his property except by
competent judicial authority and for a justified cause of public util-
ity or social interest, and always after payment of the corresponding
indemnity in cash, as fixed by a court ....'4
2. The Fundamental Law
Later that same year, a new constitutional framework, called the
Fundamental Law, came into effect, repeating provisions from the
1940 Constitution regarding property ownership.10 5 The new Article
87, like Article 87 of the 1940 Constitution, recognized the social func-
tion of land."° This new framework was followed several months
later by the first agrarian reform law. 7 Property immediately confis-
cated by the new Castro government included the following: "prop-
104. ld.
105. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 84 (quoting and discussing Ley Funda-
mental de 1959 (G.O., Feb. 7, 1959) (Cuba) [hereinafter 1959 Fundamental Law]). One of
the goals of Castro's revolution was the restoration of the 1940 Constitution, which Batista
had suspended. See William R. Baerg, Comment, Judicial Institutionalization of the
Revolution: the Legal Systems of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Cuba,
15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMNP. L. J. 233,248 (1992). Instead, Castro passed the 1959 Funda-
mental Law. Id. As a result, some observers questioned whether Ca'atro had complied
with his promise. D'Zurilla, supra note 32, at 1239.
Some fidelistas (Castro supporters) contended that the 1959 Fundamental Law up-
dated or modified the 1940 Constitution rather than replacing it. Id. Cuba was, at least in
theory, governed by the 1940 Constitution until 1976, when the new Socialist constitution
came into effect. Id. Thefidelistas distinguished between Batista, whose coup they consid-
ered unconstitutional, and Castro by asserting that Batista assumed power "to loot the
country" while Castro assumed power "to carry out the mandate of the people" for a revo-
lutionary program. Id at 1240.
Cuba has often been compared with Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, the main thrust of
Sandinista legislation beginning in July 1979 was support for organized labor and campesi-
nos, especially in the area of agrarian law and reform. The Civil Code, taken over by Latin
America from the French, had been in use in Nicaragua at the time of the revolution. See
MIREYA MOLINA TORREs, MARCO JURIDICO DE LA REFORMA AoRARIA 12 (1989). Yet
the Sandinistas felt that the Code was incapable of resolving the problems the new govern-
ment wished to address. Id. In short, the Sandinista government viewed the Civil Code
law as static, while decrees could be used more freely. Id. at 13. This approach is consis-
tent with the revolutionary nature of the Sandinista movement.
106. See D'Zurilla, supra note 32, at 1223.
107. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 84. This legislation is just one example
of a stream of new laws passed shortly after the 1959 Fundamental Law. In fact, the 1959
Fundamental Law itself was amended twenty-two times between January 1959 and August
1961. See Luis Salas, The Judicial System of Postrevolutionary Cuba, 3 NOVA L. Rv. 43,
46 (1983).
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erty of the tyrant,' 'los property of persons engaged in criminal
behavior, illegal or unjust enrichments in property, property of
counter-revolutionaries, and abandoned property.1 9
The February 7, 1959 constitutional amendments called for "all
means of production" to remain in state hands.110 As a result, monop-
olies were created, consolidating government control over banking,
public utilities, and other necessary elements of production.' Provi-
sions permitting confiscation under the Fundamental Law represented
a step back from earlier requirements of compensation at fair market
value.1
12
The first and second agrarian reform laws were of constitutional
rank.1 3 The Fundamental Law itself had constitutional rank. 4 That
document incorporated the agrarian reform law by reference. 1 s Con-
sequently, these laws maintained constitutional priority until 1976,
when a new constitution was enacted.11 6
10S. To be more precise, the 1940 Constitution was amended to allow for "confiscation
in the case of property of natural persons or corporate bodies liable for offenses against the
national economy or the public treasure committed during the tyranny that ended Decem-
ber 31, 1958, as well as in the case of the property of the tyrant and his collaborators." See
Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 230 (quoting RFxomiA Co.srarruc6AL art. 2 (G.O., Jan.
14, 1959) (Cuba) [hereinafter 1959 CONsTrrtrnONAL REtOcl]). This new provision was
then carried over into the 1959 Fundamental Law. Id. at 230 (discussing the ratification
and enlargement of this exception to the prohibition against confiscation in 1959 Funda-
mental Law).
109. Willig Presentation, supra note 29. Abandoned property was taken via Ley 989
(0.0., Dec. 6, 1961) (Cuba) [hereinafter Law No. 9S9]. See Juan C. Consuegra-Barqufn,
Cuba's Residential Property Ownership Dilenma: A Human Rights Issue Under Interna-
tional Law, 46 RUTGERS L. RE%% 873, 903 (1994). It has been argued that Law 9S9 was
enacted to punish those who left the country for political reasons. Id. If this were so, Law
989 might be subject to attack on constitutional grounds because it discriminated against a
class of people due to their political beliefs. Such discrimination violates Article 33 of the
1940 Constitution and the 1959 Fundamental Law. See id. at 904. Similar legislation has
existed in other Latin American civil code jurisdictions. See Steven E. Hendrix, The Crisis
of Land Law and Policy in Nicaragua, 29 Co mp. JUnRD. REv. 3, 6-7 (1992) (discussing
"abandoned" property under the Civil Code and later Sandinista legislation in Nicaragua).
110. Willig Presentation, supra note 29.
111. Id
112. Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 233.
113. Fournier F., supra note 48, at 93.
114. The passing of a new constitution together with agrarian reform legislation in
Cuba parallels the experience in Bolivia. See VcEmm CASANOVA, supra note 55, at 1O
(describing the enactment of the agrarian reform law following the approval of a new con-
stitution in Bolivia).
115. Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 90.
116. Id. While the notion of a "constitutional agrarian law" seems quite foreign for
common law attorneys, there is precedent for this result in Latin American civil code coun-
tries. See, eg., Gu-tm .io FIGALLO, TmRR.A Y COu srTca6: 7 (1990) (discussing consti-
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Fidel Castro proclaimed Cuba a socialist state in 1961, but it was
not until 1976 that Cuba's constitutional framework was updated.117
By the time a new constitution entered into existence in 1976,118 there
had been a delay of seventeen years from the date of the revolution to
the enactment of the first new constitution in Cuba.115 In October
1974, Castro appointed a commission to prepare a Socialist constitu-
tion that would "embody the goals of his revolution.' 20 In February
1975 the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party approved the
commission's draft by an overwhelming majority and Castro promul-
gated the new constitution in the beginning of the following year.1 21
The rehabilitation of the legal profession in Cuba began in the
1970s. During this time, Castro announced that Cuba was entering a
new and "more serious, profound phase" while admitting to mistakes
of earlier "revolutionary zeal" and calling for a path of greater Marx-
ist political fidelity."2 Nevertheless, problems persisted in Castro's
government. During the time, Maurice Zeitlin wrote that "Cuban
revolutionaries had done little to establish institutions to guarantee
that competing points of view could be heard within the revolutionary
Socialist consensus."1 Ren6 Dumont noted the lack of confidence at
the popular base, the concentration of decision-making power at the
top, and Castro's reluctance to delegate.1 24 K.S. Karol, a Polish-Brit-
ish journalist, asserted in 1968 that all mass organizations in Cuba had
ceased to exist except on paper.' 25 These observations prompted the
Cuban leadership to reconsider its previous attitudes. 26
tutional agrarian law in Peru). In Venezuela, the agrarian reform law occupies a rank
below the Constitution, but above other legislation. See Am Jost VENTruIJNI, DERECHO
AoRAmO VENEZOLANO 83 (1976).
117. D'Zurilla, supra note 32, at 1224.
118. CONSTITUCION DE 1976 (Cuba) reprinted in V CONSTTUmTONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD (Albert Blaustein & Gisbert Flanz eds., 1996) [hereinafter 1976 CONSTrru-
TioN]; see also Fournier F., supra note 48, at 95-96 (providing the te:t of Articles 21
through 25 dealing with property).
119. Nicholas J. Guti6rrez, The De-Constitutionalization of Property Rights: Castro's
Systematic Assault on Private Ownership in Cuba 14 (Jan. 26, 1995) (Cuba Transition
Workshop: Resolution of Property Claims in Cuba's Transition, sponsored by Shaw, Pitt-
man, Potts & Trowbridge) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Cuba
Transition Workshop].
120. Wachs, supra note 35, at 546.
121. Id. at 546-47.
122. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 197.
123. CARMELO MESA-LAGO, CUBA IN THE 1970s: PRAGMATISM AND INSTITUTIONAL-
IZATION 62 (1974) [hereinafter MESA-LAGo, PRAGMATISM].
124. Id. at 63.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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In 1970, Castro began to criticize the excessive centralization and
bureaucracy of government.12 7 An Executive Committee was estab-
lished in 1972, diminishing the Prime Minister's power."as In 1973, the
judicial system was reorganized. 2 9 Such reforms ushered in what was
called the "new phase of the Revolution." 13 0
In response to these changes, the rehabilitation of Cuban law yers
commenced. Castro believed more jurists131 would be needed "to
play a more important role with the advancing perfection of our
State."' 3 Upon adoption of the 1976 Constitution, Castro noted the
Cuban Socialist state "had assumed a definitive shape, and that the
provisional period of the revolutionary process had come to an
end." 33 Consolidation in Socialist states often means an increased re-
liance on the principle of law.11 As such, the 1976 Constitution re-
placed the 1959 Fundamental Law, which the first revolutionary
government had drafted immediately upon assuming power.'
The relegalization of Cuba may have been the product of Cuba's
increased participation in international trade that in turn gave rise to
the need to institutionalize governmental functions, rather than simply
relying on a "cult of personalities.' -6 This revival of the legal profes-
sion was not so much a return to the old system, but more of an out-
growth of a more advanced stage of socialist development in Cuba.137
Moreover, theorists note that the Cuban Revolution, like the Russian
and Chinese Revolutions before it, outgrew its early period of revolu-
tionary "utopianism, nihilism, sacrifice and aversion to legality" and
entered the next stage of Socialist development that featured "consoli-
dation, rationalization, material incentives and endorsement of funda-
mental principles of law and legality."13s Similarly, the rehabilitation
of the legal community in Cuba was also the result of movement from
one stage of Socialist development to the next.
127. Id at 64.
128. Id at 67.
129. Id at 67-68.
130. Id at 67.
131. During this time, the term "jurist" was used in favor of the term Ia 'yar" to avoid
the widely-held disdain for the legal profession. Bernstein, supra note 2. at 197.
132. Id.
133. MEsA-LAGo, PRAGmtATiSM, supra note 123, at 67.
134. Id
135. Id
136. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 203.
137. Id
138. Id at 203-04.
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3. 1976 Constitution
The 1976 Constitution was primarily produced by a small group
of government and Communist party appointees, despite strong decla-
rations throughout the drafting process that all Cuban citizens were
participating in the process.'39 In light of its roots, the 1976 Constitu-
tion can be seen as consistent with Cuban constitutional history from
1901 to 1976 in that the Constitution was handed down from the gov-
ernment and imposed on the people. 4 °
In many respects, the 1976 Constitution is patterned on other
Communist or Socialist constitutions.' 4' However, it deviates from
these constitutions in that it allows for more concentration of power in
a single head of state and permits individuals to hold concurrent of-
fices in the Council of State and the legislature.142 Finally, in areas of
civil, political, and cultural rights, the Cuban Constitution of 1976 re-
mained very restrictive, bearing similarity to the 1936 Soviet Funda-
mental Law.143 However, like most East European Socialist
constitutions in effect during the period from 1960 to 1989, the Cuban
Constitution departs from the Soviet Fundamental Law of 1936 by
placing articles concerning the rights, duties, and guarantees of the
individual early in the text, thereby giving them higher prominence. 144
Because property relations pertain to the socioeconomic founda-
tion of the state, they are treated in Chapter I of the Cuban Constitu-
tion rather than the section describing "fundamental rights" covered
in Chapter VI. 45 Article 1 of the 1976 Constitution defined Cuba as a
Socialist state of workers, peasants, and other manual and intellectual
laborers. 146 Article 7 recognized the Asociaci6n Nacional de Agricul-
tures Pequefios (National Association of Small Producers) and other
base groups. 47 Article 14 affirmed the social approach to Socialist
139. Linda B. Klein, The Socialist Constitution of Cuba, in CUBAN COMMINISM 506,
522 (Louis Horowitz, ed., 1987).
140. Id. The main exception was the 1940 Constitution, which was drafted by a wholly
independent assembly of popularly elected delegates from divergent groups. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 523.
144. Id at 506.
145. Id. at 508-09. This is the case in most Marxist-Leninist constitutions today. Klein,
supra note 139, at 509 (noting that "in all socialist constitutions, structurclly and ideologi-
cally property relations pertain to the socio-economic foundation of the state").
146. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 101 (discussing Article 1 of the 1976
Constitution).
147. See id. (discussing the National Association of Small Producers).
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ownership of the means of production. 14s Article 15 defined Socialist
state property, which included all land not belonging to small produ-
cers or cooperatives. 49 Articles 20 and 21 recognized the property
rights of smallholders 50 to their lands, and ensured them the right to
associate among themselves for agricultural production and obtaining
credit and state services, and the right to sell land with prior state
authorization. 5' Like the agrarian reform legislation, the 1976 Con-
stitution also prohibited renting, sharecropping, mortgage credit, and
148. Article 14 provides the following- "[T]he Republic of Cuba rules the Socialist ss-
tern of economy based on the people's Socialist ownership of the means of production."
1976 CONSTITUtnON art. 14 (translation by author).
149. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 102. Article 15 provides the follo;ving:
[T]he socialist state property, which is the property of the entire people, becomes
irreversibly established over the lands that do not belong to small farmers or to
cooperatives formed by the same; over the subsoil, mines, the natural resources,
and flora and fauna in the marine area over which it has jurisdiction; woods, %a-
ters, means of communication; over the sugar mills, factories, chief means of
transportation; and over all those enterprises, banks, installations and properties
that have been nationalized and expropriated from the imperialists, the landhold-
ers, and the bourgeoisie; as well as over the people's farms, factories, enterprises
and economic, social, cultural and sports facilities built, fostered or purchased by
the state in the future.
1976 CONs-rrTuToN art. 15 (translation by author); see also Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note,
The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current International System, IS B.U. Ir'tL LJ.
191, 204 (1995) (discussing Article 15); Sanchez, supra note 69, at 147. In the Soviet Con-
stitution of 1936, even smallholdings belonged to the State. Klein, The Socialist Consttti-
tion of Cuba, in CuB3AN Coh=NisN, supra note 139, at 509. The exemption in the Cuban
Constitution reflects the continued existence of small farmers cultivating private prop.-rty.
Id. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the Cuban state viewed elimination of this remnant of
capitalism as an immediate task in the construction of socialism. Id.
150. A smallholder is the owner or operator of a piece of land detached from a cottage,
and cultivated to supplement his main income. VEBSTER'S THipm NEW INTEr.nATIo NAL
DICTiONARY 2149 (1976).
151. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 102; Fournier F., supra note 4S8, at 95.
Article 20 provides the following:
(1) The state recognizes the right of small farmers to own their lands and other
means and implements of production, according to vhat the law stipulates.
(2) Small farmers have the right to group themselves in the way and follol ing
the requirements prescribed by law both for the purpose of agricultural produc.
tion and for obtaining state loans and services.
(3) The establishment of agricultural cooperatives in the instances and vays pre-
scribed by the law is authorized. Ownership of the cooperatives constitutes a
form of collective ownership on the part of the peasants in those coopaeratives.
(4) The state supports the cooperative production of small farmers as well as that
individual production which contributes to the growth of the national economy.
(5) The state fosters the participation of small farmers, freely and voluntarily, in
state projects and units of agricultural production.
1976 CONSrrrtnrON art. 20 (translation by author).
Article 21 provides the following:
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other forms of implicit charges or partial transfers to individuals of the
rights and actions emanating from smallholder property.152
The government also added Article 23 to the 1976 Constitution,
providing the following: "The state recognizes the ownership of mixed
enterprises, economic societies, and associations that are created ac-
cording to law. The use, benefit, and sale of assets belonging to these
entities are ruled by law and treaties as well as by their own statutes
and regulations."' 53 The government does not, however, have express
constitutional power to authorize small private enterprise.15 4
Article 24 codifies the belief that land is only inheritable by the
person who worked the land.'55 Finally, Article 25 of the 1976 Consti-
tution provides for expropriation with compensation at something less
than fair market value.'5 6
(1) Small farmers have the right to sell their land with the previous authorization
of the state agencies, as prescribed by law. In all cases, the state has the preferen-
tial right to purchase of the land while paying a fair price.
(2) Land leases, sharecropping, mortgages, and all other forms which entail a lien
on the land or partial cession to private individuals of the rights and title to the
land which is the property of the small farmers are all prohibited.
Id. art. 21 (translation by author).
152. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 102. To this end, Article 22 provides the
following:
(1) The state guarantees the right to personal ownership of earnings and savings
derived from one's own work, of the dwelling to which one has legal title and of
the other possessions and objects which serve to satisfy one's material and cul-
tural needs.
(2) Likewise, the state guarantees the right of citizens to ownership of their per-
sonal or family work tools, as long as these tools are not employed in exploiting
the work of others.
1976 CONSTrrurON art. 22 (translation by author).
153. Bourque, supra note 149, at 205.
154. The Cuban Constitution differs in this respect from the 1936 Soviet Fundamental
Law and many current socialist constitutions. Klein, The Socialist Constitu'tion of Cuba, in
CUBAN COMMUNISM, supra note 139, at 509.
155. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 102. Article 24 provides the following,
The law regulates the right of citizens to inherit legal title to a place of residence
and to other personal goods and chattels. The land owned by a small farmer may
only be inherited by the heirs who are personally involved in its cultivation, save
for the exceptions prescribed by law.
With regard to goods which are part of cooperatives, the law prescribes the
conditions under which said goods may be inherited.
1976 CONs'TrrtrnoN art. 24 (translation by author).
156. Article 25 provides the following:
The expropriation of property for reasons of public benefit or social interest and
with due compensation is authorized. The law establishes the method for the
expropriation and the bases on which the need for and the usefulness of this ac-
tion is to be determined, as well as the form of the compensation, considering the
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During the 1970s and early 1980s, Castro was able to fulfill many
of the guarantees contained in the 1976 charter. This was due in part
to a huge annual foreign assistance package from the former Soviet
Union. 57 However, in 1989, when the Communist bloc disintegrated
and the Soviets canceled the Cuban subsidy, the government's ability
to provide for the welfare of its citizens declined dramatically.'' s
Without favorable trade agreements with Socialist nations, and with
the continued trade embargo, Cuba's social and economic conditions
deteriorated dramatically. 5 9 One commentator noted that -[a]lmost
overnight, the island nation lost $6 billion a year in economic aid, un-
told billions in military aid, and $10 billion a year in trade."'
4. The 1992 Constitution
By the time of the 1991 Partido Comunista de Cuba (Congress of
the Cuban Communist Party) (PCC), the Soviet Union itself was in
the process of disintegrating.161 With the demise of Lenin's revolu-
tion, there was no longer any hope that Communist forces could wage
a successful revolt against capitalism. 62 In Cuba itself, the PCC was
faced with a failing economy with "irreversible difficulties" and "a so-
ciety slipping further and further away from any possibility of eco-
nomic prosperity."'163 Several political scandals led to purges of high
government officials, and a "cleansing" of party organs.1M Leadership
also began to remove reformers from the party, including members of
the Central Committee itself.' 6s As food became less plentiful, de-
mands for private farms increased in force."'6
interests and economic and social needs of the person 'hose property has been
expropriated.
1976 CoNsTrtUoN art. 25 (translation by author); sce also Traieso-Dfaz, supra note 24,
at 233 (citing Article 25 of the 1976 Constitution).
157. Wachs, supra note 35, at 547-48.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. William Deibler, Helpless in Havana, PITrSBURGH POST-GZETrE, Mar. 6. 1994,
at D4.
161. Juan M. del Aguila, The Paro;, the Fourdt Congress, and the Process of Counter-
reform, in CUBA AT A CROSSROADS: POLITrCS AND EcoNo .Ics AFTER THE FOURTH
PARTY CONGRESS 19, 20 (Jorge F. Perez-Lopez ed., 1994).
162. Id.
163. Id
164. Id. at 20-21.
165. Id. at 21.
166. ANDREAS OPPENHEIMER, CASTRO'S FINAL HOUR: THE SECRET STORY BEHIND
THE COMING DowiALL OF C OMUNIST CUBA 302 (1992).
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In this context, the Fourth Party Congress sought to renew the
party. However, no dramatic changes along the lines of a "Cuban-
style perestroika" occurred; the Fourth Party Congress simply restated
its commitment to a single party. 67 In short, the masses could expect
no fundamental economic or political reforms: capitalism would not
return. 68 The top political leadership in the PCC controlled the prep-
arations for the October 1991 Congress, preserving the unity and har-
mony of the party and meeting the demands of political leaders.169
Fidel Castro proclaimed, "[T]here will not be a market economy, by
whatever name; it has nothing to do with socialism. Our economy will
be programmed and planned."'7 ° Subsequently, in 1992, a new Con-
stitution was promulgated.Y
The 1992 Constitution scales back on the scope of State owner-
ship. 172 The new Constitution applies to only the "fundamental"
means of production rather than all means of production, allowing for
some private divestiture of state-owned assets.' 73 In all other respects,
however, the new constitution mirrors its predecessors. Articles 20,
21, and 22 of the 1976 Constitution correspond to Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the 1992 document. 7 4 Article 19 prohibits rental, sharecrop-
ping, mortgages or any other lien on agricultural property, and com-
mits the state to support small farmers and private farming. 175 Article
20 pledges the state's support of agricultural cooperatives, 176 and Arti-
cle 21 private personal property. 7 7 Other provisions protect mixed
enterprise property 78 and provide for expropriation with compensa-
167. del Aguila, supra note 161, at 24-25.
168. Id. at 25.
169. Id. at 26.
170. Id. at 29.
171. 1992 CONSTTUON. The constitutional changes were approved by the National
Assembly as a result of recommendations made at the Fourth Party Congress in October
1991. See generally del Aguila, supra note 161, at 24-39. Major changes brought about in
the new constitution included allowing private investment in certain state companies and
permitting foreign ownership of property in joint venture enterprises. See Cameron, supra
note 14, at 482.
172. Article 14 of the 1992 Constitution provides the following: "En la Repdblica de
Cuba rige el sistema de economfa basado en la propiedad Socialista de todo el pueblo
sobre los medios fundamentales de producci6n y en la supresi6n de la explotac16n del
hombre por el hombre. . ." 1992 CONSTITUTON art. 14.
173. Id. See also Willig Presentation, supra note 29.
174. Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 229.
175. 1992 CONsITTION art. 19.
176. I& art. 20.
177. Id. art. 21.
178. Id. art. 23.
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tion.179 Finally, the 1992 Constitution maintains the importance of the
social function of land by asserting that land should belong to the per-
son who works it.IsO
5. Summary
In summary, Cuba's several constitutions have preserved strong
individual rights in property, beginning with the 1901 Constitution and
carried through into the 1992 Constitution. The social function of
land was acknowledged and incorporated into the 1940 Constitution.
Civil Code legislation clearly expressed the need for compensation for
public expropriation. In keeping with the spirit of this social function,
Cuban law had evolved to a stage where all means of production were
under state control, as presented in the 1976 Constitution. By 1992,
however, there had been some retreat from this position, illustrated
by changes in the new Constitution requiring only the fundamental
means of production to rest in state hands.
B. The Agrarian Reform and Rural Land Ownership
1. Context for Reform: Prerevolutionary Agriculture
Land tenure was cited as a constraint to development in the 1950s
by proponents of agrarian reform.lsl Cuban peasants were well or-
179. Id. art. 25. Furthermore, Article 60 of the 1992 Constitution permits confication
of property. Id. art. 60.
180. Id. art. 24.
181. VicENm CASANO'A, supra note 55, at 173-74; Vald~s Garcfa, Antccedentes, supra
note 60, at 173-74. As illustrated by the chart below, over half of the land in Cuba %%as held
by landowners holding over 100 hectares of land and 20% of land area %vas held by very
large estates in holdings over 5000 hectares in size. This backdrop provided a basis for
reform efforts in the land tenure system.
DISTIBLrrON or L.kN LN CuB,: 1946
Number of Percent of Perce.nt of
Range (in hectares) Units total units Hectares land area
Less than 0A 1148 0.7 280 0.0
0A to 0.5 1877 12 1399 0.0
1.0 to 4.9 29.170 18.2 84354 0.9
5.0 to 9.9 30.305 18.9 210.706 2.3
10.0 to 24.9 48.778 30.5 71-5.071 8.0
25.0 to 49.9 23.901 14.9 789.715 8.7
50.0 to 74.9 S157 5.1 4S3.648 5.4
75.0 to 99.9 3S53 24 329,61 3.6
100.0 to 499.9 10.433 6.5 2.193.600' 242
500.0 to 999.9 1442 0.9 992531 10.9
1000.0 to 4999.9 780 0.5 1.443.530 15.9
More than 5000.0 114 0.1 1.817.6092 20.0
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ganized to oppose the government and demand expropriation. 18 In
addition, demands for expropriation also came from the middle class
who felt excluded from economic participation due to massive foreign
ownership.8 3 For these individuals, upward mobility meant only gov-
ernment service, because private industry was in the hands of foreign-
ers who also occupied most of the best jobs.' 84 Perceived to be
chronically high, unemployment was a serious problem of the pre-
revolutionary economic system.'85 These factors contributed to the
change in government and the demand for agrarian reform.18 6
Nevertheless, prior to the Castro revolution, Cuba's economic
picture was not as exaggerated as in other countries in Latin America.
In terms of land distribution, Cuba was typical of other Latin Ameri-
Memoria del Censo Agricola Nacional 1946 [National Agricultural Census Survey 1946] 84
(1951) (on file with the Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin).
182. Their high degree of organization is demonstrated, for example, in the creation in
1958 of the Agriculture Bureau (Buro Agrario) dedicated to the study of the agricultural
problems of the peasantry, along with the Eastern Peasant Federation (Federacl6n
Campesina de Oriente) and the Regional Peasant Committee (ComitW Regional
Campesino). See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 79-80.
183. See VADI s GARCfA, SOciAUZACi6N supra note 60, at 4; see also Nelson R.
Amaro, Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution, in CUPAN COMMUNISM,
supra note 139, at 23. In the first months following the revolution, 90% af the population
supported the new government. Id. at 25. In 1962, support for the new government re-
mained high. Id. at 16. In one survey, 80% of Afro-Cubans and 67% of whites favored the
revolution. Id. at 16 (discussing Maurice Zeitlin's 1962 study entitled Economic Insecurity
and the Political Attitudes of Cuban Workers). Support for the revolution was strongest
among blacks who had worked nine months or less before the revolution. Id. (citing the
figure as 91%).
184. See Fournier F., supra note 48, at 77.
185. See Brian H. Pollitt & G.B. Hagelberg, The Cuban Sugar Economy in the Soviet
Era and After, CENTER FOR DEVELOP ENT STUDIES OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 11 (June
1995) (on file with the Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin).
186. See id. (discussing the unpleasant conditions for peasants that prompted the infant
guerilla government to pass a law stating that the land should be assigned to those who
work it).
[Vol. 20:1
1996] Tensions in Cuban Property Law
can countries."8 Cuba was near the top of many countries in terms of
187.
INEQUALrTy IN THE DtsrmmruroN OF LANDm IN VAuous COtIUEs
Country Year Gini Coeficient Data Sourco
VERY HIGH INEQuALrry (Gini above 75)
Uruonay 1967 93.95 jarmi at I6
Uruguay 1930 84 ILd.
Guatemala* 1950 97.64 Id. at 9.
Paraguay* 1956 95.60 Id. at 14.
Paraguay 1931 94 Thi-enha-n at 9,
Colombia* 1960 94.4 hax-i3 at 5,
Chile* 1964 91.67 Id at 4
Ecuador 1954 8.46 Id. at 7.
Nicaragua 1967 86.15 Id. at 17.
Brazil* 1965 83-50 Jarvis at 3,
Brazil 1980 86 Thiac2nhu n at 9.
Panama 1931 84 Id.
Saudi Arabia 1983 83 Thi.c2nhtrn at 9.
Cuba 1946 S0.61 Ceir
Kenya 1931 77 Thic2nhu2n at 9
HIGH INEQUALrY (51 to 75_
Colombia 1984 70 Id
Dominican Republic 1981 70 Id
Ecuador 1937 69 Id.
Grenada 1931 69 Id
Costa Rica 1960 6639 Jarni5 at 6
Chile 1987 64 Thi2-2nhur2n at 9.
Honduras 1931 64 Id
Yemen 1982 64 Id.
Sri Lanka 192 62 Id.
Peru 1984 61 Id
Nepal 1982 60 Id
Uganda 1984 59 Id
Turkey 1930 5 Id.
Jordan 1983 57 Id
Pakistan 1980 54 Id
Panama 1960 53.66 Jarvis at 13.
Philippines 1981 53 Thic.nhut2n at 9.
MEDIm INEQU rALY (40 to 50)
Bahrain 1930 50 Id
Bangladesh 1980 50 Id.
Morocco 1932 47 Id
Togo 1983 45 Id.
Ghana 194 44 Id
Low INEQuALrY (below 40)
MalaNA 1931 36 Id.
Mauritania 1981 36 Id.
Egypt 1984 35 Id
Niger 1931 32 Id
Korea, Republic of 1930 30 Id
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socioeconomic indicators, with a large middle class and very progres-
sive social legislation for workers and unions.'-" At the same time,
"Cuban labor laws, rigidly enforced, were more advanced in almost
every respect [in comparison to] those in the United States." '189 Agri-
cultural workers were also well paid.190 According to the Interna-
tional Labor Organization, the average wage in 1958 was $3 per eight
hour day.191 When adjusted for purchasing power, this compares fa-
vorably with Belgium ($2.70), Denmark ($2.86), France ($2.73), West
Germany ($2.73), and the United States ($4.06).'gThese same statis-
tics disclosed that Cuban workers received 66.6% of the gross national
income compared with 57.2% for Argentina, 47.9% for Brazil, and
70.1% for the United States. 93
With the possible exception of Venezuela, Cuba had attained the
highest standard of living of any semi-tropical or tropical country in
the world by the mid 1950s.' 94 By 1956, the U.S. Department of Com-
merce concluded that the Cuban national income had reached levels
that gave the Cuban people one of the highest standards of living in
Latin America. 95 A 1951 World Bank report noted thai. the standard
of living for farmers, agricultural laborers, industrial workers, store-
keepers, and others were all higher than the standard for correspond-
ing groups in other tropical countries and in nearly all other Latin
American countries. 9 6 Although the report did not say there was no
dire poverty in Cuba, it did assert that in comparative terms Cubans
were better off than their counterparts abroad. 97
Countries marked with an asterisk indicate reduced reliability of calcu'ation due to the
data sets. Gini coefficient is defined as a measure of inequality in distribution. It ranges
from zero to one: the closer the value to 1, the greater the inequality. Gini coefficients
calculated by Marco Castillo, Research Assistant, Land Tenure Center, University of Wis-
consin (1995). WILLIAM C. THIESENHUSEN, BROKEN PRoMIsEs: AGRARIAN REFORM AND
THE LATIN AMERICAN CAMPEsINo 9 (1995). Data from Kenna Jarvis, Country by Country
Land Distribution Percentages in Latin America (1971) (on file with the Land Tenure
Center Library, University of Wisconsin). National Agricultural Cen!;us Survey 1946,
supra note 181, at 84.
188. Thompson, supra note 3, at 36.
189. LAzo, supra note 38, at 97.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 97-98.
192. Id. at 98.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 96.
195. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INVESTMENT IN CUBA 184. (1956)).
196. Id. at 96-97 (discussing the Economic and Technical Mission of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development's 1951 Report on Cuba).
197. Id. at 97.
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In the areas of education and literacy, Cuba was also near the top
in Latin America.19 Cuba was first in the region in terms of the per-
cent of national income spent on education.199 It was less expensive
to obtain a college education in Cuba than in the United States.2,30
Similarly, compared with the United States, Cuba had twice as many
physicians and surgeons-and twice as many teachers-in relation to
its population.2 10 Its infant and adult mortality rates were lower than
the United States.20 2 Food was abundant and the island was nearly
disease-free.20 3 No nation except the United States had as many tele-
vision sets per capita as Cuba.2°4
The positive condition of the Cuban economy relative to other
countries in the region was not well understood. Pre-Castro Cuba is
often depicted as a country in which a wealthy few exploited illiterate
and poverty-stricken masses and where large farms were becoming
larger, with the small farmers getting pushed out of the market, a view
underscored by Columbia University Professor C. Wright Mills.' El-
eanor Roosevelt asserted that "perhaps a Socialist government would
be the best solution [for Cuba]." ' 6 President John F. Kennedy
remarked:
I think that there is not a country in the world, including all the
regions of Africa and including any country under colonial domina-
tion, where the economic colonization, the humiliation, the ex-
ploitation have been worse than those which ravaged Cuba, the
result, in part, of the policy of my country, during the regime of
Batista. I think that we spawned, constructed, entirely fabricated
without knowing it, the Castro movement. I think that the accumu-
lation of such errors has endangered all of Latin America .... I will
tell you something else: In a certain sense, it is as though Batista
were the incarnation of some of the sins committed by the United
States. Now, we must pay for those sins....
198. Id. at 106.
199. Il
200. Id.
201. Id. at 107.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id at 96 (discussing comments made by Professor Mills after a 1959-1960 isit to
Cuba).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 94 (quoting President Kennedy's remarks published in the New 1orI: Tunes.
Dec. 11, 1963).
1996]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Despite Kennedy's remark, the United States had supported
Cuba for years by purchasing sugar at considerably above world mar-
ket prices.208 In 1958, only about five percent of invested capital in
Cuba was from the United States.209 During the 1950s, there was a
marked trend in Cuba away from American ownership in favor of na-
tional ownership of sugar mills. 210 In 1958, Cuban-owned mills ac-
counted for sixty-two percent of the total sugar production, while in
1939 the figure was only twenty-two percent.211 Despite this fact, U.S.
private capital and technology served as the "principal contributing
factor in making Cuba the most industrialized country in Latin
America in ratio to population, and in raising its living standards to
one of the highest. '21 2 In this context, it appears Kennedy and others
were mistaken about the economic state of affairs in Cuba, perhaps
reflecting the success of Castro's propaganda campaign,213
Nevertheless, before the 1959 agrarian reform, Cuban agriculture
did suffer from wealth concentrations. 214 During the period between
1940 and 1959, Cuba tripled its national income.215 Tourism was be-
coming an increasingly important source of income for the island. 1"
Yet a 1951 World Bank report indicated that reform of the agriculture
sector was urgent: if measures to reform the sector were not imple-
mented, the chances for an institutional takeover provoked by the
right or left would increase.21 7 Owners of 46% of the land comprised
1.5% of the general population, while 70% of farms occupied less than
208. Id at 108.
209. Id. at 98.
210. Id. at 99.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 108.
213. Id at 96, 116, 151-53.
214. Fournier F., supra note 48, at 77. In summary:
Tomas Estrada Palma was elected the first Cuban president [but was. replaced by
the Liberal president Jose Miguel Gomez in 1909]. The Gomez presidency estab-
lished a pattern of graft, corruption, and social injustice toward Afro.Cubans that
succeeding presidents and dictators followed. Cuba continued to attract Ameri-
can investment, and this investment combined with the growing sugar industry,
tourism, and gambling, caused the economy to prosper. [This prosperity bene-
fited only a few Cubans, primarily politicians and their relatives]. In 1958, follow-
ing a prolonged period of exile and guerrilla warfare against the Cuban
government... Fidel Castro [supplanted] the longtime dictator Fulgencio Batista.
3 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 772, 773 (Philip W. Goetz ed., 15th ed. 1988).
215. Amaro, supra note 183, at 20.
216. cLd
217. MEsA-LAGo, LABOR FORCE, supra note 86, at 32.
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12% of the island.215 Sharecropping, tenant farming, and illicit farm-
ing by squatters were common, leading to complaints about social jus-
tice and questions about efficiency in production 2 19 A 1957 survey by
the Catholic University Association found that the peasant class ex-
pected its economic problems to be resolved politically, equating the
ultimate economic power with the highest political authority.22 Peas-
ants began to question the nation's legal order, because the legal
structures they identified with political power supported the elite
groups. 21
The new Organic Law echoed the Constitution of 1940 in prohib-
iting large landholdings. Both permitted subsequent legislation to
abolish them.m In this context, the agrarian reform sought to ap-
proximate the technical advantages of large-scale production through
cooperatives, while taking advantage of the intensive cultivation prac-
tices found on smaller farms. 23
Studies carried out by the United Nations noted the extremes in
property distribution and the plight of the poor.24 The United Na-
tions report looked to diversify agricultural production and promote
productivity, especially for export crops." Further, the study looked
for increased standards of living for Cuban nationals.2-" The review
singled out resource concentration as the major impediment and
218. Ley de Reforma Agraria, whereas cls. 7,8 (G.O. Ediei6n Extraordinaria especial,
June 3, 1959) (Cuba) [hereinafter Agrarian Reform Law], see also Amaro. supra note 183,
at 13 (noting that before the Castro revolution of 1959, Cuba marked vxith a general mal-
aise of class disequilibrium).
LAND DISTRIBUTION AT THE TIMTE OF THE FIRST AGRAMAN REFORM L./v: (1959)
Property Percentage of Area Percentage of
Farm Size Owners Property Owners (Caballerfas) Total Area
Up to 5 Caballerfas 20,229 662 46,842 7.4
From 5 to 30 Caballerfas 74S5 24.4 122,314 19.2
More than 30 Caballeras 2873 9.4 465,994 73A
Totals 30,587 100 635,150 100
Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 85 (sworn declarations of property owners). 1 cabe!.
lerta = 13.4 hectares = 33 acres.
219. Agrarian Reform Law whereas cl. 5.
220. Amaro, supra note 183, at 16.
221. Ild.
222. Agrarian Reform Law whereas cl. 5.
223. l& whereas cl. 13.
224. See Vica-rE CASANOVA, supra note 55, at 173-74.
225. l&
226. Id.
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called for land reform.227 It should be noted that poverty was an in-
creasing problem by the time of the Revolution; unemployment and
underemployment had increased throughout the 1949s and 1950s,
reaching a combined total of thirty percent of the labor force by 1956-
57.228
The Batista government recognized that tenant smallholders and
holders of precarious title had been excluded from participation in the
benefits of the established rural economy and promulgated Decree
Law No. 247 to protect their interests.229 In 1952, the Cuban govern-
ment launched a new program to force landowners to allow current
occupants to rent the land.230 This new legislation was passed in the
belief that land access and security for smallholders would stimulate
and promote production.231 At that time, it was recognized that "pri-
vate property [was] subject to restrictions dictated by considerations
of national necessity. '232 The authors of the law understood that the
existing legislation
had not been adequate to prevent the eviction of the peasants and
their families from the lands cultivated by them, so that a state of
unrest in public opinion and disturbances of public order [had] oc-
curred in the areas of conflict, to the detriment of agricultural pro-
duction and national supplies, so that the usefulness of the estates
concerned [had] been impaired, and the inalienable right to work
and to a decent subsistence, vouch-safed to citizens under the Basic
Law, [had] been prejudiced.2 3
Rental of these private properties was stipulated by law to be at a
rate of not more than five percent of its sale value, as recorded by the
Government.234 Thus, restrictions on the use of private property be-
gan before the Castro government's coming to power.2-'5 Further, as
227. Id.; see also Fournier F., supra note 48, at 77-78 (discussing reform proposals after
the promulgation of Law No. 3).
228. MFSA-LAGo, LABOR FORCE, supra note 86, at 28.
229. See Decreto Ley No. 247 whereas cl. 2 (G.O. No. 171, July 23, 1952) (Cuba), trans-
lated in Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (on file with the Land
Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin) [hereinafter Decree Lw No. 2471.
230. See id. The compulsory nature of this rental obligation is found in Article 6. id.
231. Id. whereas cI. 2.
232. Id. whereas cl. 3.
233. Id. whereas cl. 4.
234. Id. art. 3.
235. Decree Law No. 247 and its restrictions were promulgated in 1952, while the
Revolution did not occur until 1959. Decree Law No. 247.
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subleasing was also prohibited, restrictions on the ownership rights of
beneficiaries also predated the 1959 revolution 6
Although many Latin American governments maintained similar
restrictions on land, revolutions did not occur in these countries. In
contrast, the Batista government's failure to extend land reform likely
led to its overthrow. Subsequent agrarian reform legislation should be
properly understood as an extension of earlier policy, rather than a
revolutionary reversal of law. From a 1990s perspective, Batista de-
serves some credit for his consideration of the poor. On the other
hand, critics of Castro cannot hearken back to a golden age of prop-
erty rights prior to Castro when property rights were absolute.
2. The 1959 Agrarian Reform Law
a Farm Sizes and Expropriation
By May 1961 more than forty percent of land that had been in
private hands was expropriated, representing some four million hect-
ares of land. 37 Unlike the Mexican agrarian reform, which allowed
owners to retain the best land, the Cuban nationalization included
land in the most fertile areas.2 s
Large farms were prohibited under the reform law.P 9 In general,
each person, either natural or juridical, was limited to thirty caballer-
[as of land.24 Any excess could be expropriated for distribution to
landless peasants.24' Exceptions to this rule were introduced for the
236. Id. art. 15.
237. Rara DuMoNr, CUBA: SoctuAsN AND DEVFLOP ENr 60 (1970).
238. Id.
239. Agrarian Reform Law art. 1. See also CHtUMiNATro C., supra note 53, at 39.
240. Agrarian Reform Law art. 1. Limitations on land size are typical in Latin Ameri-
can agrarian reform legislation. See, ag., 1992 CoNs'rruc0N tit. 1, art. 1, § 27 (XV)
(Mex.).
241. Agrarian Reform Law art. 1. The law affected certain areas of land, as described
below-
LNDs AFFEcrED FOR REDsmimxrnov
Specific Article
from the Agrarian
Reform Law of 1959 Properties Affected
Article 1 Land above the maximum limit of 30 Caballeas for any natural orlegal person.
Articles 3 and 4 State, Province. or Municipal land, except those dedicated for forestreserves, social goals or. public or service establishments.
Article 11 Property less than 30 Caballerfas if it was subject to rental
a-reements. sharecropping or squatting.
Article 13 Sugar cane properties belonging to foreign interests or belon,6n- to
persons o tninr processing plants.
Transitory provisions Property uncultivated within 2 years of the new legislation.
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following: (a) high yield sugar cane plantations,242 (b) cattle produc-
tion meeting minimum standards set by the Agrarian Reform Insti-
tute,243 (c) high yield rice plantations, and (d) produce or stock that
required land areas larger than thirty caballerfas for effcient produc-
tion from a technical and economic vantage.245 The law specified an
absolute size limit of one hundred caballerias for properties falling
into the first three of these exceptions.2 46 Any excess beyond one
hundred caballerias could be expropriated.2 47 As for the fourth ex-
ception, the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) was empow-
ered to monitor the farm to insure production was maintained.2 48
Other land was exempt entirely: cooperative land, land owned by
states, provinces or municipalities, national forest reserves, and rural
community land for social welfare, education, health or other similar
purposes.249
Sharecropping and land rental were expressly forbidden.
Farms of thirty caballerias or less and with no leases, subleases, share-
cropping, or squatting were not in danger of expropriation. 1 1 On
farms of thirty caballerias or less, expropriation remained a threat if
the land was leased, subleased or sharecropped, or occupied by
squatters. 2
Expropriation of excess land was priority ranked.25 3 First, expro-
priation began only on state lands and private lands where farmers
were working the land with leases, subleases, sharecropping or squat-
RAFAEL MENJIVAR, REFORMA AGRARIA: GUATEMALA, BOLIVIA, CUBA 390-91 (1969).
242. Agrarian Reform Law art. 2(a) (defining high yield sugar cane as "not less than
50% more than the average natural production" based on the last harvest's figures).
243. Id. art. 2(b).
244. Id. art. 2(c) (defining high yield rice plantations as those on which production was
"no less than 50% more than the average natural production" based on the last harvest's
figures).
245. Id.
246. Id. art. 2, para. 2.
247. Id
248. Id art. 3, para. 4.
249. Id. art. 4.
250. Id. art. 11.
251. Id. art. 6. There is evidence that, in practice, all property over five caballerfas was
expropriated. John P. Rathbone, Private Property Rights in Cuba (1992): Farmland, LA
SOCIEDAD ECON6MICA DE AMIGOS DEL PAlS BULLETIN (La Sociedad Economica,
London, England), Apr. 8, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter Rathbone, Farmland].
252. Agrarian Reform Law art. 6. See also Resoluci6n No. 283/86 whereas cl. 1 (G.O.,
July 31, 1986) (Cuba) [Resolution No. 283/86] (citing 1992 CONsTrrtmON art. 14).
253. Id. art 5.
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ting.2 Once this source of land was exhausted, then expropriation
could proceed to farm areas exceeding the maximum size limits. 5
The law also provided that, when in doubt, the law should be con-
strued in favor of the person working the land. 6
Under the second Agrarian Reform Law, agricultural properties
larger than five caballerias were subject to expropriation. 5 Special
rules were set up to allow for the voluntary sale of property to the
state, for persons preferring a process other than forced expropria-
tion . 5 s Similarly, special rules allowed for indemnification of smal-
lholders of five caballerfas or less who were affected by the agrarian
reform law and who relied on rental income from that plot as their
only means of income35 9 In cases of forced expropriation, INRA was
charged with carrying out the appropriate procedures until a land
court could be organized.260
Other takings of land came from nationalization. In February
1960, Cuba entered into a trade agreement with the Soviet Union al-
lowing Cuba to receive Soviet crude oil.2 61 At that time, the Cuban
government owed the American refineries about $60 million."' Er-
nesto "Che" Guevarra, then President of the National Bank, notified
SOURCES OF LAND EXPROPRIATED FOR ThE AGRARA RErom.1 t1959-1961)
Legal Instrument Caballeras Hectares Percnt
Agrarian reform law S9.358 1.199.184 27.0
Le, de Recuperaciin de Blezes Maolersados 12,162 163,214 3.7
Donations to INRA 24.03S 322,590 7-3
Voluntarv sales 43.350 5S1,757 13.1
Nationalization Law 851 94,00S 1.26157 2.A
Nationalization Law 890 67,850 910.547 20.5
Modifications to art. 24. Ley Fundamental N.A. N.A NA.
TOTALS: 330.766 4.438,,S79 103
MENjivAR, supra note 241, at 405-06. Modifications to Article 24 were made in DZcemb2r
1959 to permit the confiscation of property of Cubans who had participated in the Bay of
Pigs invasion. 1959 Fundamental Law.
254. Agrarian Reform Law art. 5(a).
255. Id. art. 5.
256. Id. art. 64.
257. IENJIVAR, supra note 241, at 409.
258. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 99 (citing Resoluci6n No. 17S, (Nov. 30,
1967) [hereinafter Resolution No. 178]).
259. Id. at 100 (citing Resoluci6n No. 266 (Aug. 29, 1961) (Cuba) as modified by
Resoluci6n No. 178 (Nov. 30, 1967) (Cuba) [hereinafter Resolution 178]).
260. Id. at 101 (citing Ley No. 588 (Oct. 1959) (Cuba) [hereinafter Law No. 531).
261. LAzo, supra note 38, at 226.
262. Id.
1996]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the refineries that they would have to process the Soviet crude oil.263
When they refused, the Cuban government not only canceled the
prior $60 million debt, but also seized their facilities, valued at the
time at about $140 million.2 '
In July 1960 Nationalization Law Number 851 was passed in re-
sponse to the sugar quota cancellation by the U.S. State Depart-
ment.265 Compensation was paid in bonds to be backed, ironically, by
proceeds from future sugar purchases from the United States.26 Pre-
sumably, this amount would be zero.267 The United States classified
this nationalization as a confiscatory action.268 In fact, Castro had ex-
pected the cancellation of the sugar quota for some time, and "Che"
Guevarra had urged the United States to make the move "the sooner
the better.' 26 9 Nationalization Law No. 890 affected any lands be-
longing to foreigners or Cuban citizens not previously affected, partic-
ularly sugar cane engineers, the majority of whom were U.S.
citizens2 70
The Ley de Recuperaci6n de Bienes Malversados (Law to Re-
cover Usurped Properties) provided for confiscation of properties of
national patrimony that the new government thought had been
usurped by functionaries of the outgoing Batista government.2 71
From 1952 to 1959, Batista and many of his officials had become
wealthy, and the new law was directed at recovery of those assets.2 72
For these properties, there was no compensation or indemnification.
As a result of this law, about $200 million worth of property was con-
fiscated from Batista government officials and their alleged support-
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See MENJIVAR, supra note 241, at 404 (discussing Ley de Nacionalizaci6n 851 of
July 1960).
266. See George R. Harper, Cuban and Peruvian Agrarian Reforms: At the Crossroads,
24 U. MiAmi L. REv. 763, 764 (1970).
267. Id. at 765.
268. Id.
269. LAzo, supra note 38, at 228.
270. Harper, supra note 266, at 765.
271. Consuegra-Barqufn, supra note 109, at 900. See also Resoluci6n No. 776 (Oct. 7,
1960) (G.O., Oct. 14, 1960) (Cuba) (citing Ley No. 879 (Sept. 24, 1960) (G.O., Sept. 28,
1960) (Cuba)); MENIvAR, supra note 241, at 403 (citing Ley de Recuperaci6n de Bienes
Malversados (Nov. 13, 1959) (Cuba) [hereinafter Law of the Recovery of Misappropriated
Goods]).
272. Consuegra-Barqufn, supra note 109, at 900.
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ers.273 This amount corresponded to about four percent of lands
nationalized.2 74
b. Rules for Expropriation of Sugar Plantations
Legislation required that sugar plantation ownership be recorded
within a year of the 1959 law.275 However, all stockholders had to be
Cuban citizens.276 Further, shareholders could not be owners, stock-
holders, or officers in any company engaged in sugar manufactur-
ing.2 7 Presumably, this restraint was to avoid conflicts of interest or
transfer pricing, defined as the ability to avoid taxes by over-invoicing
intercompany accounts carried out by a foreign parent company of a
domestic subsidiary.278 Companies not in compliance could be sub-
jected to expropriation of their land.2 79 Stockholders who did not
meet the new requirements were given a year to sell their interests on
terms approved by INRA.2s° More broadly, no unregistered corpora-
tion of any sort could hold agricultural land. 1 Already registered
companies could, of course, own land, subject to the size limits.2 - To
prevent companies from moving land around to avoid the risk of ex-
propriation, transfer of company-held agricultural property to another
company was forbidden.3
c. Citizen Ownership Requirements
Agrarian legislation provided that only Cuban citizens and com-
panies formed by Cubans could acquire rural property from 1959 on-
ward, unless exempted by INRA, which could permit foreign
corporate ownership. 2-4 Similarly, non-Cuban citizens could not ac-
quire rural property through inheritance; such land was subject to gov-
273. See Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 234 (1995) (citing MtcHA-E W. Gorx.no,. THE
CuBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FoREIGN PRIVATE PnorznR- 73 (1976)).
274. DUmONT, supra note 237, at 60.
275. Agrarian Reform Law art. 12.
276. Id. art. 12(b).
277. Id. art. 12(c).
278. For a discussion of transfer pricing abuses, especially among international corpora-
tions in Latin America, see Steven E. Hendrix, A Review of Argentine and Ecuadorian Tax
Law Regarding Transfer Pricing and Recommendations for Improving Ecuador's Ap-
proach, 20 U. MLA_"n I~mnR-AM. L. REv. 283, 284-90 (19S9).
279. Agrarian Reform Law art. 12.
280. Id. art. 13.
281. Id. art. 14.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. art. 15. The present Mexican constitution is quite similar in text, providing the
following:
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emiment expropriation." 5 A special resolution exempted foreigners
from the Article 15 prohibitions of agricultural land ownership where
the foreign farmer occupied land equal to or less than the
minimum. 286
d. Redistribution of Land and Indemnification of Owners
Immediately after Castro's rise to power, Ernesto "Che"
Guevarra, an early revolutionary leader, claimed that " [i]f Agrarian
Reform were to have to pay indemnities to owners, it would take ef-
fort slowly and at great cost.., peasants must engage in collective
action and democratically demand that this principle be waived. '2s
In 1960, Major Lufs Borg6s asserted that all he needed to do to expro-
priate land was to "sign a little paper. ' '2 88 Expropriations were carried
out with no preconceived plan, and no one spoke of even the smallest
indemnity.28 9 By the end of 1960, the Castro government had taken
more than $25 billion of privately owned Cuban property and almost
$1 billion of property owned by U.S. citizens.290
According to agrarian reform legislation, the vital minimum of
fertile, nonirrigated, rural land for a five person family was defined as
two caballerfas.29' State lands, and any private lands qualifying for
expropriation, were to be granted in full to cooperatives or distributed
in two caballeria lots to agrarian reform beneficiaries.2g Benefi-
S61o los mexicanos por nacimiento o por naturalizaci6n y las sociedades mexi-
canas tienen derecho para adquirir el dominio de las tierras .... El ]3stado podrd
conceder el mismo derecho a los extranjeros, siempre que conveIgan ante ia
Secretarfa de Relaciones en considerarse como nacionales respecto de dichos
bienes y en no invocar, por lo mismo, la protecci6n de sus gobiernos por 1o que se
refiere a aqullos ....
CONSTrrUCION tit. I, art. 1, § 27(I) (Mex.). In English, the provision reads:
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican societies [corpanies] have
the right to acquire dominion [ownership] over the lands... The State [Mexico]
may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree, before the Ministry
of Foreign Relations, to consider themselves [like] nationals with re:spect to such
property [beneficial agreements] and they do not invoke the protection of their
governments against the same [aforementioned].
Id.
285. Agrarian Reform Law art. 15.
286. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 100 (citing Resoluci6r No. 156 of Mar.
15, 1960).
287. DuMoNT, supra note 237, at 27-28.
288. Id. at 29.
289. i& at 29-30.
290. LAZO, supra note 38, at 240.
291. Agrarian Reform Law art. 16; see also Fournier F., supra note 48, at 84.
292. Agrarian Reform Law art. 17.
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ciaries, be they cooperatives or individuals, were responsible for the
appropriate taxes. 293 However, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and
squatters could receive the land free of charge up to the vital mini-
mum.z94 If farm size exceeded the vital minimum but remained five
caballerids or less, the first two were free of charge through the agra-
rian reform and the remaining portion could be purchased from the
owner by way of a forced sale if on private land, 95 or could be
granted free of charge if on state land.296 Property greater than five
caballertas was subject to distribution, after payment for any improve-
ments in the land.2 97
Landowners who were subject to expropriation, such as those
with more than thirty caballerfas, were required to submit documenta-
tion of ownership for purposes of indemnification2 9 - After a final
award of a parcel to a beneficiary, the grant could be inscribed at the
Rural Property Section of the Property Registries3 9 Any private
land not in production two years after the date of the agrarian reform
law was subject to expropriation 3°
In theory, constitutional requirements for indemnification were
to be followed. These requirements were based on sale value of the
farms, as reflected in municipal assessment statements dated before
October 10, 1958, with special provision for subsequent improve-
ments.301 Prior law had already given the State a preferential
purchase right over real property and securities.,,- However, under
the agrarian reform, capital gains in property, defined as the value
above the amount originally invested, plus additional investment of
capital or labor, were not fully paid. 3  Forty-five percent of the
"unearned increment" was handed over to the State. 4 It was then
293. Id. art. 17, para. 2.
294. Id. art. 16.
295. Id. art. 18.
296. Id. art. 21, para. 2.
297. IaM art. 56.
298. Id. art. 25.
299. Id. art. 28.
300. Id. transitory provision 7.
301. Agrarian Reform Law art. 29. Indemnification at cadastral or tax value has been
used in many agrarian reform programs in Latin America. For example, Chile indemnified
at the tax appraisal value of the property. See Joseph R. Thome, Law, Conflict, and
Change: Frei's Lav and Allende's Agrarian Reform, in SEARCI-NO FOR AGP.MARAN R.E.
FORNI n LAriN AimERcA 188, 197 (William C. Thiesenhusen ed., 19S9).
302. Agrarian Reform Law art. 57 (referring to Article S9 of the Organic Law of the
Republic).
303. Id. art. 30.
304. Id.
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transferred to IN1A for the benefit of peasants, and then to the ap-
propriate province, municipality or autonomous body.3°
Indemnification was to be paid in agrarian reform bonds, a type
of public security, with a floating interest rate capped at 4.5%. 3 06
These bonds were exempt from income tax for the first ten years, if
invested in new industries,30 7 and this opportunity was extended to
heirs of owners.30
The tax basis for indemnification was the self-declared value own-
ers had used for payment of property taxes.3 9 This was the same
method used by Guatemala, Bolivia,310 and other Latin American
countries.31'
Despite the law's requirement of compensation, thz Cuban gov-
ernment's agrarian reform program paid relatively low prices for the
land they expropriated.312 By 1961 the Cuban government had issued
bonds for $8,900,000 in compensation for 4,400,000 hectares of land.313
The Venezuelan government, with a far less radical land reform (be-
tween 1960 and 1963), paid $57,380,000 (roughly six times the Cuban
amount) for 579,000 hectares.314 This amounts to roughly about one
seventh of the total land area for Venezuela of 88,205,00 hectares.3 '
e. Redistributed Agricultural Property
Property received under agrarian reform carried with it restric-
tions. It could not be used for commercial businesses, other than
305. Id.
306. Id. art. 31.
307. Id. art. 32.
308. Id.
309. Id. art. 29.
310. MENmIVAR, supra note 241, at 396.
311. Cuban legislation used the 1958 tax return as evidence of property value. Harper,
supra note 266, at 777. Similarly, Peru used 1968 income tax returns to determine property
value. Id. One commentator noted that "this system [was] naturally beneficial to the hon-
est taxpayer, and detrimental to the dishonest one." Id.
312. IENjIVA, supra note 241, at 406-07
313. Id. at 407
314. Id. at 407-08.
315. Id.
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farmers' cooperatives.316 Property could only be transferred by inher-
itance, sale to the State, or by a sale authorized by INRA.317 The land
could not be leased, mortgaged, or sharecropped, and no one else
could be given a usufructuary interest in the land.3 18 The only excep-
tion involved asset-based lending to small farmers from the State or
from quasi-governmental institutions.3 19
The law also took steps to prevent fragmentation of land. -21 It
mandated that when parcels did change hands, as in inheritance, the
land could only pass in whole to a single heir.-2 Where more than
one heir had a valid claim on the land, as described in Article 1067 of
the Civil Code, then the lot was to be sold at auction to qualifying
peasants or agricultural workers.-' The proceeds were then to be di-
vided among the heirs, assuming the heirs were also peasants or agri-
cultural workers.3 3
Gender issues were also considered in the agrarian reform legisla-
tion. In cases of common law marriage, if the land was jointly occu-
pied for at least one year, the community property legislation for
stable, extramarital unions was applicable. 24
CUBA coMaPAED wrrH oTHER JmmsoIcrzONs: AREA EXPRO NRIATD
Percent of
Total Land land
Area Area redistributed Average
Redistributed (In) in (as % of Redistributed
No. of in Hectares the total land in Hectares.
Country Period Years (000) countr, area) year
Mexico 1915-1962 47 52.000 1.923.040 27 1.L06,D
Bolivia 1952-1962 10 4400 1.094.390 4 44A,0wl
Venezuela 1960-1963 3 579 &32.050 1 193. -0)
Italy 1950-1958 8 750 294.020 3 94,(iTA
Japan 1946-1949 3 2000 374.744 5 660.0)
Guatemala 1953-1954 1.5 606 108.430 6 414.0.D)
Cuba 1959-1961 2 4400 110.S60 40 1 1 _, co s]
Id at 406. CENTRAL INrtELLGENCE AGENCY, THm WoRLD FAcmoox: 1993 47, 98, 193,
198, 159, 255, 410 (1993) (for total land area in the individual countries). 100 hectares = 1
square kilometer (kin2).
316. Agrarian Reform Law art. 33.
317. Id. art. 34.
318. Id. These restrictions are typical in Latin America. See Hendrix, supra note 51, at
8-12.
319. Agrarian Reform Law art. 34, para. 2.
320. See generally Agrarian Reform Law.
321. Id. art. 35. See also Fournier F., supra note 48, at 8.
322. Agrarian Reform Law art. 35.
323. Id
324. Id- art. 36. Compare with Hendrix, supra note 51, at 13-14 (discussing other Latin
American jurisdictions).
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f. Agrarian Development Zones
As a part of agrarian reform, INRA was granted the power to
declare "agrarian development zones, '32 with each zone considered a
discrete administrative unit.326 These zones could be subdivided into
sections for better management. 327 A variety of factor; were consid-
ered in delineating each zone, including the following: (1) areas best
suited for property registration, population census, agricultural re-
search, and surveying; (2) agrological characteristics; (3) population
centers or settlements, state aid centers, peasant farmers' associations,
cooperatives, and local police stations; (4) hydrological resources; (5)
small, supplementary rural industries; and (6) existing communica-
tions facilities. 3 State aid centers were to provide agricultural ma-
chinery, equipment, granaries, storehouses, warehouses,
transportation, research facilities, electricity, and other assistance,
such as schools with boarding facilities, rural maternity homes, first
aid stations, dispensaries for medical and dental care, libraries, ath-
letic facilities, and cultural outlets.329
The agrarian reform law expressly provided a stated preference
for cooperatives, with management appointed by INRA.3 " On coop-
eratives, members were to personally work the land.33'
g. The National Agrarian Reform Institute
INRA was charged with overseeing agrarian reform.332 INRA
was an autonomous entity with its own legal personality. 333 The Cu-
ban Council of Ministers held the power to appoint INRA's president
and an executive director.334 Local committees, under tlhe supervision
of INRA, would be charged with enforcement.335 INRA's powers in-
cluded the following: (1) carrying out research; (2) proposing tax
measures; (3) proposing tariff protections; (4) coordinating housing,
health, and education improvement efforts within the rural popula-
tion; (5) defining agrarian development zones; (6) directing the review
325. Agrarian Reform Law art. 37. See also Fournier F., supra note 48, at 88.
326. Agrarian Reform Law art. 42.
327. Id art. 38.
328. Id. art. 40, paras. 1-6.
329. Id art. 41.
330. Id. art. 43.
331. Id art. 44.
332. Id. art. 48. See also CimurmNATro C., supra note 53, at 78.
333. Agrarian Reform Law art. 48.
334. Id art. 48, para. 2.
335. Id. art. 52.
[Vol. 20:1
Tensions in Cuban Property Law
of land distribution, the establishment of state aid offices, and the con-
veyancing of lands; (7) carrying out development plans; (8) drafting
regulations for cooperatives; (9) direct training in cooperatives; (10)
managing resettlements, land awards, distribution and other aspects of
the agrarian reform; (11) establishing its own budget and administer-
ing its own funds; (12) performing its own agricultural census every
five years; (13) establishing internal rules; and (14) linking with inter-
national associations where appropriate. 36 On the other hand, the
agrarian reform law did not apply to rural property occupied by ten-
ant farmers and squatters that 337 Additionally, the Revolutionary
Army was given a coordinating role in the functioning of INRAY s
INRA also managed aspects of agricultural credit and extension.
It was charged with establishing a credit department3 39 and contribut-
ing to efforts for the coordination of policy with the agricultural divi-
sion of the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank of Cuba.240
For its part, the State was charged with helping INRA provide agricul-
tural and livestock development units throughout the country to pro-
vide access to the following: (1) equipment and machinery; (2)
agronomical or zoological research; and (3) technical assistance.341
In 1966, property belonging to smallholders no longer capable of
farming due to age or disability was transferred to INRA under spe-
cial rules.342 The smallholder was allowed to remain in any housing
on the premises (if that were the owner's only home), along with a
small plot of land ten meters around the home, for the purpose of self-
consumption gardening. 3 This occupation of land was considered a
gratuitous usufructuary interest. - 4 In return, the smallholder re-
ceived a stipend from the government.345 These stipend benefits
could be passed on through inheritance to a spouse, companion, or
other family member who was incapacitated, lacked means for living,
or lived with the decedent.346
336. Id art. 48, paras. 1-14.
337. Id. art. 58.
338. Id. final pro-ision 4.
339. Id. art. 49.
340. Id.
341. Id. art. 50(a)-(c).
342. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 100-01 (citing Resoluci6n No. 120 (April
20, 1966) (Cuba) [hereinafter Resolution No. 1201).
343. Id. at 100 (discussing the effect of Resolution No. 120).
344. Id.
345. IM. at 100-01.
346. Id. (citing Resoluci6n No. 177 (Nov. 30, 1967) (Cuba) [hereinafter Resolution No.
177]).
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Furthermore, tribunales de tierra (special land tribunals) were
permitted to address claims arising from the agrarian reform legisla-
tion, as well as other issues related to agricultural contracts and rural
property. 47 Special resolution gave INRA the power to authorize
sales, grants, cession, alienation, or transfer of any agricultural prop-
erty.3a8 Additionally, the state was required to establish forest
reserves and national parks, with a view towards soil cortservation and
preservation of forests.349
h. Individual Versus Collective Ownership
i.-Historic Background
Law Number 3 of the Sierra Maestra, dated October 10, 1958, did
not address cooperatives or state farms.350 Subsequently, under the
agrarian reform law, farmers began to organize into farmer associa-
tions. Groups were often encouraged to sell property to the govern-
ment and join the state farms.35 1 By 1978, 137,000 small private
farmers remained, on an average farm size of 12.6 hectares; this repre-
sented about 20% of total crop and pasture land or 1,736,816
hectares. 352
As a result, Cuba had a higher degree of collectivization than
most Socialist countries.353 Cuban agricultural cooperatives (similar
to the Russian kolkhozy) were converted into state farms (similar to
the Russian sovkhozy) by mid-1962.354 Nevertheless, workers were
allowed to retain a small portion of land for individual self-produc-
tion.355 In 1967, however, this practice was stopped, reportedly be-
cause workers spent more time on their individual plots than on state
land.35
6
347. Agrarian Reform Law art. 54. In fact, these tribunals never care into existence.
See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 101.
348. See Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 99-100 (citing Resoluci6n No. 113 (Dec.
31, 1959) (Cuba) [hereinafter Resolution No. 113]).
349. Agrarian Reform Law art. 55.
350. LAzo, supra note 38, at 242.
351. Rathbone, Farmlan4 supra note 251, at 2.
352. kIl
353. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Revolutionary Offensive, in CUBAN COMMUNISM, supra
note 139, at 75.
354. Id.
355. Within the Socialist block, most land was held as kolkhozy, exc(:pt in Poland and
Yugoslavia, where the majority of land was still held by private farmers. See id.
356. Id.
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In the old Soviet Union, small garden plots accounted for almost
a third of total agricultural production.3 7 There is anecdotal evidence
from Cuba that small private plots might have made similar contribu-
tions. 5 One estimate in 1963 placed work productivity on state farms
at half that of private farms. 359
Collectivization in Cuba was encouraged in part because of the
belief that centralization of machines would ensure full employ-
ment.3 60 Consultants claimed that small farmer production had failed
in Bolivia and Mexico while the International Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) asserted small producers
had restricted modernization in Jamaica.26' Cuba was thus en-
couraged to collectivize production. 62
After 1974, with government encouragement and incentives, or-
ganization of Cooperativas de Producci6n Agropecuaria (agricultural
production cooperatives) (CPAs) increasedV6 3 From 1977 to 1984, the
number of CPA's ballooned from 44 to 1414.3  Membership jumped
from 365 to 72,500, and the area of land used by CPAs increased from
6052 hectares to 1,083,292 hectares. 365
In 1989, CPAs accounted for 7.8% of Cuban land (868,200 hect-
ares) and was comprised of 1353 associations, representing 64,000
357. William C. 'fhiesenhusen, Presentation on Private Property Conversion in Russia
Before the Organization of American States Conference on Tenure Change in Formerly
Socialist Economies (Sept. 18, 1992) (notes from presentation on file with author) [herein-
after Thiesenhusen Presentation].
358. For a general discussion of the increasing role of small private farming in Cuba, sea
Carmen Diana Deere, Socialism on One Island? Cuba's National Food Program and Its
Prospects for Food Security, 124 INST. OF Soc. SrtuD. WonmiiG PAPEr, SEIEs 38, 39
(1992).
359. DusoNrr, supra note 237, at 74.
360. Id. at 54.
361. Id. at 32-33.
362. Id.
DisTIRrmBno-, oF AOnPA.R Rnso, PRoPzRY' LN NlAM 1961
Granjas del Pueblo (state farms) 2.433.449 hctares
Cane cooperatives 6AY9.119 hectares
Private Property 1.196311 hectares
Total area affected by the Agrarian Reform 4.43S379 hectares
NMENnvAR, supra note 241, at 407.
363. See Asesores para el Avance Social et al., Perfil de Proyeeto: El Cambio en el
Manejo de las Empresas Agropecuarias en Cuba: De Empresas Estateles a Cooperativas
(1995) (on file with the Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin) [hereinafter
Cuba Project Paper] (stating that CPAs are regulated under Ley 36 of July 1992).
364. Rathbone, Farmland, supra note 251, at 2.
365. Id.
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workers.366 The average farm had 647 hectares with 47 workers.3 67
CPAs mainly engaged in export crops, usually sugar (43% of CPA
land and labor), tobacco (10% of CPA land and 15% of CPA labor),
and coffee (15% of CPA land and 13% of CPA labor).368
CPA membership was divided between "contributory mem-
bers"-those who had donated property-and "noncontributory
members"-those who had not donated any property to the CPA.369
Many noncontributing members were family members of the contrib-
uting membership.370  In fact, few CPA members were outsiders. 1
Those outsiders who did become members usually represented a spe-
cialized trade or skill. Nationwide, about thirty-eight percent of mem-
bership was classified as "contributory. 372
Members were encouraged to contribute assets to the association
and were compensated for that contribution.373 Contributions could
take the form of cattle, machinery, or other assets. All contributions
were valued carefully.374 Compensation was paid over a five to seven
year period, with twenty-five to thirty percent of a CPA's net profits
366. Id. at 3.
367. Id.
368. Id.
AGRARiAN REFORm AND GROUP FARMING AS A RESULT OF AGRARAN REFORMS IN
LATIN AMERICA, VARIOUS RECENT YEARS
General Data on Group Farming in the Caribbean and Central America
Dominican
El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Guatemala Republic
Number of 317 1939 1110 67 131
Group FarmsTotal Area(hectares) 214,049 294,424 448,104 NA 61,499
Number of 31,359 48,129 22,823 2993 15,676members
Cooperativas Asentamientos, Cooperativas Cooperativas
Type of (1st phase of Cooperativas, Agrarias de Padre Asentamlentos
Enterprise agrarian Empresas Sandinastas Gir6n and Colectivos
reform) Agrarias (CAS) others
Date 1985 1985 1985 1987 1983
J. David Stanfield & Malcolm Childress, The Viability of Group Farming Ownership Mod-
els for Central America: A Comparison of the Honduran and Salvadoran Cases (1989) at 3
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Land Tenure Center Library, University of
Wisconsin).
369. Rathbone, Farmland, supra note 251, at 3.
370. Id.
371. Id
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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being set aside specifically for compensation purposes.37s In response
to the 1974 initiative by the government, by 1981, sixty-four percent of
CPA land had been contributed by members, and twenty percent by
the state (representing a conversion of state farms into CPAs)- 7 6
CPAs were difficult to classify as either private or public, because
they displayed characteristics of both. In terms of public characteris-
tics, the CPAs shared similarities with public entities that had an orga-
nizational structure resembling public entities and specialized labor
brigades.377 In addition, CPA property was not inheritable, and was
required to produce a state-determined output.3 7S Statutes classified
them as privately owned and they had the right to divide or merge
with other CPAs.379 Furthermore, CPA members were free to enter
and leave.3So Still, the main deterrent to leaving the CPA was the in-
ability to take any property upon departure, except for contributory
property for which the worker had not received any compensation.s 1
As a result, the CPAs were a hybrid of public and private interests.-2
Nevertheless, first generation workers tended to classify themselves
with the private sector, while second generation workers identified
more with wage workers on state farms s3
Similarly, in 1992, Cuba's private agriculture sector was small.
Only about 9.7% of total island land and just 3% of the agricultural
workforce were employed in private sector agriculture. 3 Farmers in
this sector were often elderly, with their children only rarely following
in their footstepsS 5 There was no formal pension arrangement, and
farmers received only limited health benefits.s 6 In retirement, farm-
ers could elect to sell the family farm to a state or association, in effect
establishing a funding mechanism for retirement or health ex-
penses.387 To overcome some of these obstacles, most small farmers
joined a Cooperativas de Cr~dito y Servicio (Credit and Service Coop-
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id-
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 4.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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erative) (CCS).38 8 These cooperatives served as a conduit for receipt
of state inputs and technical assistance. 389 Farmers not members of a
CCS were typically dispersed subsistence farmers.390
In 1989, CCS members held about 7.6% of national land, about
833,100 hectares.A91 These farms produced tobacco and specialized
crops like vegetables (especially tomatoes), coffee, and bananas. 92
Production was marketed to the state through negotiated quotas, and
land, equipment, and produce remained privately held.393 Members
shared some installations and services.394 That same year, dispersed
private farms occupied only 2.2% of Cuban territory, approximately
249,000 hectares, mainly in the eastern half of the country.395 These
were generally self-sufficient farms engaged in growing a range of
crops and livestock.39
ii.-The Second Agrarian Reform Law (1963)
The second agrarian reform law397 had its roots in the continued
conflict with Cuban owners of large estates and the United States boy-
cott.398 Despite the efforts of the initial reform law, a poor asset dis-
tribution continued, with seven percent of farmers each owning
seventy-six hectares constituting forty-seven percent of all private
landholdings.399 About twenty-five percent of all cultivable land on
the island still remained in the hands of about one percent of the pop-
ulation at the end of the first agrarian reform law.4°°
This legislation sought to: (a) advance further the dismantling of
large estates; (b) reduce the maximum landholdings per person to five
caballerias; (c) proclaim the expropriation of all farms above the size
388. Id
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. 1d
394. Id.
395. Id at 5.
396. Id.
397. See MENJivAR, supra note 241, at 409 (discussing Segundo Ley de Reforma
Agraria (Oct. 3, 1963) (Cuba) [Second Agrarian Reform Law]).
398. For example, the fourth whereas clause of the Second Agrarian Reform Law spe-
cifically refers to imperialismo yanqui (yankee imperialism) and burgueses rurales (rural
bourgeois). Id at 410. The use of this language underscores the distinctly political, rather
than economic or technical, nature of the second agrarian reform.
399. Fournier F., supra note 48, at 92.
400. Id.
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per person limit of five caballerfas, unlike the first agrarian reform law
which allowed for the continuation of some larger farms.401
The new legislation was in some degree a response to a deteriora-
tion in Cuban-U.S. relations.402 The law mandated the expropriation
of all farms larger than five caballeras.40 3 However, the same two
exceptions from expropriation for larger farms applied; cooperatives
where land per person remained five caballerfas or less and high pro-
ductivity farms were exempt from expropriation.4 4
The second agrarian reform law resulted in the following reforms:
(a) state agricultural ownership of fertile lands increased to 70%; (b)
remnant large estates from the first Agrarian Reform Law were elimi-
nated; (c) the "Socialist agricultural transformation" was viewed as
complete.40 5
iii.-New Liberalizations
From 1982 to September 1995, 212 foreign investors had formed
joint venture companies with local participation,40 6 representing about
$2 billion in foreign investment into Cuba.40 7 The U.S.-Cuba Trade
and Economic Council calculated that, as of August 1995, approxi-
mately $4.9 billion in foreign investment had been announced, of
401. Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 97.
402. See MENJmAmR, supra note 241, at 410 (discussing the Cuban missile crisis of Octo-
ber 1962). According to Carlos Rafael Rodrfguez, "Diferir ]a segunda reforma agraria
hubiera sido comprometer por mucho tiempo el desarrollo agropeeuario de Cuba." Id. In
translation this provision reads: "To defer the second agrarian reform would compromise,
for too long, the development [unfolding] of Cuban agricultural concerns." Id.
403. Navarrete Acevedo, supra note 59, at 97.
404. Id at 98.
405. Id. at 99.
DISTRMUTION OF AGRARIAN REFORN L.ND: STATE VS. PRIVATE O,-P.SHIP
1963: Before the 1963: After the
1959: After the first second agrarian second agrarian
Year agrarian reform law reform law reform law
Percent State 40 52 71
Ownership of Land
Percent Private
Sector Ownership 60 48 29
of Land I I I
OscAR TiNcrmr VIERA, LA COOPERATiViZACI6N DE LA TIERRA EN EL AGPO CUBANO
24 (1984).
406. Castro Says Approval of Investments Will be Flexible' but Subject to Scrutiny,
supra note 17.
407. Douglas Farah, Havana Swings Its Doors Open Wider, INT'L HERALD TPi., Sept.
6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Iht File [hereinafter Farah, Havanal. Prior to
1982, no foreign investments were permitted in Cuba. See Lionel Martin, Cuba to Free Up
Investment Laws, GuYANA CHRON., Sept. 4, 1995, at 8; Jos6 de Cordoba, Cuba Will Allow
Foreigners to Own 100% of Firms, WVALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at All.
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which $556 million had been formally committed. 08 Presently, a
Mexican joint venture is fixing Cuba's telephone system, French and
Russian companies are completing the Jaragua nuclear power plant,
and other long-term infrastructure projects are advancing with foreign
financing.4°9 Japanese cars, British gasoline stations, and Spanish ho-
tels have become common across Cuba. 10
In this spirit, the Cuban government has dramatically altered its
philosophy and approach towards state farms and CPAs.411 However,
Cuban historian Carmelo Mesa-Lago suggests that the new liberaliza-
tions are perhaps best understood as measures to perfect socialism,
rather than a wholesale move to capitalism. Today, tensions within
the government are increasing because moderate reformers, who do
not advocate capitalism but want to introduce market mechanisms,
are opposed by orthodox hard-liners who resist these crucial
changes.412
"Castro permitted some limited market-oriented reforms to be
enacted in mid-1993," Mesa-Lago says, "but he apparently is trying to
halt further change... [t]he pressure from below for reforms has been
enormous but Fidel has been reluctant to make domest.c changes be-
cause he is afraid changes will lead to what happened hi Eastern Eu-
rope.'413 Despite additional reforms in 1995, the Cuban government
clearly indicated that the new provisions did not mean Cuba was in
the process of giving up its Marxist revolution.41 4
408. Douglas Farah, Foreign Investors Finding Cuba More Comfortable - With U.S.
Away, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1995, at A14 [hereinafter Farah, Foreign investors].
409. Id.
410. John Rice, Cuba Debates Foreign Investment, AustmN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 5,
1995, at A5, available in 1995 WL 6103917.
411. Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Turns State-Owned Farms into Private Operations, LAS
VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 25, 1993 at 8C; Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Relaxes Faem Rules to Boost
Food Production, MORNING NEws TRm. (Tacoma, Washington), Sept, 16, 1993, at C7,
available in 1993 WL 8762437. For other changes in the banking sector, see Dalia Acosta,
Economy-Cuba: No Readjustement Without Banking Reform, Inter Prcss Service, Jan. 2,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
412. Deibler, supra note 160, at D4. Geralyn Pye, from the Flinders University of
South Australia, argues that there has been a considerable amount of self-criticism and
reform in Cuba in recent years. See Geralyn Pye, Cuba Since the Fourth Congress, Paper
Presented at the Latin American Studies Association Meeting, Washington, D.C. 2 (Sept.
28-30, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter LASA Meeting]. Cuban rhetoric continues
to reaffirm a commitment to Marxism-Leninism. Id. But in practice, Marxism-Leninism is
defined increasingly broadly, and Cuban policy more and more represents a pragmatic
response to the severe economic difficulties it has encountered since the mid-1980's. Id
413. Deibler, supra note 160, at D4.
414. Farah, Havana, supra note 407, at A14.
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Specifically with regard to the 1995 Foreign Investment Law, Er-
nesto Melendez, Minister of Foreign Investment, stated, "This law
regulates and opens broad avenues for foreign investment. But it is
not inspired by neoliberalism, and its goal is not a transition to capital-
ism."1'5 Osvaldo Martinez, who sponsored the law as chairman of the
Economic Committee, claimed, "This is an opening to defend and de-
velop socialism," and not one that is inspired by capitalist econom-
ics.4 16 On this same legislation, Fidel Castro classified the law as
"broad and quite radical," aimed at adapting the Cuban economy to
the "new realities of today's world." '417 However, Castro emphasized
that "[t]hat does not mean in any way a return to capitalism, much less
beginning a crazy race in that direction. ' '41s John Kavulich, president
of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, asserted that the new
foreign investment law is a "transitional document" and James Whise-
hand, a Miami attorney and author of a Cuba business newsletter
characterized the law as a "zig-zag motion with a net forward gain
towards more free-market activity.14 19
Since September 1993, about eighty percent of the state farms
have been broken into unidades bdsicas deproduci6n cooperativa (ba-
sic units of cooperative production) (UBPC).4 20 In short, the Cuban
leadership has abandoned its previous ideological commitment to
state farms as the preferred form of Socialist agricultural produc-
tion.421 However, the extent of change to the basic philosophy is
debatable.42
415. Douglas Farah, Cuba Approves Law Promoting Foreign Interest, L.A. TIM1ES, Sept.
6, 1995, at Dl [hereinafter Farah, Cuba].
416. Rice, supra note 410, at A5.
417. Cubans to Discuss New Investment Law, UPI, Aug. 31. 1995, available in LEXIS
News Library, UPI File.
418. Id.
419. de Cordoba, supra note 407, at All.
420. Nahela Becerril Albarran & Victor Figueroa Albelo, Tenencia de la Tierra y
Cooperativizaci6n Agrfcola en Cuba (May 12, 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file wvith
the Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin) (citing Decreto Ley No. 142
(Sept. 20, 1993) (Cuba) [hereinafter Decree Law No. 142]). Cuba Project Paper, supra
note 363, at 1. Messina Presentation, supra note 11.
421. Deere Testimony, supra note 16, at 2; Indeed, the legislation itself notes that Arti-
cles 15 and 17 of the Constitution allow for Socialist state property to be tramferred to
legal entities or individuals on an exceptional basis, and it is this authority that creates the
UBPC's. See Decree Law No. 142, whereas cl. 1.
422. Victor Figueroa Albelo, Rural Development and Cooperatives Group, Univer-
sidad Central de las Villas, Hacia una F6rmula Cooperativa del Sector Estatal Agfcola en
Cuba iii (Jan. 15, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Land Tenure Center Li-
brary, University of Wisconsin). Geralyn Pye argues that it is difficult to identify a clear
direction in Cuban policy over the past few years. See Pye, supra note 412, at.
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Articles 14, 15, and 17 of the 1992 Constitution allow for state
lands to be transferred to the private sector.413 The resulting new
UBPC is a type of cooperative designed to replace the state farm sec-
tor.424 An estimated 4000 cooperatives will be created out of 385 for-
mer state farms affecting 82.3% of national agriculture lands or
500,000 workers.425 By May of 1995, state farms accounted for only
25% of Cuban territory, while UBPCs held 55% of the land.426
Another initiative within the rubric of dismantling state farms is a
land access program that would provide landless peasants, or groups
who organize as a UBPC, with the opportunity to use former state
farms.427 The land can be used for subsistence farms or for tobacco
production. Further use possibilities include coffee, vegetables, or
other products. 2 8 Self-consumption lots were originally half a hectare
(twelve cordeles) in size, although this has been reduced to a quarter
of a hectare (six cordeles). In 1993 and 1994, 2000 new small coopera-
tives were brought into this system,429 about 1556 of these in the sugar
sector, representing about eighty thousand cooperative farmers. 4-10
Still other state lands are being incorporated into existing CPAs.431
There were six legislative objectives underlying the creation of
the UBPCs. 432 First, UBPCs were created to affect the relationship
between the farmer and results. Second, UBPCs aimed to ensure self-
sustaining agricultural production for the farmer, his family, and the
community. Third, the UBPCs were created to improve worker life
and housing conditions. Fourth, UBPCs aimed to encourage strong
association of increased quality of life and personal income with work
results. Fifth, development of self-management for the IJBPC was an-
423. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 3 (citing Decree Law No. 142, whereas cl. 1
and the 1992 CONSTrrUTIoN).
424. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 1.
425. Id. at 3.
426. Jennifer Abbassi, Lessons from the Farmers Markets in Cuba, Then (1980-1986)
and Now, Paper Presented at the LASA Meeting, supra note 412, at 8.
427. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 1; Beatriz Dfaz, Biotecnologfa Agrfcola: Es-
tudio de Caso en Cuba, Paper Presented at the LASA Meeting, supra rote 412, at 14. A
number of local economists note an increase in the number of young people returning to
the land. See Abbassi, supra note 426, at 14.
428. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 2.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Lupo Nuflez Rodriguez, Asociaci6n Nacional de Economistas de Cuba, Evoluci6n
de la Organizaci6n Empresarial Agropecuaria en la Cuba Revolucionaria, Presentation at
the LASA Meeting, supra note 412, at 13.
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ticipated. Sixth, UBPCs were developed with the idea of voluntary
participation by workers.
By the end of 1993 the new UBPC sector already encompassed
about 26.5% of national lands. 4-3 State agricultural enterprises still
held about 47.5% of lands, with about 8.5% of lands in other state
entities.434 CPAs accounted for 8% of land, with independent farmers
occupying about 10.5% of the island.435 However, the distribution has
not been uniform nationally. For example, the Havana Province con-
tained CPAs and peasants on about 40% of its lands, with UBPC's
and the Ej6rcito Juvenil del Trabajo (Young Worker's Army) (EJT)
on the remaining 60%.411
UBPCs are allowed a high degree of self-management through a
general assembly of its members and an elected administration
board.437 The assemblea general (the general assembly) is the highest
decision-making authority of the UBPC.43s The junta adininstracion
(the administrative board) is the executive and administrative organ
of the UBPC.439 The administrator is the highest legal representative
433. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 4.
DisriunrioN OF UBPCs As OF J NE 1995
Number of Number of Areas receivcd in usufruct
Type of UBPC Cooperatives Members (in hectares)
Sugar Cane 1296 133.685 1,6S0kO
Non-Supar Cane 1558 132.087 1.510, .)
Total 2854 265,772 3.19f.v9l0
Dfaz, supra note 427, at 3.
434. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 4.
435. Id
436. Id.
1977 197
TENuRE Foim Number Areas Number Arca
of Units (Hectares) of units (Hecares)
1. State Businesses 8351.700 8,671.4q)
11. Cooperative Property (CPA) 296 45200 1418 935,( 0
IIL Usufruct (CPS. Ind.) 0 0 89
IV. Economic Parcel
A. Employed Worker 0 0 31,912 91.31
B. Other Private 0 0 22.771 7713
Total 10.381500 1107.4 D1
Becerril Albarran & Figueroa Albelo, supra note 420, at 26. The total line reflects total
agricultural land area, not necessarily the column total.
437. Dfaz, supra note 427, at 2.
438. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 24. The General Assembly, Administrative
Board, and Administrator positions were created by Resoluci6n No. 35493, arts. 6, 10-13
(Sept. 28, 1993) (Cuba) [hereinafter Resolution No. 354f93].
439. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 4.
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of the UBPC and ensures compliance with the General Assembly and
the Administrative Board Decisions."40 They select their own mem-
bers, establish capitalization requirements, elect four managers, set
self-consumption levels, and make other relevant management deci-
sions. 41 Land assets of the UBPC remain state property.44 Yet, the
UBPCs maintain an indefinite usufructuary interest443 in the land,
444
an interest typically inscribed at the official registry.445 With this type
of property interest, UBPC members (ubepecistas) effectively manage
a voluntary, private cooperative, and own what they produce.
44
"
The UBPC is a "social and economic organization" made up of
workers with autonomous power, and with its own juridical personal-
ity.447 In this sense, the UBPC manages the factors of production on
its own behalf. This includes internal organization of labor, con-
tracting of any outside labor needed, negotiation of credit with bank-
ing officials, designation of any self-consumption levels, and setting of
organizational structure and remuneration.448
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 20.
443. Decree Law 142 art. 2(a); Dfaz, supra note 427, at 25 (citing Acuerdo del Buro
Polftico (Sept. 10, 1993) (Cuba) [hereinafter Political Bureau Agreement]).
444. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 20 (citing Decree Law No. 142 art. 2).
445. Id.
446. Deere Testimony, supra note 16, at 5.
447. Decree Law No. 142, art. 2; Resolution No. 354/93 art. 1; Becerril Albarran &
Figueroa Albelo, supra note 420, at 17; Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 24. The exact
nature of the UBPC legal personality is at this stage still evolving. See Jos6 Lufs Martfn
Romero, Los Sindicatos Cubanos Ante la Crisis Actual, Paper Presented at the LASA
Meeting, supra note 412, at 8.
LISTING OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UBPCs.
Public Characteristics Private Characteristics
The mother state enterprise retains ownership UBPCs can own nonland property.
over the land.
The mother state enterprise retains the
exclusive rights to sale of inputs to the Autonomous managemimt of
UBPCs, and to purchase of UBPC outputs, production
at price levels which are centrally controlled.
UBPCs must seek optimal levels of Members retain benefits of increased
production, not optimal economic behavior, productivity.
The state provides subsidized credit Invests collective capital.
opportunities for UBPCs. I
See Deere Testimony, supra note 16, at 5, 11.
448. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 25; Becerril Albarran & Figueroa Albelo,
supra note 420, at 17.
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There are several external problems facing UBPCs in Cuba.' 9
Water and land quality depend on whatever the State provides.4
The amount and disposition of cooperative credit and the amount of
existing debt are also problems."5 In addition, there are difficulties in
assuring a favorable and stable market for production 4 2 Finally, co-
operative regulatory legislation can limit decentralized and flexible
development by requiring a specific organizational structure.4 53
The relationship between the UBPC and the state has changed
dramatically under the new arrangement.4 54 Many legal restrictions in
management decision-making have been removed.-' Still, despite
legal autonomy from the state, the UBPCs remain dependent on the
state for credit access and usufructuary rights45 These factors limit
the commercial autonomy of the new cooperatives 4 7
Further, the functions of the UBPC are redefined through polit-
ical processes4 s Ministries of Sugar and Agriculture continue to
have some organizational and directional oversight over the
UBPCs. 459 Additional regulations from the Ministry of Sugar
(MINAZ) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) further circum-
scribe UBPC activity.460 External economic relationships between
UBPCs are nearly impossible, as any such transactions would require
prior approval from the state.461
UBPCs have been extended through much of the sugar cane in-
dustry. Between September and December of 1993, 1556 sugar cane
UBPCs were organized, accounting for about ninety percent of the
land previously in the hands of state sugar entities complejos
449. Cuba Project Paper, supra note 363, at 3.
450. Id
451. ld.
452. Id-
453. l See also Nufiez Rodriguez, supra note 432, at 15.
454. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 26.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id The July 7, 1995 issue of the periodical Bohemia reports that self-management
still has not been achieved. Id- There is still no autonomy, Bohemia argues. Id. In thi3
regard, UBPC's are "autonomous to lose and pay" and UBPC's are still under the "lense
of paternalism." See Nufiez Rodriguez, supra note 432, at 15.
458. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 27 (citing Political Bureau Agreement).
459. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 27 (citing El Acuerdo No. 2703 del Comitd
Ejecutivo del Consejo de Ministros (Sept. 21, 1993) (Cuba) [Agreement No. 2703 from the
Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers] [hereinafter Agreement No. 2703]).
460. Figueroa Albelo, supra note 422, at 27-28.
461. Agreement No. 2708 7th cl.
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agroindustriales (CAts).4 62 Mixed cultivation state enterprises are
now experimenting with the new organizational structure of UBPC.
By January 1994, 816 UBPCs with 81,000 members had been organ-
ized.4 3 The UBPC structure has been extended to dairy and livestock
production in the province of Holguin since January 1994, and the
province of Havana since March 1994.464
There are also several problems associated with UBPCs in
Cuba." 5 First, joint owners often rank consumption needs over coop-
erative capital and skill investment. Second, there is no practical need
or legal mechanism (like commercial or business shares) to assure that
a joint owner will recoup future investments made into the enterprise.
These problems may translate into low levels of investment and grad-
ual reduction in the viability of the productive unit. Third, production
cooperatives frequently limit hand labor or wage participation by fam-
ily members of the joint owners. There are few clear inheritance
rules, and restrictions on family participation are creating dissatisfac-
tion among joint owners. Finally, lack of incentives and adequate su-
pervision mechanisms mean lower joint labor productivity.
Traditional problems of free riders in cooperative arrangements thus
emerge.
Organized labor in Cuba has also identified the following
problems associated with the UBPC structure: (1) the lack of auton-
omy in decision-making for the UBPC; (2) the fact that UBPC admin-
istrative decisions effectively go beyond just day to day matters, and
462. Deere Testimony, supra note 16, at 5.
463. IM at 6.
464. Id
DISTRIBUTION OF NON-SUGAR CANE UBPCs: JUNE 1995
'T'ype of Agriculture Number of Cooperatives
Various Produce 356
Cattle 728
Citric Products and Fruit 110
Apiculture 71
Coffee 204
Tobacco 70
Rice 15
Mixed 2
Forest 2
TOTAL 1558
Dfaz, supra note 427, at 3.
465. Cuba Project Paper, supra note 363, at 2-3.
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include, for example, personnel policy; (3) many UBPC decisions are
made without any state intervention from govemment. 46
Another liberalization in the agriculture sector involves the farm-
ers' markets.4 7 In these markets, which had officially existed until
1985, 46s surplus agricultural produce-production above and beyond
production quotas-could be sold privately.469 These markets were
reopened in the autumn of 1994.470 Although undocumented, there is
speculation that this policy change is a result of military pressure to
address the underlying causes of public unrest in Cuba. 471 Reopening
the markets has had the effect of "bleaching the black market"-that
is making legal what was previously illegal.47 Since the change, the
value of the Cuban peso rose from 140 pesos to the U.S. dollar (before
the change in 1994) to about 40 or 50 pesos to the dollar in early
1995,173 and 10 pesos to the dollar in early September 1995. a47 It is
not clear whether re-opening the markets has actually increased food
production; some experts speculate that food production is being di-
verted from the quota system to the farmers markets475 In practice,
production quotas that had been imposed on farms were not being
met.476 Nevertheless, more food appeared in May 1995 than had been
available twelve or fifteen months earlier.47 While some have sus-
pected military participation in the production of food, the level of
466. Martin Romero, supra note 447, at 8.
467. See generally Abbassi, supra note 426, at 14.
468. The mercados libres campesinos (free peasant markets) were eliminated in mid-
1986. Sergio G. Roca, Reflections on Economic Policy in Cuba's Food Program, in CUBA
AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 161, at 94-95,110. In October 1991 the issue of free peasant
markets was again presented to the Communist Party. Id. At the Fourth Party Congress,
the Party rejected the reinstitution of the markets. Id.
469. Messina Presentation, supra note 11.
470. hI. Abbassi, supra note 426, at 14.
471. Messina Presentation, supra note 11.
472. Id. President Castro has noted that the dollar was in circulation even before it was
decriminalized because tips were paid in dollars or people received dollars through rela-
tives. Remarks by Cuban President Fidel Castro to the National Assembly of the People's
Government, ANPP (radio broadcast, Cuban TV, Tele Rebelde, Havana, Sept. 4,1995), in
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bbcwb File [hereinafter Castro's Remarks]. The dollar was circulating and "all ve did was
legalize something that was already taking place." Id.
473. Messina Presentation, supra note 11. Since July 1993, the government has author-
ized the free circulation of the dollar. See Farah, Cuba, supra note 415, at Dl.
474. Cubans to Discuss New Investment Lmv, supra note 417.
475. Messina Presentation, supra note 11.
476. Id.
477. ld.
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involvement in food production and food markets has not yet been
defined or documented.478
Another important change in policy has addressed private sector
employment. 479 Individuals are now allowed to be self-employed. 48
Appropriate businesses include barber shops, restaurants, bicycle re-
pair shops, and other businesses that cater to the Cuban people, not
the tourists.481 In addition, there is anticipation that joint ventures
will be formed in the near future, if they have not already been organ-
ized, between the state and foreign capital entities that are dedicated
to food production.'
In 1995, modifications in Cuba's property law continued, this time
in the form of a new Foreign Investment Law483 that allowed foreign
ownership to extend beyond minority participation in a joint ven-
ture.4 " It extends to all foreign citizens, even native Cubans who
have taken foreign citizenship, including Americans, although the
blockade will make participation nearly impossible for those individu-
als.485 For the first time in Cuban history, the legislation has also per-
mitted assembly plants to use Cuban labor to attract capital and
technology4 86 within duty-free trade and industrial zones.487 This will
478. Id.
479. Id. Article 45 of the Cuban Constitution states: "El trabajo en la sociedad Social-
ista es un derecho, un deber y un motivo de honor para cada ciudadano." 1992 CONSTITU-
TION art. 45. In translation Article 45 reads; "Work in the Socialist society is a right, a duty,
and a source of pride for each citizen." Id.
480. Messina Presentation, supra note 11.
481. Id.
482. Article 23 of the Cuban Constitution recognizes property of mxed business ven-
tures. 1992 CONSTrrUION art. 23.
483. Ley Para Ia Inversi6n Extranjera (Sept. 5, 1995) (Cuba) [hereinafter Foreign In-
vestment Law] (on file with the Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin);
Parliament Head Alarc6n Issues Warning on Helms-Burton Bill, in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Sept. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcwb File.
484. Davies, supra note 3, at 14. The law includes a measure to allow foreign investors
to establish fully owned subsidiaries in Cuba without participation in such companies by
Cuban state firms. See Cuban Parliament Passes Controversial Investment Law Changes,
Deutsche Press-Agenter, Sept. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Un-
til this legislation, foreign companies could only own up to 49 percent of it Cuban company.
Id.
485. Parliament Head Alarc6n Issues Warning on Helms-Burton Bill, supra note 483;
Castro's Remarks, supra note 472; Cuban Parliament Passes Controversial Investment Law
Changes, supra note 484.
486. Farah, Cuba, supra note 415, at D1.
487. Foreign Investment Law arts. 50-53; Maribel Acosta & Julio Acanda, Radio Out-
lines Main Points of Foreign Investment Law, (radio broadcast, Cuban TV, Aug. 31, 1995),
in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bbewb File [hereinafter Acosta & Acanda Report].
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be similar to the Mexican maquiladora" model used to manufacture
for export.4s 9 However, strategic businesses, those connected with na-
tional security, defense, education, and public health, continue to have
restricted ownership.490  Yet even in these areas, foreign private in-
vestment in management systems will be allowed 4 91
Additional provisions of the new investment law will guarantee
the right to repatriate profits.49 Investors will have the freedom to
purchase residential, office, or tourist properties. 493 Further, they will
be able to sell their interests either to the government or to a third
party, provided the investors obtain prior government author-
ization.494
As part of the legislative debate, Deputies Agustfn Lage and Fer-
nando Vecino requested that the law expressly prohibit Cubans living
in other countries from participating in investments in Cuba.495
Others argued that trying to exclude Cubans living abroad would be
difficult and would aid those who portray Cuba as intolerant.49 6
While the final draft allows for all to invest, an executive committee of
the Council of Ministers along with a governmental commission still
must approve proposals on a case-by-case basis.4 97 Further, foreign
488. A maquiladora is typically a manufacturing plant along the U.S.-Mexico border,
where foreign materials are sent, manufactured, and then returned to the original market.
AmEIcAN HETAGE DicrioNARY 1097 (3rd ed. 1992).
489. Castro Takes One More Step Toward Capitalism, supra note 3, at 45.
490. Foreign Investment Law art. 10; Davies, supra note 3, at 14.
491. Foreign Investment Law art. 10.
492. Id. art. S; Castro Takes One More Step Toward Capitalism, supra note 3, at 45;
Rice, supra note 410, at A5.
493. Foreign Investment Law art. 16(2)(a)-(c); Rice, supra note 410, at AS; Farah,
Cuba, supra note 415, at D1.
494. Foreign Investment Law art. 6.
495. Douglas Farah, Socialist Cuba Alters Course to Spur Foreign Investment; New-, Cu-
ban Law Permits Free-Trade Zones, WASH. Post, Sept. 6, 1995, at Al. Supporters of op.en
investment, even by former Cuban nationals, include Fidel Castro, Alfredo Guevara, Mi-
guel Barnet, Orfilio Pelaez, Lazaro Barredo, Roberto Bobaina, Eusebio Leal, Luis Estruch
and Vicente Junenez. Castro Says Cuban Emigrs Should Not Be Excluded from Nve;,
Investment Law, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Bbcwb File.
496. Id.
497. Castro Says Cuban tmigr&s Should Not Be Excluded from New Investment Law,
supra note 495. Authorization has been defined as one coming from either the Executive
Committee of the Council of Ministers, or a Government Commission designated by the
Council. Foreign Investment Law art. 2(a). According to Article 21(2), an investment
must be approved by the Executive Committee it: (a) the transaction is over USSO mil-
lion; (b) the capital is entirely from overseas; (c) the investments in public services includ-
ing transportation, communication, aqueducts, electricity, or for the building or operation
of any other public work; (d) the investment is by a foreign government; (e) the project is
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investors are expected to offer foreign exchange, technology, and mar-
kets.4 98 The new legislation is said to allow flexibility, but will require
verification and consultation.499 Additionally, the Cuban state
reserves the right to decide on the approval of any contract.5
Employment is perhaps the most complex issue in the legisla-
tion.50' Under the new framework, foreign investors are still banned
from directly hiring Cuban nationals in most cases.5 2 Instead, em-
ployees will have to work through a state-run employmEcnt agency that
is responsible for allocating workers.503 While the employer will be
charged dollars, the workers will be paid in Cuban pesos.50n In this
sense, the law continues its prior practice of prohibiting direct employ-
ment of Cuban citizens, and substituting instead Cuban intermediary
companies to employ local workers. Castro stated that the purpose of
this policy was to protect Cuban workers from the "anarchy, disorgan-
ization and privileges" of free, direct hiring by foreigners.05
Still, large foreign investors will be allowed to press for individu-
als they want in exceptional cases, 50 6 a loophole that could become
much wider than it now appears.50 Employees who must work for
the Cuban intermediaries may be paid a second, under..the-table dol-
lar wage, to top off low official salaries.,50  Earlier drafts of the legisla-
tion allowed investors to employ workers directly.50 9
for mineral exploitation; (f) there is a purchase of state property or real estate; or (g) the
transaction involves the armed forces. Id. art. 21.
498. Castro Says Cuban lmigrs Should Not Be Excluded from New Investment Law,
supra note 495.
499. Castro Says Approval of Investments Will Be 'Flexible' but Subject to Scrutiny,
supra note 17.
500. Acosta & Acanda Report, supra note 487.
501. Castro Says Approval of Investments Will Be 'Flexible' but Subject to Scrutiny,
supra note 17.
502. Foreign Investment Law art. 31(1); see also Cuban Parliament Passes Controversial
Investment Law Changes, supra note 484. Article 31(2) allows employers to hire directly
foreign management or technical employees, despite Article 31(1)'s policy preference for
hiring Cuban nationals. Foreign Investment Law art. 31(2).
503. Foreign Investment Law art. 33; Davies, supra note 3, at 14.
504. Davies, supra note 3, at 14.
505. Martin, supra note 407, at 8.
506. Farah, Foreign Investors, supra note 408, at A14. Article 35 allows the governmen-
tal authorization to set up "special labor rules." See Foreign Investment Law art. 35.
507. Castro Takes One More Step Toward Capitalism, supra note 3, at 45; de Cordoba,
supra note 407, at All.
508. Castro Takes One More Step Toward Capitalism, supra note 3, at 45; see also de
Cordoba, supra note 407, at All.
509. de Cordoba, supra note 407, at All.
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The new investment legislation now allows foreigners to purchase
property, including attractive beachfront lots suitable for condomini-
ums. 5 10 In theory, investments of $10 million or less can be approved
at a ministerial level within sixty days-"1 from the time the respective
proposal is submitted to the government for consideration.512 To pro-
vide investors with security to induce investment, the law guarantees
appropriate prior compensation in the case of any expropriation.5 13
Still, the legislation was approved without the belief that it would re-
sult in massive new investment, but rather that it would prevent loss of
investment and keep Cuba competitive in terms of investment oppor-
tunity.514 Andrew Zimbalist, a Smith College economist and a Cuba
specialist, says investors fear that the Cuban government rill treat
them according to "political whim." 's5 Historically, this has made in-
vestors wary about their involvement in Cuba. 16
C. Housing
Two basic systems of home ownership coexist in Cuba, outright
ownership of housing and long-term leasing.517
1. Home Ownership
Article 22 of the 1976 Cuban Constitution and Article 156 of the
Civil Code seek to establish the right to home owvnership.5'5 Since
1959, one million Cubans have become homeowners51 9 Rough esti-
mates show there are about 2.75 million homes in Cuba with about
eighty to ninety percent of them privately owned.Y0
510. Davies, supra note 3, at 14.
511. Id.
512. Foreign Investment Law art. 21(6); see also Castro Says Approval of Investments
Will Be "Flexible' but Subject to Scrutiny, supra note 17 (citing Ernesto Melendez, the Cu-
ban Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation Minister).
513. Article 3 of the Foreign Investment Law allows expropriation for -public utility or
social interest." Davies, supra note 3, at 14; Foreign Investment Law art. 3. Article 3 alzo
requires prior indemnification in freely convertible money at a commercial value of mutual
agreement or a value established through an international arbitration arrangement. Id.
514. Castro's Remarks, supra note 472.
515. Rice, supra note 410, at A5.
516. Id.
517. John P. Rathbone, Private Property Rights in Cuba (1992): Housing, L, SOCIEDAD
ECONOMICA DE AMIGOS DEL PAlS BUL.ETIN (La Sociedad Economica, London, England),
Mar. 17, 1991, at 2 [hereinafter Rathbone, Housing].
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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When addressing home ownership, a distinction should be made
between ownership of the house structure itself and ownership of the
lot on which the home sits. 521 A homeowner does not necessarily own
the lot.5' At times, the lot may be state-owned. 2 3 This, however, is a
legal technicality. In these cases, the homeowner can purchase a life-
long, inheritable right to live on the land, called a derecho perpetuo de
superficie, a usufructuary interest.5 4 The fee is paid on a one-time-
only basis.5z The usufructuary rights remain in effect as long as the
land is used for housing.526
a. The 1960 Urban Reform Act
The Urban Reform Act of October 1960 radically changed the
housing market in Cuba. The legislation canceled outright all leases
and mortgages on existing properties. 527  Renters and mortgagees
were converted into potential owners, and were required to make pay-
ments to the state.528 If they paid punctually, including all real estate
taxes (now their responsibility), they became owners after a period of
years, depending on the age of the building.529 These "potential own-
ers" were also responsible for all repairs.5 30 Any delinquency in pay-
ment meant loss of all rights.53'
From a legal perspective, the new law introduced the idea of
housing as an inalienable, non-rescindable right.5 32 Leaseholds were
converted from private to public ownership, the State giving usufruc-
tuary interests to the occupants, now "owners. 533 In the first phase of
521. Id. at 4.
522. Consuegra-Barqufn, supra note 109, at 911.
523. Id. Consuegra-Barqufn actually argues that the state is the sole proprietor of the
totality of the Republic's land, with the exception of those lands that belong to small farm-
ers or their cooperatives. I&. This would include urban lots. Id.
524. Resoluci6n No. 1/87 resolution 1 (Jan. 6, 1987) (G.O., Jan. 21, 1987) (Cuba) [here-
inafter Resolution 1/87].
525. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 4.
526. Id.
527. LAZO, supra note 38, at 231.
528. I&
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Ley de Reforma Urbana whereas cl. 2 and art. 1 (G.O., Oct. 14, 1960) (Cuba)
[hereinafter Urban Reform Law]. Urban reforms have precedence in the Latin America
region. See, ag., Decreto Ley No. 3819 (Aug. 27, 1954) (Cuba); Ley de Oct. 29, 1956
(Bol.).
533. Article 9 of the Urban Reform Law sets forth the contract whereby the occupant
purchases the house from the Government. Urban Reform Law art. 9. See also Ly Gen-
[Vol. 20:1
Tensions in Cuban Property Law
the law, purchasers had financing terms of five to twenty years, de-
pending on the age of the home.534 The law was later amended to
allow for newly constructed homes to be sold off with permanent usu-
fructuary interests, with monthly financing not to exceed ten percent
of family income.535 The third and final stage was to give free usufruc-
tuary interests to all families.536
All urban rental arrangements were declared illegal,5 3 7 except for
vacation hotels, hostels, or non-permanent arrangements for vaca-
tions.53s Mortgages were also outlawed.539 Property the state handed
out could not be traded, transferred or sold without prior authoriza-
tion from the Counsel of the Urban Reform.-IO The State maintained
a right of first refusal in all such cases.5 41 Despite research, it could
not be determined whether these provisions have been honored in
practice.
In a transition from leasehold to freehold, the government first
reduced rents by 30 to 50 percent along a gradual scale.5 42 Surpris-
ingly, criminal penalties attached for infringement of this civl legisla-
tion.-43 As a result of this new legislation, over 200,000 rentals were
converted to home ownership.54
In practice, the Cuban government was a strict landlord. Attor-
neys representing former owners seeking compensation or clients
about to be evicted were themselves accused of counter-revolutionary
activities, an offense that carried the death penaltyr1 5
b. The 1984 Housing Law
By 1984, about half of the 2.5 million Cubans owned their
homes. 46 The 1984 legislation sought to extend home ownership to
those persons who had lived as usufructuary beneficiaries of govern-
eral de la Vivienda, Ley No. 65 whereas cl. 2 (G.O., Dec. 23, 19S3) (Cuba) [hreinafter
1988 Housing Law].
534. Urban Reform Law art. 1(a)
535. Id. art. 1(b).
536. Id art 1(c).
537. Id. art. 2.
538. Id. art. 4.
539. Id. art. 30.
540. Id. art. 29.
541. Id.
542. Id. art. 37.
543. Id. art. 44.
544. Rathbone, Housing supra note 517, at 2.
545. LAzo, supra note 38, at 231.
546. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 2.
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ment-constructed housing built since 1960. 547 Legislation affirmed the
goal of housing ownership for all occupants currently living in
homes.548 The law also sought to promote construction to address the
national housing deficit. 4 9 The Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (Na-
tional Housing Institute) was charged with carrying out these goals.5 50
The 1984 legislation allowed 480,000 lessors to amortize their rent
payments to purchase homes. 1 Sales prices were calculated at the
equivalent of fifteen to twenty years of rent, with rent being no more
than ten percent of monthly income.5 Past rent counted towards the
purchase price.553 For persons wishing to purchase the property out-
right, personal loans, but not mortgage loans, were available through
the Banco Popular de Ahorro (People's Savings Bank), the only insti-
tutional source for consumer lending in Cuba.55 4 Otherwise, occu-
pants simply continued to pay monthly rent until they purchased the
house.555 By 1988, 450,000 families had acquired homes (with 350,000
homes registered to titleholders), while 30,000 home sales remained
pending, due to late rent payments. 5 6
Since back rent counted toward purchase price, about 740,000 in-
dividuals automatically received title to their homes wiftiout any addi-
tional payment due. 57 This figure represents about one third of
Cuban households. 5 Included in this group were persons who built
their own homes and beneficiaries of housing projects in rural
areas.
559
Persons who continued to live in tenements, irreparable struc-
tures or informal housing were ineligible for registration as homeown-
ers.560 In these cases, the earlier Urban Reform Law continued to
547. Ley General de la Vivienda, Ley No. 48 art. 22 (G.O., Dec. 27, 1984) (Cuba) [here-
inafter 1984 Housing Law]. People who built homes prior to October 14, 1960 on land
belonging to the state, in most cases got the land free of any further charge for the derecho
perpetuo de superficie (right of usufruct). See also Resolution No. 1/87 resolution 4.
548. 1984 Housing Law art. 1.
549. Id. art. 2(ch) and (e).
550. Id. art. 3; 1988 Housing Law art. 145.
551. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 2.
552. 1984 Housing Law art. 11.
553. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 3.
554. 1984 Housing Law art. 9; see also Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 3.
555. Id arts. 10, 13.
556. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 2-3.
557. Id at 3.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
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apply.561 These individuals continued to have lifetime, rent-free lease-
hold interests.56 When appropriate state-constructed housing be-
came available, these individuals would be given the opportunity to
purchase a home under the same conditions as other beneficiaries of
the 1984 Housing Law.5 63
Yet another group of individuals occupied 145,000 housing units
(about six percent of all Cuban housing), which were either owned by
or connected with workplaces, representing about one-third of houses
built in postrevolutionary Cuba64 These persons received special
consideration under the legislation, paying a monthly amortized rental
payment calculated at about half of the price of comparable housing
on the rental market.56 5 The rental occupants would become owners
outright after twenty years of rental payment.56
Finally, the legislation promoted self-construction of housing. It
allowed market rate sale of housing, and market rate rental for extra
rooms for up to six months.567 The rental market for extra rooms was
important, since there were about 140,000 homes with at least one
extra room according to a 1981 census.56 s Special permission was
granted for trading homes and swapping home loans5 69 It seems
likely that the general housing scarcity pushed individuals into the
rental market.
c. The 1988 Housing Law
The 1988 Housing Law represented a partial reversal of the mar-
ket orientation of the 1984 legislation." The legislation passed amid
561. Id
562. Id
563. Id
564. Id
565. Id
566. Articles 74 to 76 of the Housing Law of 1984 discuss viriendas vinculadas (con-
nected housing). See 1984 Housing Law arts. 74-76.
567. Articles 94 to 107 of the 1984 Housing Law discuss room rentals. See id. arts. 94-
107. This concept is carried forward in Article 74 of the 19SS Housing Law. 19S Housing
Law art. 74.
568. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 3.
569. 1984 Housing Law art. 68.
570. The fourth whereas clause of the 19SS Housing Law states: "[Flortalecer el control
que el Estado debe ejercer sobre las operaciones alvededor de la vivienda, asi como a
definir la decisiva participaci6n estatal en la solucion del problema habitacional en el pafs."
Housing Law of 1988 whereas cl. 4. (In translation, this whereas clause reads: "To fortify
the control that the State should exercise over the operations regarding housing, as well as
to define the decisive participation of the state in solving the housing problem in the
country.").
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public debate on "correction of errors" and "negative tendencies"
within Cuba.571 This debate came out of the Third Party Congress in
1986, after individuals recognized a need to address the gap between
the rhetoric of exemplary conduct and the facts of privilege and bu-
reaucratic corruption.5 7 Old practices, like complacency and traffick-
ing in personal privileges, were reappearing in Cuba and party
discipline was in question. 73 Consequently, Cuban leadership sought
to confront these concerns.574
While in many ways the 1988 law was a continuation of its fore-
runner, it introduced greater potential for state intervention in the
housing and construction markets. 75 It also cut back on the right to
buy and sell housing in the market. 76
2. Leasehold
Leaseholders generally live in one of three housing categories:
substandard housing, state owned properties, or houses left vacant
due to emigration. 77 Individuals in substandard housing live rent free
with a lifetime leasehold interest .578 About ten percent of Cubans live
in such housing, representing the most popular form of household
leasing.579
The second group of renters either is still renting properties that
were in the private sector in 1959, but are now state-owned (in which
case the renter has a usufructuary interest), or is in state-owned prop-
erty leased without a purchase option5 ° Tenants with a usufructuary
interest simply amortize rental payments until obtaining an equity po-
sition.581 With the 1984 legislation, most usufructuary beneficiaries
became outright owners. Therefore, those continuing with a leasehold
interest represent a negligible portion of the rental market.5s Simi-
larly, very few renters occupy state-owned houses without a purchase
option, also due to the 1984 legislation.58 3 Today, leasehold applies
571. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 3.
572. del Aguila, supra note 161, at 22.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 19, 22-23.
575. Id. at 22.
576. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 3.
577. Id. at 4.
578. IM at 3.
579. Id at 4.
580. Id
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id
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mainly to renters in special land use zones, such as areas destined for
tourist development."s
The final group of renters occupy houses left vacant due to emi-
gration.58 From 1960 to 1974, 139,256 houses became available for
rental in this fashion, almost as many homes as were constructed by
the government over that same period.5s The government has man-
aged these homes under the same criteria it uses for newly built gov-
ernment housing.587
Tenants in housing made available because of emigration of their
owners could receive title to the home in two ways. '5 Approximately
forty percent of homes were confiscated by the government and used
for public services like schools5 s9 The remaining homes, approxi-
mately sixty percent, were leased to economically disadvantaged fami-
lies.590 Tenants would then make monthly payments amortized until
the house was purchased. 91 Alternatively, if the new tenants them-
selves left the country, any close relative that lived with the tenant for
at least two years prior to the tenants' departure could simply assume
the tenants' position and continue paying amortized rental pay-
ments.5 2 This provision could be extended beyond close relatives to
any other person living with the tenant, but then a period of five years
of living with the tenant would be required for the new beneficiary,
instead of just two. sg9
a. Rental Value
Article 50 of the 1988 Housing Law established a scale for rent
pricing.5 94 The calculations consider property location, usable floor
space, and depreciation.595 Rent is capped at twenty percent of in-
come.596 For low income residents, rent may not exceed ten percent
of household income.5 97 In slum dwellings called "cuarterias," renters
584. 1&.
585. 1988 Housing Law art. 55(b); see also Rathbone, Housing, supra, note 517, at 4.
586. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 4.
587. Id.
588. Id. at 4-5.
589. Id.
590. I&
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. 1988 Housing Law art. 50.
595. Id.; see also Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 5.
596. Rathbone, Housing supra note 517, at 5.
597. 1988 Housing Law art. 50, para 2; see also Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 5.
1996]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
have lived rent free since 1967.98 Actual rental price is fixed by the
municipality where the home is located.5 99 Rent is paid monthly at
the People's Saving Bank.6° °
b. Leasehold interests
Leasehold interests are expansive under Cuban law. Leases are
inheritable and may only be ended: (1) by mutual agreement; (2) due
to death or emigration without leaving clear heirs; (3) due to unsafe
conditions; or (4) if the occupant is an illegal occupant.6 °1 Illegal oc-
cupants are usually squatters and persons who are more than three
months behind in rent either on state or private property. 2 In the-
ory, illegal occupants could be evicted, however, few evictions actually
occur.6 0 3 Evicted persons have nowhere to go. Thus, more often, the
state garnishes up to fifty percent of wages.6"4 Thus, there are in fact
few evictions. Leased homes can be swapped with other occupants of
leased homes, provided proper authorization is given at the
municipality. 605
3. Real Estate Market for Housing
The Cuban housing market is tightly controlled. The state main-
tains the right of first refusal on all sales.' Owners may only sell at a
government determined price, a function of the size, location, and
quality of the home.607 Prices range from 45 to 215 pesos per square
meter.608 Values have no relationship to amortized rental prices; often
sales prices are much lower.60 9
598. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 5.
599. Resoluci6n No. 63/92 art. 5 (Apr. 24, 1992) (G.O., May 6, 1992) (Cuba) [hereinaf-
ter Resolution 63/92].
600. 111 art. 6.
601. 1988 Housing Law art. 58. These classifications were redefined by executive order.
Article 11 of Resolution No. 63/92 allows for rental to conclude in six ways: (1) by mutual
agreement, (2) unilateral decision of the renter, (3) by unjustified use of the home for six
months, (4) due to change in purpose for the home, (5) due to breach of contract by renter,
(6) due to trade of the home to someone else or cession of rights to someone else, and (7)
due to public utility. See Resolution No. 63/92 art. 11.
602. See generally 1988 Housing Law arts. 111-15.
603. Id. art. 114.
604. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 5. This remedy is contemplated in Article
113 of the 1988 Housing Law. See 1988 Housing Law art. 113.
605. Resolution No. 63/92 art. 10.
606. See, e.g., Resolution No. 1/87 resolution 6.
607. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 5.
608. I&
609. I& at 5-6.
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Due to the low sales prices, there are few formal market sellers.
More typical are permutas (house exchanges). 610 These exchanges re-
quire no governmental or legal authorization. 611 Persons can trade
homes and personal debt.6'2 Under Cuban law, home or consumer
loans are personal rather than asset-based. 61 3 The exchange of homes
allows households to take personal debts with them to the new resi-
dence.614 Moreover, the 1984 legislation allows parties to exchange
personal debts, functioning as a substitute for mortgage lending by
one party to the other.615 One party can even end up holding the
personal debts from both dwellings.616
To get more homes on the market, the government has pledged
support for housing construction loans.6 17 Special rules on construc-
tion seek to further encourage new construction.618 This strategy
complements housing swaps to provide additional housing. House
swaps usually involve only two parties, but may involve complicated,
multiple exchanges. Indeed about 20,000 swaps take place annu-
ally.619 Classified ads, bus stops, window ads and grocery stores serve
as advertising networks.620
Finally, a condominium law has given structure to multifamily
housing arrangements.621 This framework allows individuals living in
multifamily units to transfer individual interest with total indepen-
dence from the group.6 1 Condominium housing is either self-admin-
istered, if it is a smaller piece of property, or administered by the
municipality, if there are a large number of individual homes in-
volved.62 In either case, an Administrative Board oversees the con-
610. 1984 Housing Law art. 68; 198S Housing Law art. 63.
611. 1988 Housing Law art. 6S. Non-traded homes required certain legal formatities for
an exchange, including notarized documents and prior authorization. See 1934 Housing
Law art. 70; 1988 Housing Law art. 70.
612. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 5-6.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. Id.; 1984 Housing Law art. 68.
617. 1988 Housing Law art. 5; Joint Resolution, whereas cl. 1.
618. See generally Resoluci6n No. 160191 (June 27, 1991) (G.O., July 17, 1991) (Cuba)
[hereinafter Resolution No. 160191].
619. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 5.
620. Id at 6.
621. Since the new 1988 Housing Law, new rules were enacted to carry out this policy.
See generally Resoluci6n 4191 (Jan. 14, 1991) (G.O., Jan. 18, 1991) (Cuba) [hereinafter Res-
olution No. 4191]).
622. Id art. 4.
623. Id. arts. 33-35.
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dominium.624 The residents elect a President and a Treasurer by
certain democratic procedures. 625
Because of the 1988 Law, current legislation forbids speculation
in the housing market.626 Consequently, exchanges between large, ex-
pensive homes and cheaper, smaller homes are not allowed. Ex-
changes must be certified by a notary empowered to use discretion
about whether a transaction might be suspect.627 Occasionally, specu-
lative transactions may result in state confiscation of the property.628
In the leasehold market, lessees can also trade homes. Leased
homes can be swapped with other occupants of leasecL homes, pro-
vided proper authorization is given at the municipality.629 Unlike the
freehold market, exchanges of leases require authorization from the
appropriate local housing council.630
Finally, leaseholders can exchange property with homeowners
under a complex legal arrangement. Title for homeowners remains
with the household, not the house itself. So, a leaseholder who trades
with an owner remains a leaseholder in the new home. The home-
owner, similarly, remains a homeowner but in the new house. While
these exchanges made transactions confusing, they have largely been
eliminated as a result of the 1984 legislation that made most occupants
owners outright.63'
In practice, there is an active informal land market. According to
one account from 1991:
If you wanted to move within [Havana], you simply went to the Del
Prado Avenue plaza, Havana's real estate marketplace. Hundreds
of people gathered every morning in a tree-covered square in the
middle of the wide avenue. Men and women-many of them eld-
erly people-would sit on the colonial benches or walk around
holding signs. "Have three bedroom apartment in Vedado. Look-
ing for one bedroom apartment in same area," read a typical one.
The minute you inquired about a possible exchange, the seller
would say: "I'm open to proposals," code for, "How much are you
willing to pay?"
624. Id art. 36.
625. Id arts. 36-40.
626. 1988 Housing Law final disposition 7.
627. Id arts. 69-72.
628. Id final disposition 7.
629. Resolution No. 63/92 art. 10.
630. Id
631. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 6.
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Milling around the plaza were illegal real estate agents, carry-
ing thick notebooks under their arms. If you didn't find a sign to
satisfy your housing needs, you approached one of the agents, and
told him what you were looking for. The man would check his
notebook and most likely find your dream house there. The mid-
dleman would then arrange a meeting with the potential seller.
If the transaction went through, the realtor would get a five
percent commission on the off-the-books purchase price. As far as
the government was concerned, the two properties had been traded
without one centavo ever changing hands -32
HI. Status of Geographic Information: Property Registries
The agrarian reform legislation prescribed that all land not re-
corded in the property registries before October 10, 1958 would be
considered property of the State.63 3 That same legislation required
the Ministry of Treasury to survey and record all state lands.6' State
lands consist of unregistered properties, properties registered in favor
of the state, and purchased and acquired lands.6-s Actions for recov-
ery of state land are imprescriptable; that is, they do not have a re-
spective statute of limitations.636
The agrarian reform law also mandated that new regulations be
implemented for registration of land grants in a new Rural Property
Section of the Property Registry.637 Until these new regulations were
632. OPPENHEIm R, supra note 166, at 140-41.
633. Agrarian Reform Law art. S.
634. Id.
635. Id. art. 10.
636. Id. transitory provision 1.
637. Id.
PROPERTY REGISTRATION PROCESS AT A GENERIc TRA moNAL REo.rmn, N CE_,rt,
AMEImcA: SAomPLE PRoPERi' T&Rv"sFER
Steps Usual Time Comments
1. Presentation Less than half an Presentation of a registration request is
hour. carried out at the public counter. The request
is called a diario. The diarios are usually
presented by law)ers or notaries to one of
txvo windows where the receipt of the
document is recorded. The receipt boak
contains columns for owner name, a
document number (asigned serially b
month), and the volume and page w.here a
copy of the document is actually filed (in the
tomes). The time and date are also stampd
on the back of the last page of the document.
"Avo copies must be presented for recording,
with a copy kept for filing and the original-
returned to the owner.
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2. Microfilming Microfilming of Microfilm copies are made and stored on site.
documents is
relatively up-to-date,
without any backlog.
3. Marginalization A delay of about Marginalization is a process of making
three months. marginal notes, indications of a transaction
pending. The delay of about three months
creates opportunities for fraud via multiple
sales of a single parcel prior to completion of
marginalization.
4. Distribution Little delay. Distribution of the transaction is made to a
working group, which will inscribe the
transaction. Working groups ore referred to
as "cells," or cdlulas in Spanish.
5. Confrontation Usually several days. Confrontation consists of examination of the
However, if document against the existing records in the
someone else is Registry.
using the book(s)
needed to carry out
the confrontation,
the examination is
put on hold until
the book(s) is/are
available. In
practice, this means
months in some
cases.
6. Qualification Assuming there is Qualification involves a scribe who drafts up
no problem, the the document, which is then approved by a
document will pass Registrar.
the qualification in
about a week. If a
problem arises,
however, the process
bogs down and can
carry on for as long
as ten years.
7. Typing In El Salvador, for This involves preparation of a summary in the
example, as of July folio real or a note in the folio personal,
1994, there was a according to the case. The same persons
several month responsible for preparing the tnxtual notes
backlog in this also receive public inquiries. Consequently,
office, they spend most of their time answering
questions rather than processirg new
documents.
8. Photocopying This now takes This activity is done on site.
about three days.
9. Completion Little delay. a) If a folio real transaction: the documents
are microfilmed. This process is up-to-date.
The documents are then forwarded to the
registry's internal cadastre office.
b) If a folio personal transaction: the
documents are sent straight to the registry's
internal cadastre office.
Steven E. Hendrix & Stephen J. Leisz, Land Registration for the Urban Poor in Nicaragua:
A Status Report with Recommendations 16-17 (July 1995) (unpublished report on file with
the Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin).
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put in place, the existing law governed -.6 S Reportedly, Cuba has re-
tained its folio personal system of property registration,639 a system
still used in parts of Latin America and the Caribbean.640 Despite a
literature review, it is not clear how much the Cuban folio real differs
from its neighbors' versions."'
A. Urban Registry
The 1984 housing legislation affirmed a Registro de la Propiedad
de la Vivienda (Housing Property Registry) under the National Hous-
ing Institute.642 The registry was decentralized, and inscription took
place at the municipal level where the house was located.6 3
In 1988, Cuba replaced its former housing registry with a new
computerized version, organized in a slightly different fashion. 'ile
the former housing registry remains, it is only used as a reference tool,
not as the active registry. 4
638. Id.
639. Telephone Interview with Roberto Estrada, Registrar, Vieja Habana, Apr. 20,
1995.
640. El Salvador, for example, maintains most of its rural records in a folio personal
system, as do Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Hendrix & Leisz, supra note 638, at 18. In
very simplified terms, the folio personal system is indexed by name, as opposed to a folio
real system (used in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, or San Salvador in El Salvador),
which is indexed on a parcel basis. Id. Analogies can be drawn in common law jurisdic-
tions between areas using a deeds registry system (like most of the United States and por-
tions of Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, and Belize) as opposed to a parcel-bared
or Torrens system (like Australia or South Africa; surveyed portions of Trinidad and To-
bago, Barbados, Guyana, and Belize). Id. The folio personal is often a sloi er, more ex-
pensive system. Id. The folio real, however, is predicated on up-to-date parcel maps. In
this context, Cuba's continued use of the folio personal system can be viewed as conven-
tional. ML
641. The folio real is usually a large book (about 15 by 18 inches) containing about
250 pages per volume. The pages are two-page sets, facing each other. The left
page has three major and several minor columns containing information about
rights to the property. For example, the inscription (parcel description) is placed
in the second of the three major columns. Only one inscription is written for each
parcel. The left column contains any annotations such as judgments. The right
hand column contains information on cancellations, such as cancellation of a use
right. The right hand page also contains three major columns and several minor
columns, all related to encumbrances on the parcel. For example, mortgages and
liens are noted in the center column. Columns for annotations and cancellations,
similar to the left page, are also available for the encumbrances page. All entries
are usually handwritten or typewritten.
La
642. 1984 Housing Law art. 120; 1988 Housing Law art. 120.
643. 1984 Housing Law art. 122; 198S Housing Law art. 117.
644. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 1.
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Property registration was initiated in Cuba in 1893. 64- The old
Civil Code system outlined a framework for inscribing the owner's
name and property.646 However, the registry slowly fell into disuse
after the Revolution.6' 7 Most transfers were made informally, despite
Articles 120 and 123 of the 1984 Housing Law that mandated inscrip-
tion of all transfers. 648
Article 116 of the 1988 Housing Law created a new registry
designed to record all transfers of housing dating back to the Revolu-
tion.649 Reportedly, there are really only two differences between the
new and old registries.650 First, the new registry reverses the order of
name inscription.651 The current owner is listed first, with prior own-
ers listed afterwards. 652 The old system had an inverse system: the
current owner was listed last, the very first owner topped the list.653
Second, the new registry is computerized, despite local press objec-
tions to a registry that could be altered as easily as a computerized
one.654 A fee of twenty pesos is charged for any notes made within
the registry system. 655 This is paid through tax seals placed on
documents. 656
B. Rural Registry
Article 9 of the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law required the Ministry
of Agriculture to record any confiscated property. 657 Article 28 re-
quired that redistributed land also had to be inscribed.658 Provision
Number-3 of the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law allowed for creation of a
new rural property registry by INRA for inscription of all future
transactions. 659
645. Id at 6.
646. Id.
647. d
648. Id
649. 1988 Housing Law art. 116.
650. Rathbone, Housing, supra note 517, at 7.
651. Id.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Id.
655. 1988 Housing Law art. 121.
656. Id.
657. Rathbone, Farmland, supra note 251, at 5.
658. Id.
659. Id.
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The 1963 Agrarian Reform Law did not mention any obligation
to record land transactions.1160 Since then, production cooperatives
have been formed, state farms have been merged, and private farms
sold.66' Thus, some transactions may have gone unrecorded since
1963. However, Articles 62 and 68 of the 1982 Agricultural Coopera-
tives Law required that all property transactions involving the forma-
tion or liquidation of CPAs should be recorded with the State
Statistics Committee.662 Also, legal owners of land were required in
1990 to inscribe land at the municipal registry.663 So perhaps it will be
possible to recover at least part of data on unrecorded transactions
post 1963.
The Registro de la Tenencia de la Tierra (Land Tenure Registry) is
governed by government resolution. 664 Rural property registries are
at the municipal level66- and are based on registries that have been
functioning since prerevolutionary times.66 6 The registry divides own-
ership into the following categories: state ownership, cooperative
ownership, private property, non-state property (political, social, and
popular groups that may own property), and other entities (any type
not falling under a previous heading). 667 In terms of organizational
structure, municipal and territorial offices were set up. -6s These of-
fices were under the broader control of the Territorial Judicial Depart-
ments. The Central Registry Office remained under the control of its
internal Legal Department.669
The Central Registry Office receives copies of inscriptions from
the field offices and maintains a centralized, up-to-date national regis-
try.670 It also inspects and supervises local offices to insure proper
office operation, among other functions.67 ' In short, the registries
have local municipal offices that have contact with the public.6 - Ter-
660. Id
661. Id.
662. Id
663. Resoluci6n 288190 art. 14 (G.O., May 17,1990) (Cuba) [hereinafter Reolution No.
288190].
664. Resolution 597 created the Registry, and Resolution 59S set forth its administra-
tive rules. Resolution 288190 whereas cl. 2 (citing Resoluci6ns Nos. 59787, 59-17 (Oct. 27,
1987) (G.O., Nov. 13, 1987) (Cuba) [hereinafter Resolutions Nos. 597185, 59-17]).
665. Resolution No. 288190 art. 6.
666. Rathbone, Farmland, supra note 251, at 5.
667. Resolution No. 598187 art. 2; Resolution No. 28590 art. 2.
668. Resolution No. 598187 art. 4.
669. Id.
670. Id. art. 5(a), 6.
671. Id. art. 5(c)-(e).
672. Id. art. 7.
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ritorial offices provide certain analytical and supervisory services, 673
while the Central Registry Office has the broadest level of over-
sight.674 The municipal registries are also supervised in administrative
matters by the Cooperative and Peasant Director for Municipali-
ties.675 The territorial offices are under the control of the appropriate
Justice Department Delegation, falling under national supervision of
the Central Registry Office.6 76
Land is always inscribed at the municipal office where the plot is
found.677 Where property is in more than one municipal jurisdiction,
the owner will inscribe the parcel in the municipality of the owner's
home. Id. This office will then be charged with coordinating the re-
gistration with the other appropriate office.678 Exempt from munici-
pal registration were lands belonging to the armed forces, the Interior
Department and local popular power organizations for militias, which
would more properly be recorded at the territorial registry.679
After an initial review at the municipal registry, requests for re-
gistration are sent to the territorial registry office.6 0 The territorial
office decides upon the merits of the case, and then orders the munici-
pal office to proceed with inscription or not.681 Backup copies of the
inscription are subsequently forwarded by the municipal registry to
the territorial one within thirty days.6s2
Data needed for inscription depends on property category. On
state farms (farms belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture and
Sugar), applications for inscription should contain, among other items,
topography, survey, land use, housing, installations, and soil quality, as
stated by the Provincial Office of Soils. 6 8 3 Private holding applica-
tions must include a description of how the property was obtained,
together with authorization information, extent of use, survey, and
other information.684 Cooperatives require, among other things, clari-
fication of any improvements, topographic information, and valua-
673. Id. art. 6.
674. Id. art. 5.
675. Resolution 288190 art. 7.
676. Id art. 8.
677. Id. art. 12.
678. Id.
679. Id. art. 13.
680. Id. art. 15.
681. Id art. 16.
682. Id. art. 18.
683. Id. art. 21.
684. Id. art. 22.
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tion.6 s5 Private smallholder farmers specifically do not need exact
survey information, but can instead rely on sworn declarations for
property boundaries. 6S6 Municipal and territorial offices should make
land inspections periodically to insure the accuracy of data and com-
pliance with appropriate norms.6V
C. The National Physical and Fiscal Cadastres
The Catastro Nacional de Cuba (National Cadastre) is organized
by the Direcci6n de Hidrografia y Geodesia (Hydrography and Geod-
esy Office) under the military (Ministerio de Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias) (MINFAR). GEOCUBA, a corporate entity, is in
charge of implementation of the cadastre. The cadastre falls under
the jurisdiction of the Instituto Cubano de Geodesia y Cartografla (Cu-
ban Institute of Geodesy and Cartography).6 -s The cadastre is main-
tained via a system of municipal offices. Property occupants are
expected to come to the office to update parcel information. Parcel
measurement is carried out by the government, not the parties, giving
a perceived higher accuracy level.6 s9 To date, the majority of the ca-
dastre has been manually updated.690
The National Cuban Cadastre was present in 1992 in 161 munici-
palities. The cadastre reflects both graphic and verbal descriptions of
property and occupants, whether or not legal or formal owners. The
cadastral system was heavily influenced by the system previously in
Czechoslovakia, which the Cubans felt was one of the most advanced
in the world, having survived 300 years of governmental changes and
dating back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.6 91
Maps of 1:10,000 scale exist for 93% of the rural areas, with 7%
of rural areas mapped at a 1:25,000 scale, generally corresponding to
areas with very low parcel density.6 92 All rural areas have been classi-
fied as either agricultural, or as one of eight classes of nonagricultural
6S5. Id. art. 23.
686. Id. art. 24(c).
687. Id. art. 38.
688. Resolution 591897 art. 9.
689. See Direcci6n de Hidrograffa y Geodesfa, Gobiemo de Cuba, Reformas a In-
troducir en el Catastro Nacional de Cuba en Interes de los Fines Fiscales, Econ6micos y
Juridicos, Seminar on Reforms to the Cadastral and Registry Systems for the Real Estate
in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America (Seville, Spain. Mar. 5-
8, 1996) at 2 [hereinafter Seville Seminar].
690. lId at 6.
691. Id. at 1.
692. Id at 2.
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land. Agricultural lands have fourteen subclassifications for sugar
cane, citrus, coffee, cacao, tobacco, and other products.693
Experimental maps are used for select urban areas such as all of
Veradero and parts of Havana. These maps have not been carried out
further due to scarcity of resources, and what does exist accounts for
only about one percent of urban surface area.694 For those municipali-
ties that have a cadastre,695 rural property inscriptions are required to
include a Cadastral Certificate.696
Cadastral information has had primarily three uses: (1) furnishing
calculations of land use area, (2) providing a base for cadastral certifi-
cates, required for the inscription of rural property in the public regis-
try, and (3) keeping statistical analysis.697 However, a working group
is being organized to extend the uses of the cadastre to other fields,
including tax purposes. Recently, MINFAR, the Justice Ministry, the
Agriculture and Sugar Ministries, the Banco Nacional de Cuba (Cen-
tral Bank), the Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas (National Statistics
Office), GEOCUBA, and the Institutes for Physical Planning and
Housing have joined together to form a working group to explore fis-
cal application of the national cadastre. The Cuban government be-
lieves that the system will provide easy access to necessary data, while
deterring tax evasion. The present system, which allegedly provides
for precise parcel description and location with georeferenced coordi-
nates, would provide a base for future valuation of property.698 Other
potential future applications for present cadastral data include, among
other uses, support for the public registry, banking, agricultural plan-
ning, national park management, traffic control, and social services
planning.699
A literature review has disclosed no serious academic documents
concerning the current state of physical cadastral systems or fiscal ca-
dastral records. As a result, any statement here concerning accuracy,
format or compatibility would be speculation.
In 1990, the Centro de Investigaciones de Geodesia, Cartograffa y
Teledetecci6n (Center for Geodesic, Cartographic and Remote Sens-
ing Research) established a general conceptualization for geographic
693. Id.
694. Id. at 1-2.
695. Resolution No. 598/87 art. 9.
696. Id.
697. Seville Seminar, supra note 689, at 2.
698. Id. at 3.
699. Id at 4.
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information in Cuba.700 This included a land use and land tenure in-
ventory for urban properties, along with a structure for regional and
national mapping activities.70 I However, little has been done to carry
out this work. According to one report, this activity includes base
maps of 1:20,000 scale for the Havana Province, and base maps of
1:250,000 scale at the national level that exist in a DXF format.7°
In summary, Cuba's property registration system (folio real) is a
typical, if not dated, system from the region. The system is locally-
based, with regional oversight offices. Although the law mandates a
cadastre, there is no report of its current status. To the extent prop-
erty records will be needed to address any conflict with the United
States, Cuba's land administration practices will need much more at-
tention in the immediate future.
IV. Property Disputes with the United States
U.S.-Cuba relations have been tumultuous. The United States
took its first steps toward an embargo in 1960.703 In May of that year,
the United States ordered U.S. oil companies in Cuba to refuse to
refine Soviet crude oil because of concern the island might be leaning
toward socialism.704 Castro then nationalized the refineries. 7o On
July 6, 1960, Eisenhower canceled the 700,000 tons of sugar remaining
in Cuba's 1960 quota under the Sugar Act of 1948, de facto creating
an embargo.706
Ralph Galliano, writing for the Washington Times, described the
situation as follows:
From May 17, 1959, through October 14, 1960, the Castro govern-
ment expropriated massive amounts of private properties - includ-
ig those of U.S. citizens - without [acceptable] compensation.7u7
700. Julio Cabrera Quifiones, Bases Cartogreficas digitales planim6tricas 1:20,00 de Ia
Provincia Ciudad de La Havana [paper presented at seminar on Urban Land Markets and
Information Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean] Havana, Cuba, (Nov. 27-Dec. 3,
1994) at 2.
701. Id. at 2-3.
702. Id. at 4-5.
703. Bell, supra note 7, at 81.
704. Id.
705. Id. These included refineries from Texaco, Shell, and Esso. See Duv.iozr, supra
note 237, at 34.
706. President Sets Cuba Sugar Quota at Zero for First Quarter of 1961, 44 DEI'- ST.
BuL. 18 (1961); Bell, supra note 7, at S1.
707. What is adequate compensation? There has been a great deal of debate on this
issue. See, eg., Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Laiw of the Past? Modern
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 .m. J. IN'TL L. 474 (1991).
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As authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, President Ken-
nedy proclaimed an embargo on trade with Cuba [in February]
1962.708 The Act also provided for the president to request an evalua-
tion of expropriated U.S. properties. Enabling legislation prompted
by the Cuba Claims Association of Miami, headed by Mr. Clarence
Moore, led directly to the ex parte adjudication of Cuba claims by the
U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. That process was com-
pleted in 1972, after three extensions. The commission to the Secre-
tary of State certified that process in the amount cf $1.8 billion.
Records show there were a total of 8,816 were claims filed; 1,195 were
denied, 1,710 were dismissed, and 5,911 were awarded. While about
$1.8 billion was awarded ... $1.5 billion was denied. Of the 5,911
claims awarded ... 898 were corporate, amounting to $1.578 billion
and 5,013 were for individuals, amounting to $221 million.0 9
What also makes U.S.-Cuba claims noteworthy is that the $1.8 billion
in claims "constitutes the largest certified seizure of U.S. property by a
foreign government in history. 7 10
The United States has also restricted travel to Cuba since 1963.711
It has been noted that: "In 1992, those restrictions were increased
under the Cuban Democracy Act (also known as the Tbrricelli Law),
which prohibited trade with Cuba by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. cor-
porations. Previously, these subsidiaries could be licensed by the U.S.
government to engage in such trade. ' 712 Ambassador Alexander Wat-
i
708. See Foreign Assistance Act § 620(a), 75 Stat. 424, 444-45 (1962). In 1992, several
countries reported unwanted U.S. pressure on them to cease trading with Cuba. See Cam-
eron, supra note 171, at 481, 482. That same year in November, the Urited Nations Gen-
eral Assembly voted 59-3 with 79 abstentions in favor of a resolution calling on the United
States to end its embargo of Cuba. Id
709. Ralph Galliano, Ignoring U.S.-Cuba Claims?, WASH. TiMEs, July 6, 1993 at E4.
710. Id
711. See Lisa Shuchman, U.S. Won't Ease Embargo Against Cuba, Official Says, PALM
BEACH PosT, Apr. 29, 1994, at 5B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Pbpst File. New
rules continue to emerge. See, eg., 60 Fed. Reg. 39,255 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
§ 515).
712. Shuchman, supra note 711, at B5. See Jefferies, supra note 1, at 76 (citing Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 §§ 1791-1712,22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-6010 (1993)); Bell, supra note 7, at
77.
There are some questions about the validity of the legislation from the vantage of its
extraterritorial application. See Jefferies, supra note 1, at 97-99 (1993). Canada passed
legislation to retaliate against the United States if any Canadian companies were affected.
See Bell, supra note 7, at 95.
Curiously, while the United States seeks to extend territoriality to protect U.S. inves-
tors, it is narrowly defining territoriality in human rights cases involving Cuba. In one
human rights case involving Cuba, Judge Birch of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Cuban and Haitian migrants in a safe haven outside the phys cal borders of the
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son, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, asserted: "The gov-
ernment of Cuba, in violation of international law, expropriated
billions of dollars' worth of private property belonging to U.S. individ-
uals and has refused to make reasonable restitution."713 Similarly,
Dennis Hays, Coordinator for Cuban Affairs in the U.S. State Depart-
ment, reportedly has stated that "before the United States lifts the
embargo, the expropriation of American-owned property by the Cu-
ban government would have to be addressed. '714
Further, Representatives Robert Torricelli and Robert Menen-
dez, both Democrats from New Jersey, "have denounced unnamed
corporations doing business with Cuba by acquiring assets Cuba ex-
propriated from U.S. owners. 'To those who seek to profit from stolen
properties, our message is clear: you will not be allowed into the
United States,' stated Menendez. ''715
More recently, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
of 1995716 proposed to:
United States did not have cognizable U.S. statutory or constitutional rights. Cuban
American Bar Association, Inc., Cuban Legal Alliance, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412,
1426 (11th Cir. 1995). The court also held that humanitarian organizations did not have a
U.S. First Amendment right to associate with the migrants held in the safe haven outside
physical borders of United States for the purpose of engaging in political spe-ech. Id. at
1429. Finally, the court held that the government was not required to disclose to humanita-
rian organizations the names of all Haitian migrants in the safehaven. Id. at 1430.
The Cuban American Bar case brings up the question of priority in foreign policy.
Given that the top 15 U.S. claimants correspond to over two-thirds of all U.S. claims
against Cuba and given the reluctance to extend U.S. constitutional protections to persons
held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, is U.S. foreign policy really intended to protect large
U.S. investors but not indigent refugees fleeing oppressive governments? Ibis appears the
result under present law. Harold Hongju Koh, Democracy and Hunan Rights in the United
States Foreign Policy?: Lessons from the Haitian Crisis, 4S SMU L. Rnv. 1S9 (1994); see
also Shuchman, supra note 711, at B5.
713. Ralph J. Galliano, More Than a 'Foreign Policy Option' W ASH. TmEs, Mar. 7,
1993, at B5.
714. Shuchman, supra note 711, at 5B. Mike McCurry, formerly of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, has indicated: "Our long-standing position is that Americans are entitled to
unconditional compensation for their expropriated properties. If the Cubans have a seri-
ous proposal in that regard, we would be interested to hear it." See State Department
Regular Briefing: Mike McCurry, Federal News Service, June 16, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Fednew File.
715. Jorge A. Banales, New Measures Against Cuba Proposed, UPI, Feb. 9, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
716. Similar versions were passed by the House and Senate on September 21 and Octo-
ber 19,1995 respectively. Bryan T. Johnson, The Cuba Bilk Protecting the Property Rights
of Americans, BACKGRCOUnDER (Heritage Foundation Repts. No. 441), Dec. 7, 1995, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Hfrpts File.
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[A]llow U.S. citizens whose property was confiscated by Fidel Cas-
tro to seek compensation in U.S. courts from foreign businesses that
now operate on this property. To avoid a threatened I)emocratic
filibuster, the Act's Senate sponsor, Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), agreed to remove Title III, which
enabled U.S. citizens to use U.S. courts to seek compeasation for
their confiscated properties. 717
The bill was sent to conference to reconcile differences between the
Senate and the much tougher House bill [IR 927].718
With the downing of two American civilian planes off the coast of
Cuba on February 24, 1996, the bill received renewed support.719
Shortly thereafter, the bill was signed into law and is known as the
Helms-Burton Act.720
There are three main titles in the Cuba bill:721
Title I: strengthens international sanctions against 1rhe Castro re-
gime by urging the President to seek an international embargo in the
United Nations Security Council. In addition, this title prohibits indi-
rect financing of Castro by U.S. citizens through loans or lines of
credit for business ventures using confiscated U.S. property. It also
requires the President to oppose Cuban membership in such interna-
tional financial institutions as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund until a transitional government is established with a
system in place to hold democratic elections.
717. Ild.
718. Canada Urged to Use Legislation to Fight U.S. Bill on Cuba, 12 Int'l Trade Rep,
(BNA) 1957 (Nov. 29, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Intrad File.
719. Cuba the Outlaw, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1996, at 20.
720. Ann Devroy, Clinton Adds to Pressure on Cuba: Legislation is Signed to Discour-
age Foreign Investment on the Island, WASH. PosT, Mar. 13, 1996, at A4.
721. This summary of the bill is from Johnson, supra note 717, at 1. According to
Johnson:
To get a property claim to court under this bill, a claimant must meet a number of
stringent conditions: 1) the claimant must be a U.S. citizen; 2) the d ;sputed claim
must be valued at over $50,000; 3) a foreign investor must occupy the disputed
property after the bill is enacted (thus, the bill is not retroactive); 4) a foreign
investor must be given 180 days to vacate the disputed property; and 5) a foreign
investor laying claim to U.S. property must hold assets within the continental U.S.
before he can be sued in a U.S. court. Only after all of these conditions are met
may a U.S. claimant seek action in U.S. courts. Under these strict conditions,
most of the 6000 claims will not be brought to court.
Johnson, supra note 717, at 1. For a good summary of the Act and its proponents'
justifications, prepared by the Republican Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, see Don Nickles, Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Congressional Press Re-
lease, Sept. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Hillpr File.
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Title II: specifically instructs the President to develop a strategy
to support Cuba's transition to a democratically elected government.
Title III: seeks to protect the interests of U.S. citizens whose
property was seized by the Castro regime without due compensation.
U.S. citizens could seek restitution from potential foreign investors
through the U.S. legal system.'m
The law allows the President to suspend for six month periods the
Title III provision against property.tm However, the first suspension
period was set for August 1, 1996, the middle of the 1996 Presidential
campaign .2" This is a rolling six-month waiver that can only be used
if the President finds that suspension of the provision is in the national
interest.725
Under the new legislation, the embargo will remain in place until
"democracy" arrives in Cuba.72 6 Democracy is defined specifically to
exclude any government that includes Fidel Castro or Raul Castro.2 7
Current licensing practices are continued.78' In addition, the ciil pen-
alty process is carried forward under the Helms-Burton Act. '
Curiously, the legislation appears designed only to help former
large estate holders and not the bulk of Cuban-American claimants.719
Former property must have a minimum value of $50,000 exclusive of
interest for a claim to inure.731 Thus, only the wealthiest of Cuban-
722. Johnson, supra note 717, at 1.
723. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (Mar. 12, 1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6022 et seq. (1936)),
724. William Scally, U.S. Senate Approves Cuba Sanctions Bill, Reuters, Mar. 5, 1936,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. The bill became law on Augu3t 1, 1936.
725. 22 U.S.C. § 6064(e).
726. 22 U.S.C. § 6065(a).
727. 22 U.S.C. § 6065(a)(7).
728. 22 U.S.C § 6082(a)(7).
729. 22 U.S.C § 60S2(a). Many attorneys complain that this hearing process is Cx-
tremely slow and expensive for litigants and the government. To the extent this pra:: es is
now embodied in law, the Helms-Burton Act could be criticized as wasteful. Further, the
new legislation provided no new funding for the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.S.
Treasury Department in charge of enforcing embargo provisions. Attorneys also complain
the provisions of the law are vague. Assuming most U.S. corporations are excellent in
their compliance with law generally and sanctions in particular, we should expect in-hou:e
attorneys to construe the statute conservatively. This will further restrict even lawful activ-
ity. Yet another problem with the legislation is that it mandates compensation to the fami-
lies of the pilots shot down off the Cuban coast. To date, there has been no trial or finding
of fact by any court. In the future, however, legislation could be criticized as a violation of
the rule of law.
730. Louis F. Desloge, The Great Cuban Embargo Scam: A Little-Known Loophole
Will Allow the Richest Exiles to Cash In, WAsH. POST, Mar. 3, 1996, at 1.
731. I&
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Americans will benefit. Yet another loophole allows for settlement
outside court without need for U.S. government approval.732 As a re-
suit, if a former landowner wants to sue a British company, for exam-
ple, for trafficking in property in Cuba, the former landowner can
reach a settlement agreement whereby the former owner can share in
the profits of the new venture in Cuba. In this way, the former owner
in fact becomes a de facto and legal U.S. investor in Cuba, without the
need for approval from the U.S. government and despite the
embargo.733
While helping the wealthiest Cuban-Americans and denying re-
course to others, the new legislation also has produced two curious
results.73' First, the law applies only to commercial property, and ex-
cludes residential property, further excluding small U.S. claimants.
Second, it advances an internationalization of American citizenship.
In some cases, it has been alleged that third country nationals have
incorporated legal entities in Florida, and transferred ownership of
"their" property in Cuba to the Florida entity. The Florida company
is then treated as a U.S. citizen for purposes of the legislation. In
effect, the legislation has been used to extend protection to sophisti-
cated, third country nationals. U.S. courts are now faced with resolv-
ing conflicts of non-citizens that occurred in Cuba about thirty years
ago.735
Even as the bill was being discussed, the Canadian government
began consideration of retaliatory measures using the Foreign Extra-
territorial Measures Act to block application of U.S. congressional
measures that would affect Canada's trade with Cuba. 3 6 According
to Bill Graham, a member of the House of Commons with the gov-
erning Liberal Party in Canada:
The United States has the right to embargo trade with Cuba by U.S.
firms based on domestic political considerations .... But the Cana-
dian government, however, must move to ensure that any measures
adopted by Congress that violate international law or U.S. interna-
tional trade obligations are not used to restrict Canada's rights to
conduct relations with Cuba.737
732. Id.
733. Id
734. Robert Muse, Address at the Bar of Washington D.C.'s Forum on Cuba (Mar. 21,
1996).
735. Id.
736. Canada Urged to Use Legislation to Fight U.S. Bill on Cuba, supra note 718.
737. Id.
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He added that:
Canadian legislators have a number of concerns about the original
bills, introduced by Senator Jesse Helms, Republican from North
Carolina, and Representative Dan Burton, Republican from Indi-
ana, such as the confiscation prohibition, which is particularly troub-
lesome as the bill defines a U.S. person in terms that could apply to
subsidiaries in Canada.73s
According to Graham, "this represents a form of secondary boy-
cott, a practice the United States has in past condemned, for example
in the case of the Arab boycott of Israel." Graham has stated that the
new law represents "an extraterritorial application of laws against Ca-
nadian corporations carrying on lawful business in this country and
with Cuba."739 The enactment of the bill into law prompted scores of
condemnations of the United States from countries around the
world.74
Mario Diaz Cruz Jr., a Cuban lawyer, and David Willig, a Miami-
based attorney, are drafting "property-claims legislation for a free-
market Cuba. Several property-claims laws are in the works that use
restitution and compensation laws from Germany, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, Nicaragua and Mexico as models."7 41
The drafting of new property-claims laws for Cuba has received
much of the attention so far. Without the political and economic
stability created by a legal framework to return land, homes and
businesses to their former owners, and to award money damages
and resolve disputes, international investors might balk at pouring
money into the island nation. 'Central to the legitimacy of any re-
turn to a market-based democracy [in Cuba] and to the confidence
of capital markets is the government's recognition that owners
738. Id.
739. Id. According to the New York Tunes, administration officials say the provision
would violate international law, create numerous lawsuits, sour relations betwen Wash-
ington and any post-Castro Government, and make it difficult for a post-Castro Cuba to
privatize property because of pending lawsuits. Steven Greenhouse, Bill to Ease Cuba
Suits Faces a Veto By Clinton, N.Y. Tms, Aug. 20, 1995, § 1, at 4.
740. The 14 Caribbean countries and the Rio Group of 14 Latin American countries
both denounced the legislation. See The Americas: Falling out with Uncle Sam, Eco- o-
zms-r, Mar. 16, 1996, at 47-48. Europe, Japan, and Canada, among others, also objected.
See Anne Swardson, Allies Irked by Bill to Deter Their Trade with U.S. Foes, WASH. Posr,
Mar. 7, 1996, at A20.
741. Resnick, supra note 4, at 1.
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whose property was confiscated 30 years ago have legal rights to
their property,' writes Robert E. Freer, Jr.742
The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) has promul-
gated a number of recommendations for post-Castro economic legisla-
tion. These include repeal of all laws, regulations and decrees creating
a state-run economy, rapid privatization of most state-controlled as-
sets, and recognition of the right of Cuban citizens, residents, and
legal entities to own private property.743
CANF leader and Miami millionaire Jorge Mas Canosa has called
for a compensation system based on privatization.744 The National
Association of Ranchers and National Association of Land-owners in
Exile have claimed that "[n]obody has more right to property than its
legitimate owners," providing the example of Nicaragua, which has
allowed return of properties to the original owners.745 As early as
August 1990, a joint venture between former Dade County Commis-
sioner Barry Schreiber and the University of Miami Research Insti-
tute for Cuban Studies began a private Registry of Expropriated
Properties in Cuba, encouraging Cuban exiles to register their
claims.746
Jeb Bush, the son of former President George Bush and the
Chairman of the International Republican Institute (IRI), has taken a
slightly different stance than CANE.7 47 Bush urges a rapid effort to
define the parameters of restitution.748 He stops short of calling for
full, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriated proper-
ties.749 Instead, Bush emphasizes acceptance of responsibility to make
restitution in a form to be determined by future negotiations. 750
742. Id. (quoting Robert E. Freer, Jr.). Freer is a partner at Freer & Alagia in Washing-
ton, D.C. and a member of the Cuban American National Foundation's Blue Ribbon Com-
mittee on the Reconstruction of Cuba. I& 'The quotation comes from a paper published in
May 1993. Id.
743. Id According to Resnick, the Cuban American National Association is a power-
ful Washington, D.C., lobbying group with close ties to the Republican Party and an anti-
Communist orientation. Id.
744. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 166, at 323. In mid-1991, Mas Canosa released his "So-
cial. Political and Economic Program for the Reconstruction of Cuba." Id. According to
Oppenheimer, Mas Canosa is perceived as the "head of a horde 9f rich exiles eager to
reclaim their lost properties." Id. at 328.
745. Id. at 324.
746. Id. at 323.
747. IrcNrnr A7oNAL REPUBLICAN Irsrnmr, supra note 3, at 26.
748. Id
749. Id.
750. Id.
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Alternatively, Michael Krinsky, a lawyer representing Cuban in-
terests in the United States, asserts: "In most other countries the
United States has ultimately reached a settlement not for the return of
the property but for a part of the lump sum. On the average that was
about 40 percent of the claim value without interest."
75
'
Part of the problem in dispute resolution, compensation, or resti-
tution is deciding which law applies: the prerevolutionary, revolution-
ary, or postrevolutionary law. In Cuba, some scholars argue that the
1940 Constitution remained in effect during the Castro years. They
claim the new government was never legally constituted under the
provisions of that 1940 document; consequently, all subsequent ac-
tions are violations, and prerevolutionary law should apply.752 Some
takings may have violated even revolutionary law norms.75 3 These
same scholars advocate that future law could clarify the current ambi-
guity and restore rights from the past.
7 5 4
V. Property Disputes wvith Other Countries
"Cubans also cite the embargo as the reason it has been impossi-
ble to negotiate indemnification agreements with... the U.S. prop-
erty seized during the revolution. 7 5  In comparison, Cuban officials
assert that "all other countries with property claims have been indem-
751. Ana Arana, U.S. firms making Cuban land claims, SUN-SE NrMEL, May 16, 1Q3, at
IF, available in LEXIS, News Library Sungen File.
752. Jon L. Mills, Principal Issues in Confiscated Real Property in Post.Commumst
Cuba, in CUBA IN TRAnSsnON: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF Er0PPoJ-.
ATED PROPERTIES 23-25 THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESFoNSIBILITY, UNiv. FLOPDA COL-
LEGE OF LAW & A.B.A. SEC OF INT'L L. & PRAC. Perhaps the most direct argument
against the constitutionality of the Castro government is found in GutirrCz, supra note
119, at 2. These necessary arguments are based on the unconstitutionality of the takeover
by Castro and the implicit reforms to the 1940 Constitution through the Organic Law of
1959, which were without following procedures set out in the 1940 Constitution itelf. It
should be noted, however, that the status of the 1940 Constitution itself v.as in question
even before Castro assumed power. Batista had usurped pov.er himself in 1952 in an un-
constitutional manner, leaving some doubt as to the exact status of the 1940 dcument by
the time Castro had taken over. For his part, Castro's speeches seem to indicate that he at
least thought of the 1940 Constitution as governing, as he cited its pro'.isions against
largeholder estates, and carried these provisions over to the new Organic Law.
753. This occurred in Nicaragua. See Nicaragua Propert. Disputes, VoV.raNG PAPE.r
SEnRES (The Carter Center, Emory Univ., Atlanta , Ga. ), Apr. 1995, at S-12 (report pre-
pared for the United Nations Development Program by the Latin American and Carrib an
Program) (on file with author).
754. Mills, supra note 752, at 23, 25.
755. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures and the Subcomnuttz
on Trade House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 314 (1994) (testimony
of Irene Philippi, Senior Economist, Polyconomics, Inc.) [hereinafter Phillipi Testimony].
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nified. 756 Cuba has already settled with Switzerland, France, Canada,
Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, claims totaling about $60 miion.75 7
"No other country applies economic sanctions against Cuba," 758
and in 1995 the U.N. General Assembly for the third consecutive year
condemned the U.S. embargo.7"9 "Almost every government in the
756. Id.
757. Olga Miranda, Cuba Ha Satisfecho con Puntualidad sus Obligaciones de Pago por
Nacionalizaciones, in Cuba Transition Workshop, supra note 119, at 32, 36. In general,
these claims have been settled at a fraction of the assessed value of the expropriated assets.
Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 220 (citing Cuba to Compensate Spanlards for Property
Seizures, Reuters, Feb. 15, 1994). The Spanish claims, for example, were valued at $350
million. The settlement paid $37.6 million. Id. "Even this amount was not actually paid
until 1994, three decades after the claims accrued." Id.
758. Banales, supra note 715. The Organization of American States lifted the
mandatory sanctions on Cuba in 1975. See Boris Yopo H., Latin American Perspectives on
the Cuban Transition, 3 CUBA BRIEFING PAPER SERIES 1 (1993).
759. General Assembly Adopts Draft on Need to End United States Embargo Against
Cuba, Federal News Service, Nov. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File;
Foreign minister comments on UN Resolution Condemning US Embargo, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Nov. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Top News Library, Bbcwb File;
Banales, supra note 715.
One example of the drastic extraterritorial effects of the embargo occurred in
May 1991. Regor International, a Canadian corporation, incorporated and doing
business in Canada, ordered 29,000 cases of Pepsi from Pepsi Cola Montreal.
Pepsi, however, canceled this order when it learned that the product's final desti-
nation was Cuba. Pepsi-Cola Montreal claimed that due to discussions between
its Canadian office and the U.S. head office, it was unable to fill any orders where
the product was destined for Cuba. The drastic effect on companies incorporated
in Canada and subject to Canadian laws stems from the fact that Canadian for-
eign policy towards Cuba favors trade in non-strategic goods. In response to this
situation, the Canadian Trade Ministry issued a reprimand which stated that the
Canadian government has ... consistently opposed the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. trade policy towards Cuba, either directly by the U.S. government or
through U.S. parent corporations.
Bourque, supra note 149, at 213-14. Bourque also notes that:
Many countries, such as Great Britain, view the (Mack) Amendment and the pol-
icies supporting it, as a violation of their sovereign rights. As evideace of its op-
position, in 1980 Great Britain passed into law The Protection of Trading
Interests Act (PTIA). The PTIA is a response to what many consider to be U.S.
extraterritorial measures. This Act instructs British companies to ignore Ameri-
can laws, such as the Mack Amendment, that affect foreign sovereignty.
l at 217-18. Bourque goes on to assert that:
[T]he European Community also protested the Cuban Democracy Act by stating:
the European Community and its Member States cannot accept the extrater-
ritorial extension of U.S. jurisdiction as a matter of law and policy .... The Bill
... would also prohibit any vessel from engaging in trade with the United States if
the vessel has entered a port in Cuba during the preceding 180 lays. Such a
measure would be in conflict with long-standing rules on comity and international
law ....
Id. at 220 (citing Mary Murray, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. Tin, U.S. BLOCKADE
AGAINST CUBA 21 (1993).
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Western Hemisphere maintains diplomatic and economic relations
with Cuba," among these are "Canada and Mexico, members of the
Arguably, the criticism directed against the United States is well-deserved. The
Torricelli Bill's imposition of sanctions onto third countries violates international
law and encourages the economic isolation of Cuba. In addition, this policy
clearly imposes U.S. domestic law onto sovereign states by making foreign inves-
tors and businessmen suffer should they choose to engage in business relations
with Cuba. The Bill, therefore, removes the element of free choice from business
decisions of companies outside of U.S. territory.
Id. at 220-21.
In March 1974, MILW-Worthington, a Canadian firm, negotiated a contract with Cuba
for approximately $15 million. Bell, supra note 7, at S6. The Canadian government and the
Canadian directors of MLW-Worthington protested the application of the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations (CACR) regulations as a violation of Canadian sovereignty because
of the possible delay that applying for a Treasury license could cause. Id. at 86-S7. The
Canadian government stated:
The Canadian government holds that the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of
the U.S.A. should not be given effect in Canada through the parent-subsidiary
relationship or in any other way... the Canadian Government wishes to empha-
size the significance of this issue and to urge the U.S.A. Government to remove
on an urgent basis any restraint on the directors or officers of MLWV-Worthington,
who are also U.S.A. citizens, which might interfere with the proposed sale of the
Canadian company.
Id
MLW-Worthington completed the contract without U.S. approval and over the
objection of two U.S. directors. The United States eventually granted a waiver
for the sale, but this was apparently connected with a similar problem that the
United States was having with Argentina. Argentine executives of two U.S. for-
eign automobile subsidiaries, Ford and Chrysler, traveled to Cuba during the
early part of 1974 to negotiate a possible sale. The Argentine government stated
that it would consider any United States attempt to block the sale a violation of
Argentine sovereignty. Argentina threatened to nationalize the plants involved
and to proceed independently to fulfill the contract. The United States re-
sponded by granting Argentina a special license, in the interest of good relations
with Argentina.
The United States again deferred to foreign pressure during a third incident,
the Litton affair. Late in 1974, a Canadian subsidiary of Litton Industries, a U.S.
corporation, asked whether the Treasury Department would prohibit a proposed
furniture contract with Cuba. When the Treasury Department stated that it could
deny such an application as violative of the regulations, the U.S. parent company
canceled the sale. In response, the Canadian government pressured the United
States to allow the sale. The United States again relented.
Id. A New York Times reporter notes that French President Francois Mitterrand calls the
U.S. blockade "stupid." Craig R. Whitney, In a Slap at the U.S., Castro Is Given a Warm
Welcome in Paris, N.Y. Tmms, Mar. 14, 1995, at A5. The French have long criticized the
American trade embargo, and more than most other Europeans have gone out of their way
to show their disregard for it. Id. "The U.S.A. has held this country by the throat for
decades," Mitterrand is quoted as saying. Id. "Strangling this people through this em-
bargo no longer has any sense. Id. "It no longer represents any threat to world peace, nor
any threat to the Americans." Id.
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North American Free Trade Agreement."76 Meanwhile, the block-
ade has caused strained relations with traditional American allies in
Europe and elsewhere as evidenced by the U.N. declaration and pro-
Cuba domestic legislation, such as the act passed in Canada.6 More
recently, on September 13, 1995, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, P.J.
Patterson, called for an end to the U.S. embargo on Cuba, declaring
that "the continued isolation... 'cannot be justified' in a post-Cold
War world. 762 Even the Pope has come out against the embargo.763
Honduran Foreign Minister Mario Carias said Washington sent a
letter to the [Honduran] economy ministry warning that much of
the property being bought by Honduran investors in Cuba actually
belongs to Cuban exiles and U.S. citizens-and is subject to expro-
priation claims. According to the... United States, legal proceed-
ings to recover these properties 'will be initiated the moment the
Fidel Castro regime falls.' 7 6 4
With the more recent passage of the Helms-Burton law, the
United States has received criticism of the embargo and its extraterri-
torial impacts from Japan, the European Union, the fourteen Carib-
bean countries, the Rio Group of fourteen Latin American countries,
Mexico and Canada.765
VI. Analysis
A. The U.S.-Cuba Property Rights Dispute
Settlement of the property dispute with the United States will be
a precondition for sustainable development and normalization. One
precedent potentially similar to the Cuban case is Nicaragua. That
country transferred power from the Sandinistas to the UNO coalition
760. Banales, supra note 715; Bourque, supra note 149, at 213-14.
761. For a discussion on how the U.S. embargo has impacted U.S.-Canada relations, see
Bell, supra note 7, at 95.
762. Gus Constantine, Jamaica's Patterson Asks End to Cuban Policy, VASH. TIimES,
Sept. 14, 1995, at All. In a similar statement, President of Venezuela C'Xlos Andrs Prez
criticized then President Reagan, saying "we must not permit a new confrontation between
Cuba and the rest of Latin America. . .we must promote coexistence with a regime [that
is] different from ours, but which is an integral part of Latin America." Yopo H., supra
note 758, at 1.
763. Greg McDonald & Cecile S. Holmes, Pope Tells U.S. to be 'Example': Clinton
Gives Welcome Upon Pontiff's 4th Visit, HoUSTON CHRON., Oct. 5, 1995 at Al, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Hchrn File.
764. Honduras: United States Warns Against Investing in Cuba, Oct. 19, 1993, Inter
Press Service, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
765. Swardson, supra note 740, at A20; The Americas: Falling out with Uncle Sam, supra
note 740, at 47.
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in 1990, ending a decade-long civil war and beginning a process of
reconciliation.766 Donors again began to operate there and a U.S. em-
bargo was lifted. However, as time went on, U.S. foreign aid and sup-
port for loans to Nicaragua through multilateral institutions (like the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank) were made contingent on resolution of prop-
erty claims for U.S. citizens.767 It appears in regard to Cuba, that
resolution of the property dispute may be a precondition to receiving
any assistance, rather than a condition for continued aid.
U.S. claims in Cuba approved by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission in 1972 reflect a concentration of assets among the larg-
est former owners. The top ten corporate claims account for about
half of the $1.8 billion.76s The top fifteen claims reflect about two-
thirds of all claims.769 Most of these expropriated properties have not
been subject to improvements, nor have they been parceled.770
Therefore, some former owners view recovery of the original asset as
a real source of compensation. 7 ' It has not been determined what
impact UBPCs are having in conserving the original confiscated
parcels.
So far the approach to the property dispute has been character-
ized by polarization, posturing, and politicization. 7 To date, little has
766. Nicaraguan Propero Disputes, supra note 753, at 1.
767. Id. at ii (preface).
768. Top claimants include the following: Cuban Electric Company (S267.6 million),
International Telephone and Telegraph ($130.7 million), North American Sugar Industries
($100.9 million), Moa Bay Mining Company (SSS.3 million), United Fruit (S$5.1 million),
West Indies Sugar ($84.9 million), American Sugar ($31.0 million), Standard Oil (S71.6
million), Bangor Punta Corporation ($53.4 million), and Francisco Sugar (52.6 million).
See Rolando FL Castafieda & George Plinio Montalvdin, Economic Factors in Selecting an
Approach to Expropriation Claims in Cuba, in Cuba Transition Workshop, supra note 119,
at 4.
769. The 11th through 15th companies included Texaco ($50.1 million), Manatf Sugar
($48.6 million), Nicaro Nickel Company ($33.0 million), Coca-Cola (S27.5 million), and
Lone Star Cement ($24.9 million). Id.
770. IL
771. Id.
772. For example, U.S. Congressman Lincoln Dfaz-Balart, a Republican from Florida,
issued a press release denouncing Cuban foreign investment legislation as "an immoral
farce" the day after it was passed. See Lincoln Dfaz-Balart, Dfaz-Balart Denounces Castro
Foreign Investment Farce, in Cong. Press Releases (Sept. 6, 1995), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Hlllpr File. That press release cites Yanik Fenton as the contact prson for
information. Id. On September 11, 1995, the author contacted Ms. Fenton regarding the
announcement. According to her, neither the Congressman nor any member of his staff
had a copy of the new law, nor had any of them seen it. Telephone Interview by Steven E.
Hendrix with Yanik Fenton, advisor to Congressman Lincoln Diaz.Balart (Sept. 11, 1995).
However, Ms. Fenton insisted the law was a "farce" and did not see any reason why the
1996]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
been done to explore technical approaches or the adequacy of prop-
erty records to verify ownership as a prerequisite for dispute resolu-
tion. Also, closer examination of past compensation by Cuba to other
countries, and how such amounts were calculated, will be essential.
The following questions must be answered: Was that process viewed
as fair? What was the level of compensation? How was compensation
calculated? Was any interest paid? How did those settlement ar-
rangements compare with those granted by the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics? Hungary? Poland? Russia? Nicaragua? Ib date, these
analyses have been done largely in the abstract, rather than by techni-
cal comparison of the present state of Cuba disputes with these other
experiences.
Congressman needed to read the law to come to that conclusion. Id. After all, she rea-
soned, Cuba is Communist. Id
As points of comparison, Honduras paid between 2% and 6% per annum over 15 to
25 years. See Agrarian Reform Law, Decree Law No. 120 art. 67 (G.O. 21.564, Aug. 2,
1975) (Hond.). Bolivia was required to pay 2% over 25 years. See Agrarian Reform Law,
Decree Law No. 3464 art. 156 (Aug. 2, 1953) (Bol.). In fact, in Bolivia no official compen-
sation was ever paid nor have any agrarian bonds been issued. See Ronald J. Clark, Agra-
rian Reform: Bolivia, in LAr REFonxi IN LAmN AmmuCA 129, 138 (Peter Dorner ed.,
1971). Peru used 4% to 6% over 20 to 30 years. See Decree Law No. 17716 art. 174,
Supreme Decree No. 877 (July 18, 1979) (Bol.). Chile paid in bonds over 25 to 30 years.
See Thome, supra note 301, at 197. Other Latin American countries had similar programs.
In comparison, the Italian land reform program of 1947 called for compensation with
25 year bonds at five percent interest. See Vicnlm CAsANovA, supra note 55, at 126. In
Peru, Bolivia, and elsewhere, the law on the books might have called for compensation, but
in practice there were cases of de facto takeovers of property, with the former owner never
receiving any indemnification or even due process. In fact, Bolivia, has offered no official
compensation nor ever has issued any bonds. See Clark, supra, at 138. In other countries,
for those that did receive compensation, the fixed rates of interest were often eroded with
inflation. Bonds often have traded at a fraction of face value, reflecting the discount for
political and economic risk. Cuba's case should be understood in this broader, regional
context of similar experiments with agrarian reform.
General Fulgencio Batista's 1952 coup partially suspended the 1940 Constitution and
constituted an extraconstitutional assumption of power. See Fernando L. Torres Ramirez,
Comentarios e Impresiones de Algunas Instituciones y Normas Jurfdicas de la Repablica de
Cuba, 28 REVISTA DE DERECHO PuERToRR QuEt o 2,3 (1988); Gutirrcz, supra note 119,
at 2-3. One author argues that acts after March 9, 1952 and before 195.9 are prima fade
invalid because the constitutional process was not followed. See Nestor Cruz, Legal Issues
Raised by the Transition: Cuba from Marxism to Democracy, 29 Cohip. JuRm. REv. 68, 74
(1992).
A group of Cuban jurists living in exile maintain that the 1940 Constitution is still in
effect and bases this argument on the procedure used in replacing the old constitution with
the new constitution through 1959 Fundamental Law. Compare Consuegra-Barqufn, supra
note 109, at 898-99 with Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 237-38 (noting that it is "generally
accepted that a successful revolution has the power, under certain conditions, to annul the
existing constitution and create new fundamental law") (citing law in Pakistan, Canada,
Ghana, Lesotho, and Trankei). See also Baerg, supra note 105, at 247.
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STEREOTYPED 7 7 3 LEGAL POSMONS: CUBA VS. UNrTED STATES ON THE M.AJOR
CONTENTION POINTS.
Issue: Cuba: United States:
Was adequate Yes. Cuban agrarian reform No. Expropriation demands
compensation bonds paid 4.5% interest over compensation at fair market
offered? 20 years, compared to bonds value. Even in comparative
issued under Gen. Douglas Latin American terms, the
MacArthur's agrarian reform Cuban agrarian reform did
in Japan, which paid interest not compensate former
at 2.5% over 24 years. owners as other countries did
in carrying out their agrarian
reforms.
Was adequate The law contemplated funding No. Cuba structured its
compensation compensation out of U.S. repayment mechanism
actually paid? sugar quota purchases. As knowing the sugar quota had
this was discontinued, the already been canceled.
U.S. ended the funding
mechanism for compensation.
What is the U.S. figures should be The Cuban claims program of
value of discounted due to damages the Foreign Claims Settlement
claims and losses inflicted on the Commission reviewed 8,816
outstanding? Cuban economy by the U.S. claims, certifying 5,911
This includes the blockade. ($1.8B), denying 1,195
Further, any settlement (S1.5B), and dismissing 1,710.
should recognize and reflect FCSC decided that a statutory
the price paid by workers simple interest rate of 6%
who lost their properties to should be used, although the
the Batista officials who took Cuban Claims Act did not
their lands illegally in the specify a rate.
years 1952-1959.
N.B.: U.S. claimants have
sometimes taken deductions
from their taxes for losses in
Cuba. Additional
compensation at this point
I could mean double payment.
773. The word "stereotyped" is used intentionally in the chart's heading. These are not
the official positions of either government. However, this chart does attempt to summariz,
possible anticipated positions. The Cuban position is summarized by Olga Miranda, Vice
President of the Cuban Society of International Law. See Miranda, supra note 757, at 32;
see also Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 235; Consuegra-Barqufn, supra note 109, at S9S.
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Were takings
legal in the
first place
under the
1940
Constitution?
No, because takings require
compensation and due
process.
Yes, as the Constitution
forbade large estates and
insisted on the "social
function" of land. Regional
jurisprudence approved
agrarian reform legislation.
Indeed such an approach had
the backing of the U.S.
Alliance for Progress in the
1960s. Changes made to the
1940 Constitution via the
Fundamental Law allow for
the takings of property,
especially those inconsistent
with the social function.
Yes. The 1940 Constitution
had been abrogated by
Batista who assumed the
presidency in violation of the
Constitution. The revolution
sought to restore the rule of
law. Indeed, the Cuban
Supreme Court held the 1959
Fundamental Law to have
succeeded the 1940
Constitution.
Further, the agrarian reform
law provisions are consistent
with the 1940 Constitution.
Thus, the agrarian reform was
a constitutional act, whether
the 1940 Constitution or the
1959 Fundamental Law
applies.
In the end, the political will of the parties, rather than the
strength of their legal claims, will decide the actual settlement; legal
arguments will only be bargaining chips. In Mexico, the government
carried out an ambitious agrarian reform and expropriated vast
amounts of property, especially U.S. investments in the petroleum
sector, without resulting in an embargo. 7 In Eastern Europe, lump
sum agreements were offered to many countries shortly after the fall
774. Regarding the Mexican case, one author writes:
To this day Cardenas represents the promise of a "Mexico for the Mexicans." By
the end of his administration, the role of foreign capital had dimini;hed substan-
tially: in 1940 total direct foreign investment in Mexico was under 500 million
dollars, less than one-quarter of most estimates for the 1920s. "Of the four areas
traditionally dominated by foreign capital-railroads, oil, mining, and electric
power-foreign control had been eliminated from the first two. Foreign enter-
prise still controlled the mining and electric power industries... but even in those
fields the amount of foreign capital had been reduced.
No. The Fundamental Law
was announced in a manner
inconsistent with the way in
which the 1940 Constitution
specified that amendments or
changes were to be made.
The 1940 Constitution was
never effectively repealed and
the Fundamental Law and
subsequent con3titutions are
invalid because they did not
conform to the procedures
described in Articles 285 and
286 of the 1940 document.
Laws deriving their authority
from the Fundamental Law
are thus invalid.
Was the
Fundamental
Law a valid
constitutional
change?
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of the Berlin Wall, allowing those governments to cash out claims.775
Like Cuba, Nicaragua suffered an embargo. More recently, it has had
to pay individual claims on a case by case basis, with the United States
demanding fair market value for all its citizens, past and present.776
The deal Cuba receives will depend mainly on the politics of that
moment.
Much of the focus so far has been on Eastern European models
as precedent for any future compensation program leading to normali-
zation. Yet the Cuban agrarian reform contains many of the same
provisions that many Latin American reforms have had: the social
function of land, restrictions on alienation, and preference for cooper-
ative structure." 7 The United States has categorized Cuba with East-
ern Europe, thinking of Cuba as a state that is tied to Russia. U.S.
authors have largely ignored many relevant models closer to home
and more similar in structure and history to the Cuban case. Peru,
Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, El Salvador, Chile, Nicara-
Cardenas's last two years in office brought "severe economic difficulty."
Several factors-among them, the expropriation of the oil industry, bitter coun-
terattacks in the press by foreign companies, and retaliatory economic sanctions
against Mexico ....
Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cyclea The Link Between Markets and
Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. Rv" 223, 230-31(1995) (citations
omitted).
775. For example, Hungary paid about $20 million to the United States to sttle all
outstanding claims with U.S. citizens, however, this payment %vas largely s:mbolic. S2
Laszlo Takacs, Embassy of Hungary, Presentation at the Organization of American States
(Washing.ton, D.C., Sept. 18, 1992).
776. At the time of Nicaraguan President Chamorro's inauguration, less than 20 U.S.
citizens had filed property claims with the U.S. government. Nicaraguan Property Dis-
putes, supra note 753, at 3. In 1995, the State Department had over 600 perons claiming
1631 properties on file. Id. at 2. Only 501, or 31%, of those properties v ere owned by U.S.
citizens at the time of expropriation or confiscation. Id. "The remainder %ere o0,ned by
Nicaraguans who subsequently became naturalized U.S. citizens. Id. at 3. Claims %, ere
approved by the United States in 1972, capping the number of outstanding claims against
claims and making the problem more manageable. Id. However, a Nicaragua-like result
could occur in Cuba with the bill introduced in the U.S. Congress, uhich provides relief
sought by new Cuban Americans. Travieso-Dfaz, supra note 24, at 223. The LIBERTAD
Act, amends the Cuba Claims Act to allow U.S. citizens to file expropriation claims against
Cuba whether or not the claimants were U.S. citizens at the time of expropriation. Id. It
would also enable any U.S. citizen whose property was confiscated to bring action in U.S.
district courts against any third country person or government that "traffics" (defined as
"sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, purchases, receives, possesses, obtains control of,
manages, uses, or disposes of") the expropriated property. ld. (citing Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, 5.3S1, 104th Cong., 1st Ses., §§ 4(7),
302, 303 (1995)).
777. The concept of "land to the tiller" is found in Article 24 of the 1992 Cuban Consti-
tution. 1992 CoNsTrr-rboN art. 24.
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gua,778 the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Honduras and others
should be reviewed in terms of their historic compensation methods,
bond structures, and other features. If much of the text of the Cuban
reform is repeated in these other countries, perhaps a balanced solu-
tion can be found in Cuba as well.
B. Privatization
Opening industry and agriculture to the private sector appears
necessary, based on comparative experiences in other countries. Irene
Philippi, Senior Economist at Polyconomics, Inc., argues that a quasi-
privatization process "can be said to have already begun, with the em-
ulation of the successful Chinese conversion of its farming communes
to democratically run cooperatives." According to Philippi,
[T]he process could be enhanced by relinquishing even more power
over policy decisions at the co-ops from the center, which appears to
[her] to be the real key to China's success in agriculture. Privatiza-
tion of large enterprises should not be rushed. Shock therapy has
not succeeded in Russia or Eastern Europe, and there i,. no reason
to believe that hurling Cuba into the 'free market abys;' could be
accomplished with better results. A new economy should be built
parallel to the old, enabling the new to replace the old over time.
Asset values should be permitted to reflect the declining political
risk and improving business climate before these companies are
sold. In this way, the people of Cuba will reap the value of Cuban
properties, rather than seeing them squandered in hard currency
sales to foreign speculators.779
778. Nicaragua has sometimes been explored, perhaps in the belief that the Sandinista
government was a "Communist" one. Yet, like Cuba, Nicaragua's reform package re-
flected much more influence from Mexican, Chilean, Bolivian, Peruvian, Cuban, and Co-
lombian agrarian reform legislation than from Russia.
779. Philippi Testimony, supra note 755, at 29. For a lengthy discussion of the privatiza-
tion process in China regarding agricultural properties, see Transition of China's Rural
Land System 151, Land Tenure Center Paper (May 1995) (paper on file with the Land
Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin).
One commentator wrote that:
Whether or not the Chinese model should be an antidote or an alternative to
'shock therapy,' its success at the very least indicates that before countries such as
Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, Russia and others from the ex-Soviet Union be-
come the testing grounds for 'shock therapy,' this all-too-common prescription
for ailing transitional economies should be subjected to further scrutiny.
Lan Cao, The Cat that Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Domnant Privatizatlon
Model, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 97, 178 (1995). Geralyn Pye argues that Cuba looks to China
and Vietnam as examples in its modernization process. See Pye, supra note 412, at 7, 10.
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Others point to Chile's relatively successful conversion from mar-
ket intervention to free market principles. In that country, the change
was accompanied by accelerated economic growth. This would sup-
port a faster, more dramatic privatization, more in conformity with
standard International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions for priva-
tizing. In short, Cuba will have to decide whether an incremental,
slow path to privatization is better, as in the Chinese model, or if a
quicker pace would produce better results, as in Chile.
In discussions of private versus public ownership, it should be
noted that empirical studies in Cuba have failed to provide a compre-
hensive comparison of private versus public sector productivity.7
The state has been the dominant factor in agricultural production.7 1
During the first years of the Revolution, French agronomist Ren6 Du-
mont found that the newly created state enterprises were overly large,
poorly organized and managed, and wasteful. 7" He was unimpressed
with Cuba's private sector as well.7 In more recent times, govern-
ment officials have maintained that economies of scale and centralized
planning would facilitate the introduction of capital-intensive techno-
logical innovations.7M Yet, it is clear that state farms suffer from poor
management and a lack of incentives for workers in the fields.7 s5
C. Registry and Cadastral Reform
A literature review has uncovered no reviews or evaluations of
registry or cadastral systems in Cuba. This is alarming for many rea-
sons. First, normalization of relations with the United States depends,
in part, on resolution of property disputes. To the extent accurate
property records are needed to address this issue, a diagnostic of reg-
istry records will be needed. Any dispute resolution strategy should
depend on the perceived reliability and precision of the existing
records.7s 6
780. Nancy Forster, Cuban Agricultural Productivity, in CUBAN Co.MUNIs!.I, supra
note 139, at 196, 202.
781. Id. at 201.
782. Id.
783. Id
784. Id at 200.
785. Id
786. For a similar but more detailed discussion of this same point in Venezuela, see
Steven E. Hendrix, Tenure Insecurity in Venezuela: Empirical Data on the Faihre of Codas-
tral and Registry Systems in the Reformed Agrarian Sector, 55 SuRv. & LAND INFO. SYs. 92,
92-98 (1995).
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More generally, free market systems are based on private prop-
erty ownership. Registries are where interests in real estate property
are recorded. If the registries are in order, any transition toward a
market economy will go more smoothly than if they are in disrepair.
In this sense, registries are usually the requisite informational infra-
structure of market-oriented development strategies that include mas-
sive foreign investment and tenure security.
In the longer term, if Cuba wishes to convert from its folio per-
sonal system to a parcel-based system, like the folio real, it will need
up-to-date survey data.78 7 This same information will be required to
establish the base layers of any future multipurpose cadastre. The
strategy for modernization of land records management will depend in
large measure on the existence of and level of confidence in current
records. This subject demands immediate attention.
Finally, it is perhaps axiomatic that tenure security is vital for in-
vestment.7s  Consequently, the Cuban government should try to
avoid insecurity of ownership. Yet, in any reversal of present policy in
Cuba, that is precisely what might happen. In Bolivia, for example,
R.J. Clark writes:
Many current land conflicts between peasants and e,-landlords
have arisen because of confusion and inefficiency in the expropria-
tioni process....
In many situations, peasants harbor resentment and feel very
insecure vis-A-vis the landlord. They remember the power of the
landlord in the pre-reform period, and many fear that he will be
able to take their lands because they do not yet have clear title.
Landlords often exploit and foster this uncertainty by threaten-
ing to repossess their land and by telling the peasants they will
never get titles, especially now that ex-President Paz Estenssoro is
out of power. In a few cases landlords have disguised peasants and
urban residents as soldiers or police and sent them to demand pay-
ment for land to which they no longer have legal rights. Sometimes
787. The regional tendency is towards parcel-based systems. The following countries
either have or are moving to the folio real system (or land registration, if under the British
system, rather than the civil code): Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Jamaica, among others.
788. In Nicaragua, the IMF believes investment has failed to return to the country due
to tenure insecurity resulting from the removal of the Sandinistas from power. Current
owners wonder whether they will be kicked off their land. Former owvrs seek return of
assets or indemnification. While there is indecision, there is no investment. See William C,
Thiesenhusen & Steven E. Hendri, Poverty and Progress: The Cases oJ' El Salvador and
Nicaragua, 17 HARV. INT'L REV. 16, 19, 59-61 (1995); J. David Stanfield and Steven E.
Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua, 22 CAP. UNiv. L. REv. 939, 939-51 (1993).
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the peasants, confused and bewildered after waiting so long for land
titles, are willing to agree to almost anything. As a result, some
peasants have purchased their own land-sometimes at inflated
prices-in search of the security that a vigorous program of title
distribution and enforcement could have provided.Y" 9
Such a result should alert the Cuban government and interna-
tional donor assistance agencies. Like Bolivia, confusion or informal-
ity in the original expropriation process, combined with later lack of
titling, may later result in tenure insecurity for current landholders.
D. Tenure Policy and Sustainable Development
A broad tenure policy to promote long-term sustainable develop-
ment will be critical, especially in the early stages of any new market-
oriented initiative. Cuba still suffers from inefficient land use and de-
ficient land access for the resource poor. National and international
investors will need institutional confidence in the land management
system before investing the massive amounts of money Cuba will need
to strengthen its economy and put people to work. In this regard, a
well-articulated land tenure strategy will be crucial. Such a strategy
could include land market activation, land and mortgage banks, prop-
erty taxation, registry and cadastral reform, zoning, land use planning,
and privatization. New property legislation should also be considered
to promote investment while streamlining and simplifying the process.
Nevertheless, Cuba must be attentive to both public and private
needs. A balance of these interests should be explored. This should
provide sufficient tenure security to owners, while allowing the gov-
ernment flexibility in environmental regulation,79 eminent domain,
and other historic state interests.
789. Ronald J. Clark, Problems and Conflicts over Land Ownership in Bolivia, 22 Ir.
TER-Am. ECON. AFFArRS 3, 6-7 (1969) (reprinted as LTC Reprint No. 54, on file vith tha
Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin). Else%vhere, Clark wites that in
one case, land was not worked for fourteen years after the agrarian reform. Clark, supra
note 772, at 143. The former landlord was particularly abusive and still wanted the peas-
ants to work his remaining land for him under the pre-reform system. Id. The era was
noted for confusion rather than tenure security. Id.
790. Advancement of environmental law often conflicts wvith privatization goals. See,
e.g., Theodore S. Boone, Environmental Regulations and the Privatization Process (unpub-
lished manuscript presented at the American Bar Association, Section of International
Law and Practice). On the other hand, low incentives for resource conservation that char-
acterize state farms in Cuba are leading to rapid reduction in the stock of soil resources.
See Hdctor Sdez, Technology, Institutions, and Land Degradation: A Case Study of Santo
Domingo, Cuba, Presentation at LASA Meeting, supra note 412, at 1.
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VII. Conclusions
This Article has provided a legal history of recent Cuban prop-
erty law, highlighting expropriations and confiscations since 1959, the
dispute with the United States, and the general agrarian reform struc-
ture. In many respects, the Cuban agrarian reform and property con-
fiscations are similar to other regional tenure changes and should be
understood in this context. While the rhetoric may have focused on
East-West stereotypes, Cuban agrarian reform legislation is represen-
tative of the Latin American and Caribbean region.
While other articles have focused on the lack of compensation,
few authors have noted that many of the lands now claimed by U.S.
citizens were actually banned by the 1940 Constitution, which out-
lawed large estates. Perhaps the rhetoric clouded earlier reviews of
the merits of these cases. Still, it appears that even the Cubans recog-
nize some compensation remains due, as they have settled with all
other countries to which indemnification was owed.
Today, a U.S. embargo continues against Cuba, due in part to the
property claims of U.S. citizens. Castro's government expropriated
property under dubious conditions with little compensation. Yet, as
has been shown, just fifteen claimants represent about two-thirds of
all claims in dollar figures. It may well be that the vast majority of
these claimants have already received compensation in the form of tax
deductions in the United States and any further indemnification
would amount to double payment. It remains an open question
whether the estates were lawfully confiscated under prerevolutionary
law. Further, these investors invested in Cuba knowing the risks while
making handsome profits. Should U.S. foreign policy now be tailored
to a special interest group of former large estate holders and political
opponents? Such an approach perpetuates the Cold War ideology and
runs counter to U.S. interests in positive engagement with the Cuban
people for peace, democratization, and economic growth. It also de-
nies U.S. investors opportunities in agriculture, tourism, pharmaceuti-
cals, and other attractive industries in Cuba, while injuring Cuba's
poor and disadvantaged the most.
Based on this initial description of Cuba's property law, it is
hoped policymakers can approach tenure policy in a more technical
and nuanced fashion, providing opportunities for more scientific, less
political solutions. It is fully recognized that tenure policy has become
so politicized that final resolution will depend on Cuban and U.S. poli-
tics; still, tenure policies to address compensation or privatization mat-
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ters should not lose sight of the longer term development goals of the
island nation. Such interests should be taken up in a tenure strategy
that promotes sustainable development and participatory growth.

